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Abstract 
 
Road safety is regarded as one of the most significant public health issues in the world.  
In Ireland, strategies for the mitigation of the effects of road traffic accidents appear in 
policy documents such as the Road Safety Strategy which is then disseminated via 
various media outlets.  Such an approach highlights the centrality of mediation in the 
social acceptance of policy initiatives, relying on an assumption of media-centricity – 
that the mainstream media are central to social formation.  This thesis problematizes 
this assumption.  Drawing together the disparate elements of a dispositif of road safety 
in the under-researched Irish setting, this study explores the complex range of actors 
implicated in the mediation of policy.  It examines the mediated policy context of the 
worst road accident in Irish history, as well as the introduction of a network of speed 
cameras, to explore how policy initiatives output in print media reports, as well as 
online discussion.  Through analysis of car-commuters’ focus group interactions, it also 
examines the ways in which mediated policy understandings are immanent and circulate 
in how car-commuters talk about their commuting practices. 
 
The study highlights how mediated policy actions attempt to curb the unfettered 
expression of car-based freedoms through the construction of individual responsibility 
as the ultimate expression of road safety.  However, commuters’ freedoms are also 
shaped and constrained by responsibilities in terms of work, study, and family, as well 
as by the types of social action automobility makes conceivable, facilitates, and 
disrupts.  In addition, the research shows that while rational choices and rationality are a 
dominant framework within policy contexts, mediation about road safety is actually 
enmeshed in multiple rationalities that surface as circumstances require.  Exploration of 
driving practices reveals how commuters are nodes in their own networks of 
rationalities around automobility that adhere and disjoin to varying degrees with the 
concerns of media representation.  The study also highlights the mainstream media 
consensus constructed around speed cameras, even though forms of resistance to this 
consensus manifest, especially online.  Commuters’ car-based activities can often also 
be resistant to discourses of road safety.  Yet commuters fight to defend the space and 
time spent on forms of work performed in the car that reinforce the exigencies of 
neoliberalism. Overall, the thesis finds that media are but one of the many sets of actors 
that constitute the complex networks of neoliberal automobility in Ireland.  
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Introduction:  The dispositif of road safety, media-centrism, and the context of the car  
 
The car is ubiquitous in social, economic, and geographic landscapes, as well as in 
culture (Featherstone, 2005).  Urry (2005, p. 25) argues that the car is more “systemic 
and awesome in its consequences than what are normally viewed as constitutive 
technologies of the global, such as the cinema, television and especially the computer”.  
More than one billion cars were produced in the 20th century (Urry, 2005).  Global car 
production has increased from more than 61 million vehicles in 2009 to almost 90 
million units in 2014, despite the effects of global recession (oica.net, 2015), and car 
sales are judged by news media as a bell-weather of national economic health (McAleer, 
2015).   
 
Benefits associated with the car are harmful because of the costs associated with what 
the automobile necessitates (Conley and McLaren, 2009, p. 3).  The external costs of 
the car include congestion, ecological sustainability, oil dependency, and road traffic 
accidents – what Bohm, et al. (2006, pp. 9-10) characterise as the car’s antagonisms.  
Indeed, road safety is regarded as “one of the world’s largest public health and safety 
issues” (National Crime Council, 2015).  Road traffic accidents claim the lives of 1.24 
million people globally per annum (WHO, 2013) while 196 people died on the roads in 
Ireland in 2014 (The Irish Times, 2015a).  
 
In Ireland, strategies for the mitigation of the car’s excesses appear in policy documents 
published by the Road Safety Authority (RSA) such as the Road Safety Strategy 2007-
2012 (RSA, 2007).  The RSA was set up on 1st September 2006 (RSA, 2007, p. 16) as a 
“common response to an ‘urgent need’ at a particular historical moment” (Thiele, 1986, 
p. 255): that is the problem of road safety in Ireland.  The functions of the RSA were 
transferred from the Department of Transport, the National Roads Authority (NRA), 
and the National Safety Council and it was organised into three directorates with 
responsibility for “driver testing and training”, “road safety, research and driver 
education”, and “standards and enforcement” (RSA, 2007, p. 16).  The Road Safety 
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Strategy notes that “the print, broadcast and electronic media play a critical role in 
communicating road safety issues and maintaining road safety as a priority social issue 
in this country” (RSA 2007, p.  21).  It also acknowledges that the success of the 
strategy relies on political commitment, supporting legislation, proper funding for safety 
initiatives and engineering measures, as well as public support (RSA, 2007, p. 21).  In 
reality, the aspirations of policy are articulated and filtered through a potentially 
ambivalent news media, popular cultural texts, and the everyday experiences of the 
users of the car-system – who ostensibly can accept, alter, and reject such strategies – as 
well as through the operation of other actors, such as the enforcement actions of the 
Gardai for example.   
 
Government strategies that highlight the media’s criticality to social acceptance of 
policy initiatives rely on an assumption of media-centricity: that mainstream media 
institutions are central to social formation (Couldry, 2004, 2012).  But this assumption 
needs to be problematized.  The articulations of strategy concerns through the media 
and experiences of the users of the car-system must be investigated in order to “make 
strange” this notion and to demonstrate the limits of government strategies and 
conceptualisations of how the car and the networks it necessitates are actually lived.  
The following study attempts to comprehend better the actual “assemblage” of car-
drivers (Dant, 2005) and the system of the car considered as “automobility” (Sheller and 
Urry, 2000; Urry, 2005) to problematize a media-centred view of how these networks 
are constituted in Ireland.  The concept of the assemblage considers cars and drivers 
together as social beings that produce a range of actions associated with the car that 
cannot be produced by the car or driver considered separately (Dant, 2005, p. 61).  
Automobility is defined as “‘a self-organizing autopoetic, nonlinear system’ which links 
together cars, car-drivers, roads, petroleum supplies and other ‘novel objects, 
technologies and signs’ in an expanding relatively stable system which generates 
unintended consequences”, and where the car is not a discrete object (Featherstone, 
2005, p. 2 citing Urry, 2005, p. 27).   
 
However, despite its extraordinary costs and consequences, the automobile has been the 
subject of comparative academic indifference for more than 125 years (Featherstone, 
2005, p. 1; Urry, 2005).  This lack has influenced many writers who have sought to 
account for the car within the context of their own academic milieu in disciplines such 
as sociology, cultural studies, and political theory, for example (including Sachs 1984; 
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Dant and Martin, 2001; Gilroy, 2001; Maxwell, 2001; Miller, 2001; Edensor, 2005; 
Featherstone, 2005; Urry, 2005; Rajan, 2006).  Conley and McLaren (2009, p. 3) note 
that more recent academic interest in the car is borne in part from “the gnawing sense of 
the growing risks and troubles associated with automobile-dominated transportation”.  
The car is still both the “product and producer of modernity” (Rajan, 2006, p. 113) and 
the subject of the theoretical twinning of mobility and modernity in social science 
(Beckman, 2005, p. 82).  For example, for Keohane, Kuhling, and Horgan (2002, p. 48), 
the Irish experience of modernity “is ongoing, uneven, and fed by many sources” and 
their discussion of road traffic accidents offers a conduit into social actions shaped by 
the car and also what these mean for the Irish experience of modern society.   
 
The car and its practices may be “the most important modern development that could 
fulfil the unremitting liberal demand for individual autonomy” (Rajan, 2006, p. 113).  
But the meanings of the way in which lives are shaped around the car and how the car is 
shaped by society remain under-researched and under-explored in the social sciences 
and humanities, particularly in the Irish context.  This general lack includes a neglect of 
the everyday lived experience of the car, as well as exploration of its mediated 
discourses that articulate the policy strategies which attempt to curb the car’s worst 
excesses.  How life with the car seems shaped around people’s needs, how its 
contingent demands are perpetuated, and the ways in which the exigencies of strategies 
designed to mitigate its well-publicised antagonisms are accommodated may account 
for the car’s persistence in the face of its continued promulgation of social, economic, 
environmental, and public health costs (Conley and McLaren, 2009, p. 3).  This study 
seeks to address the lack, to explore some of the meanings related to the car and what 
they have to say about the way lives are lived in contemporary Ireland. 
 
The dispositif of road safety 
 
The Road Safety Strategy document states that the RSA’s establishment represented:  
 
the first time such an extensive and important range of road safety related 
functions has been vested in one statutory body. It enables the RSA to co-
ordinate and implement a series of interdependent road safety initiatives in a 
way that has not been possible before now. (RSA, 2007, p. 16) 
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The first primary action of the Road Safety Strategy was to attempt a reduction in the 
number and severity of traffic accidents, but the second and third highlighted the 
implementation of mass-media campaigns about road safety and their integration “with 
the policing plans of An Garda Siochana and other enforcement agencies” to this end 
(RSA, 2007, p. 53).  The enforcement actions of the strategy prioritised the publication 
of an annual Garda road safety plan and the roll-out of the Garda Traffic Corps and then 
listed a comprehensive range of specific targets aimed at increasing the compliance of 
drivers with speed limits.  To enforce these targets, the action plan cites the 
implementation of a “Safety Camera Network in the region of 6,000 hours enforcement 
per month”, targeted to be completed by the second quarter of 2008 (RSA, 2007, p. 57).   
 
The strategy notes that its own success depended “on the support of the community it 
serves and road users in particular” (RSA, 2007, p. 28).  The first three education policy 
actions of the strategy underline the importance of the mainstream media in achieving 
the stated primary action – that is, ostensibly, saving lives.  In relation to the safety 
cameras and other potentially controversial actions such as penalty points and 
mandatory alcohol testing, the strategy states that these actions require major public 
awareness campaigns “to make all road users aware of the role of the cameras in 
enhancing their safety” (RSA, 2007, p. 28).  The risk in implementing these actions, 
according to the strategy, was that the support of the community and road users would 
be lost if they were not “experienced as reasonable and proportionate to the lives saved 
and the injuries avoided” (RSA, 2007, p. 28).    
 
What is described here are the elements of a dispositif being formed in relation to road 
safety in Ireland – that is a “heterogeneous ensemble of discursive and non-discursive 
elements… manifested in laws, discourses, institutions, philosophical statements, 
architectural forms, and so forth” (Foucault, 1976; Thiele, 1986, p. 255; Rabinow and 
Rose, 2003, p. 9).  The dispositif links together actors and objects in a sense of 
ideological coherence about a social problem.  The co-ordination of elements in 
response to the problem of road safety that the Road Safety Strategy represents, such as 
legislation, funding, engineering, education, enforcement, and evaluation measures, as 
well as the media, is the culmination of the RSA and its “stakeholders” coming together 
to orchestrate an Irish “crusade” against road traffic accidents in the most systemic 
manner (RSA, 2007, p. 13; Packer, 2008, p. 31-32).  The prioritisation of the 
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mainstream media’s role for public awareness of road safety indicates its importance to 
the formation of the dispositif and justifies its investigation in this thesis.   
However, even though it represents the melding of the goals of media and government 
and other actors, the RSA’s strategy should not be considered in a vacuum, nor in 
isolation from its contexts and their practices.  Mobilised within the dispositif of road 
safety are popular and news media representations of driving, cars, and road safety 
initiatives themselves.  The dispositif does not begin or end in policy documentation 
then; neither can its discourses be discretely encompassed in Governmental 
publications.  Therefore the investigation of the dispositif of road safety must also 
include the threads of discourses that connect government policy to its reporting and 
interpretation across media forms.  Together, these and other actors shape the actual 
outputs that occur, rather than those that are “planned in advance” (Muntigl, 2002, p. 
48) or are targeted by the strategy itself, which cannot simply enact themselves.   
Packer’s (2008) account of the “crusade for traffic safety” in the US outlined a similar 
starting point.  Packer (2008, p. 28-29) introduces the 1954 crusade as the starting point 
of his analysis of the problematization of the automobile: 
 
according to experts’ evaluations of specific populations, and governmental and 
nongovernmental measures…created to address them specifically… It was, in 
effect, an attempt by the federal government to organize a concerted effort of 
media leaders to advocate and spread the gospel of traffic safety.   
 
This crusade attempted to corral a diverse media (across newspapers, magazines, trade 
journals, radio and television, film, and advertising) in the cause of teaching 
“Americans everywhere to do things for themselves” with respect to road safety 
(Packer, 2008, p. 30).  For Packer (2008, pp. 31-32) the act of reorganising public 
opinion produced “a new popular truth”: 
 
By this I mean that a phenomenon becomes recognized as a serious public 
problem through publicity that identifies it as such and suggests it be dealt with 
through expert explanation.  In essence it becomes a popular truth insofar as it 
creates a sense that reality is adequately represented, that something is amiss and 
must be set right, and most generally, that this is some form of expertise that can 
sufficiently come to grips with the situation.  Furthermore in this instance it was 
recognised that numerous institutions must work together to study the problem 
and orchestrate the crusade.  
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Packer (2008, p. 32) traces “many of the cultural manifestations of this popular truth 
about automobile safety” through a form of problematization:  The crusade for road 
safety represented “a unification in form and focus of investments, practices, and goals 
between government and media regarding traffic safety” (Packer, 2008, p. 32).  It was 
the culmination of existing discourses and was spoken by a wide range of experts; it 
imagined the media as necessary to its goals, set the stage for interventions tasked with 
the alteration of conduct, and presaged the increasingly neoliberal personal 
responsibility approach to road safety in which the lives of others were of secondary 
importance to one’s own (Packer, 2008).  While neoliberalism is open to a range of 
interpretations and meanings, perhaps Fairclough (2003, p. 4) most succinctly defined it 
as “a political project for facilitating the re-structuring and re-scaling of social relations 
in accordance with the demands of an unrestrained global capitalism”.  However, 
neoliberalism has many facets and is thinkable as a discursive formation, governmental 
programme, and ideology or technical assemblage, for example (Gilbert, 2013, p. 7).  
Significantly, neoliberalism extends the logic of the market as a conceptualisation of all 
social interaction and as a response to social problems.  
 
The Irish Road Safety Strategy is also an attempt to unify practices and goals about road 
safety in the way Packer (2008) describes and is one of the critical components of the 
dispositif of road safety in an Irish context.  The strategy brings together a diverse range 
of agencies and international “best practice” and it is provided with resources and 
“leadership” by the government (RSA, 2007, pp. 2-3).  Its critical success factors 
necessitate accountable stakeholders and their collaboration, data sharing, monitoring, 
and evaluation, training and equipment, as well as “marketing, outreach and public 
information” (RSA, 2007, p. 20).  Yet all of these factors are envisioned as inputs into 
the policy, as well as its on-going evaluation and improvement.  In terms of the 
translation of policy outcomes into social action, the media’s role is taken for granted as 
one of transmission of policy actions into lived reality.  But this is based on a 
communicative fallacy in which it is assumed that the frameworks of knowledge which 
encode meaning into the policy strategy will be decoded in the same way by the 
meaning structures and knowledge frameworks of the media – and also of the citizens at 
which the policy is directed (Hall, 1980, p. 136).   
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Media-centrism in the context of Irish road safety narratives and policy 
formation  
 
The idea that social acceptance of the Road Safety Strategy might somehow be willed 
into existence by mainstream media is based on the assumption that media are 
inevitably central to the constitution of society (Couldry 2004, 2012).  Media-centrism 
is “the automatic assumption that media are central to explaining the dynamics of 
contemporary life” (2004, p. 5).  Noting that centres per se, never mind mediated ones, 
“are not a necessary feature of social organisation”, Couldry (2012, p. 22) argues that, 
“rather over time, things have been progressively organised so that…everything goes on 
as if they are necessary” (emphasis in original).  Couldry sees the assumption of media-
centrism as related to the functionalism that views society and culture as a series of 
complex parts that contribute to the operation of a self-sufficient whole.  Such 
functionalism “lives on in media institutions’ discourses about themselves”, where it 
fulfils the purpose of self-justification (Couldry, 2004, p. 2).  Further, the assumption of 
the mediated centre not only plays out in the central social role the media constructs for 
itself, it is also a feature of Media Studies as a discipline (Couldry, 2004).  Couldry 
(2012, p. ix) notes the importance of avoiding the trap of following “Media institutions’ 
underlying interests in sustaining their position as a ‘central’ social infrastructure”, by 
remaining “close to what people…are doing with media”.  For Couldry, this is how “we 
get a grip on media’s relations to society and world”.  
 
Relating this to the context of Irish road safety narratives and policy formation, while 
the Road Safety Strategy shows awareness of how the RSA’s own power to effect its 
plans through the strategy as an instrument of government is contingent on the symbolic 
power of the media, it does not concern itself with whether and how the media can 
construct this, nor what the audiences of these texts, and drivers in action, do with these 
meanings.  It is not that such discussion should appear in a policy strategy document.  
Rather, what is present is the implicit assumption that the media can simply produce 
social reality.  In relation to mainstream media support, the strategy seems to posit the 
notion that if you build “it” – a public awareness campaign – “they” – the driving public 
– will simply come around to your point of view.  In reality, “drivers and vehicles 
perform in, and are constituted through, complex networks of sociality and materiality” 
(Merriman, 2005, p. 158).  They are not constituted wholly by symbolic meaning 
related to the car, policy imaginings, or the media alone, but by a diverse range of 
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actors, symbols, and practices that go to make up the lived reality of road safety. These 
other elements associated with driving practice must be considered to fully understand 
the dispositif of road safety in Ireland.  What my work seeks to show is the complexity 
of how media operates in contemporary governance systems in the context of Irish road 
safety narratives and policy formation.  Thus the problematization of media-centrism is 
a motivating force in the thesis as a whole, that attempts to make a nuanced intervention 
exploring these assumptions in this important arena of policy and media.  From 
Couldry’s (2004, 2012) analysis, discussions of media-centrism are largely theoretical 
and about Media’ Studies presumptions of media power and influence within its own 
disciplinary imagination.  The current research proposes to undercut tendencies towards 
“giving undue prominence to media” in the explanation of social phenomena (Couldry 
2004, p. 8), by exploring some of the other factors involved in shaping social practices 
in addition to the media.  My study therefore functions not only as an empirical study, 
but also a sustained engagement with media-centric assumptions associated with the 
context of Irish road safety narratives and policy formations.  
 
The evidence presented in this thesis demonstrates how users of automobility messily 
implement – that is, accept, reject, or alter – processes that have been put in place to 
guide their conduct through policy contexts as part of their practices, challenging the 
mythical centrality the media accords its own authority (Foucault 1978a, p. 268).  When 
such processes are altered by the users of automobility, it constitutes an implicit 
problematization of media-centrism.  Users do not simply enact policy strategies, as 
evidenced by the existence of road accidents, the existence of strategies to counter these 
incidents, and as Conley and McLaren (2009, p. 3-4) note, the existence of public 
institutions such as the police and courts that are largely taken up with dealing with 
issues related to automobility.  Therefore these user practices should also be accessed in 
terms of the dispositif of road safety, a facet of Packer’s (2008) problematization of 
automobility not directly addressed by him.  This study does not set-out to check if 
people “properly” understand road safety policy initiatives, however.  Instead, it 
explores how policy understandings are immanent in the ways in which people talk 
about their practices, in lives that are organised around the car.  I will argue that the 
materiality of these formations is best interrogated through the networks implied by 
insights from actor-network theory (ANT), the concepts of automobility (Sheller and 
Urry, 2000; Urry, 2005), the car-driver assemblage (Dant, 2005) and thinking about 
automobility in terms of the dispositif of road safety.  While I have briefly defined the 
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other terms, ANT in addition conceives of a world filled with fluid networks of hybrid 
entities, such as the car-driver assemblage, the conception of which negates the need for 
their human and non-human components to be analysed separately (e.g. Latour, 2005).  
The relevance of ANT is explored further in Chapter 1. 
 
The mediated policy context of the worst accident ever and commuting 
by car. 
 
In order to explore the question of how policy strategy circulates in the system of 
automobility as a constituting element of both mediation and practice, a mediated policy 
context needs to be defined as a punctuating point of entry to primary analysis, rather 
than simply exploring government publications or confining investigation to the 
mainstream media alone.  This means relevant instances or events where elements of the 
dispositif of road safety become visible and can be followed through the networks of 
automobility need to be examined.  What needs to be identified and analysed are the 
places where the network congeals or intensifies and where nodes accumulate or 
disperse in media representations.  But what also needs to be examined is where the 
dispositif becomes visible and intertwines, or not, in the concerns and practices of the 
users of system of automobility.  It is all of these actors together who shape strategy 
outputs into the lived experience of the system, rather than how it is planned in advance 
(Muntigl, 2002).  
 
The mediated policy context of a serious road safety incident that occurred in Donegal 
in July, 2010 – in fact, the worst ever car crash in Ireland for fatalities – provides such a 
point of entry.  This is chosen as a starting point because strategies of road safety are 
thrown into sharp relief in the context of the failure of governmental initiatives to 
manage events in the system of automobility or keep them within socially acceptable 
limits.  Eight people died in the accident, which occurred in the best year to that date for 
road traffic accidents (RSA, 2011), in an Ireland where almost every fatality makes the 
news.  The study commences  its primary data analysis then with the investigation of 
how road safety policy is articulated through the mediated policy context of the Donegal 
accident.  This point of entry enables us to follow the  networks of actors (that is the 
texts, media, objects and people) that emerge as constitutive of the dispositif of road 
safety in Ireland.  Given the potentially infinite nature of these actors and the 
interrelationships that could be drawn between them however, it is necessary to draw 
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boundaries around what is chosen for analysis.  My exploration thus begins with the 
representation of the Donegal accident in The Irish Times.  This is because The Irish 
Times can still be considered the newspaper of record (Mulcahy, 1995; Conway, 2006; 
Fahy, Trench and Clancy, 2012; Mercille 2014, p. 291) and can be argued to be central 
to the constitution of the dispositif of road safety as a result.  My analysis excludes TV 
and radio coverage and reports from other sources such as RTE who could equally be 
argued as central to the constitution of the dispositif, and these sources would be 
appropriate for a further study.  This somewhat arbitrary boundary is required in order 
to mould a potentially infinite range of actors and interconnections between them into a 
research problem that is feasible to interrogate.  
 
After reviewing coverage of the accident in Donegal, analysis begins on the day when 
most Irish Times reporting materialised in the paper.  One of the most important actors 
that emerges from this coverage is the RSA.  Its status as the key administrative body 
for road safety justifies the Road Safety Strategy text as an object of exploration, 
exposing the nature relations of power between actors that the RSA proposes, and 
leading to the RSA’s Annual Report 2010 – which considers a policy response to the 
Donegal accident.  In analysis, key actors that emerge are followed between policy 
documents and the Irish Times, and policy, print and other mediated discussion are all 
considered as integral components of the networks that constitute the dispositif of road 
safety in Ireland.  My work therefore identifies and follows key actors that mediate 
automobility, including The Irish Times, the RSA, the Road Safety Strategy, and Gay 
Byrne (then Chairman of the RSA).  
 
However, none of these actors actually determine the constitution of the dispositif of 
road safety in Ireland: how it is lived in practice does not causally emanate from the 
implementation or mediation of Road Safety Strategy itself, as a media-centred 
approach might assume.  Thus, the analysis of texts is considered in light of the lived 
experience of car-commuters.  Car-commuters are chosen because as a solution to 
problems of transportation, among the most salient types of journeys taken with the car 
every day is the one to and from work or college.  For the purposes of this thesis, 
commuting by car is the form of driving predominantly explored.  Car-commuting has a 
particular salience in how it relates to everyday life in the Irish context. For example 
Keohane, Kuhling, and Horgan (2002, p. 50) make the connection between road traffic 
accidents and Irish society – one in which crashes can be understood in terms of 
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collisions of incompatible paces of life rather than speeds of cars.  They argue that road 
accidents are symptomatic of a “crisis arising from processes of social transformation” 
in which tradition and modernity co-exist uneasily in social life (Keohane, Kuhling, and 
Horgan, 2002, p. 45).  Noting that these processes are not new, they argue that in 
contemporary society such collisions are amplified and characterise Ireland (Keohane, 
Kuhling, and Horgan, 2002, p. 47).  Irish society, they say, is: 
 
transformed by processes of reflexive – or accelerated – modernisation and 
globalisation: technologies and markets of production, distribution and 
consumption generated by transnational corporations; administrative systems, 
governmental strategies and legal-rational principles developed by post-national 
and transnational institutions. (Keohane, Kuhling, and Horgan, 2002, p. 47) 
 
For Keohane, Kuhling, and Horgan (2002, p. 50) one of these collisions is that between 
a commuting and agrarian driving culture.  A rural driving culture prioritises customs 
over motoring laws, but commuting is instead characterised by a shared commitment to 
rationality as well as universal and formal rules, and thus exemplifies the drive towards 
“accelerated modernisation”.  While it is easy to view car-commuting as a solution to 
the problem of connecting spatially divergent realms of home and work, it is not often 
constituted as a social problem per se in the way Keohane, Kuhling, Horgan (2002) and 
Maxwell (2001) allow for, which is how I want to investigate it.  This necessitates a 
switch to methods that can interrogate the meaning-making of these commuters.  
Accordingly, I explore how the actors and concerns of mediated texts become filtered 
through the meanings car-commuters make of their commuting journeys – from their 
perspective, as assemblages of cars, drivers and occupants (Akrich, 1992; Tatnall and 
Burgess, 2002; Dant, 2005; Latour, 2005).  Car-commuters also constitute the dispositif 
of road safety and the networks of automobility in this country.  In order to understand 
their perspective as much as possible it is necessary to explore how the conditions they 
encounter on these daily journeys, and their own identities, are evaluated and interpreted 
(Harper, 1987; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, p. 169).  To achieve this, a number of 
focus groups met to discuss driving and car-commuting issues.  The selection processes 
involved for the exploration of how the particular mediated texts and car-commuters 
were chosen is explained further in the methods section in Chapter 1. 
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My study explores the practices of car-commuters and mediated texts in order to 
problematize how the mediation of the dispositif of road safety is engaged with and 
ways in which this informs the constitution of the actual practices of the system of 
automobility in the context of everyday Irish life.  By investigating different modes of 
mediation and the quotidian experience of the users of the system of automobility, a 
broader contextualisation of the dispositif of road safety as it is lived in Ireland can be 
established.  The relationship between media and the social formations of automobility 
is also problematized, highlighting their hybridity, “system-ness”, and the materiality of 
the network.  The associations with media in users’ thinking, as well as some of the 
sources that feed the Irish experience of modernity can be traced (Keohane, Kuhling, 
and Horgan, 2002).  The interrogation of the articulation of policy strategies through the 
mediatisation of Donegal accident will thus begin the investigation of the sources of 
some of the more taken-for-granted relationships “that we have and hold around 
automobility” in everyday Ireland (Miller, 2001, p. 17).   
 
Problematizing the car  
 
Before primary data analysis can begin however, the ways in which the car has already 
been problematized in the social sciences and humanities needs to be contextualised.  
How considering automobility as a system – of car-drivers, user practices, policy, and 
the media for example – constitutes the most effective way to proceed also needs to be 
expanded upon.  Chapter 1 – Problematizing the car – discusses existing literature 
related to the car and elaborates upon the methodological focus of the project.  It 
explores how the ways in which the car has been written about in academia offer useful 
insights and resources, but do not adequately address the range of actors associated with 
automobility.  The focus of many studies in a dominant genre of research about the car 
has in common the assumption of a deterministic force that inheres to the car’s ability to 
shape social formation.  But what is required instead of such reductionist approaches is 
a sense of how sociality and the car are mutually constitutive, requiring a wide range of 
actors.  Some writings about “externalities” (Miller, 2001), for example, begin the 
process of thinking about the car in terms of its systemic characteristics and costs.  
Ultimately, however, this framing does not connect the car’s aggregate effects to the 
more personal associations that are associated with it (Miller, 2001, p. 22).  I argue that 
a much better exploratory framework for thinking about the car-system can be achieved 
through concepts such as automobility (Urry, 2005), the car-driver assemblage (Dant, 
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2004) and ANT.  I expand the argument about considering automobility in terms of the 
dispositif of road safety in Ireland (Foucault, 1975) and I explain why the investigation 
of the lived experience of the users of the system is necessary as part of the 
investigation of the dispositif.  I expand the argument that commuting journeys provide 
an apt focus for collecting data about lived experiences of automobility.  This is because 
commuters are actors in the constitution of road safety in Ireland, the mediatisation of 
policy strategies, the constitution of the commuting sphere, and therefore automobility, 
but in ways that often are assumed but not interrogated.  Because it draws attention to 
the complex range of actors involved in the constitution of the networks of 
automobility, my approach allows for the problematization of media-centrism.  In this 
chapter I also describe the methods used and how the research proceeded. 
 
Networks of freedom 
 
What is clearly absent from the existing problematization of the car is a comprehensive 
interrogation of the apparent contradiction that exists in relation to the freedom the car 
is assumed to provide, in light of the constraints that are imposed on it and by it in 
automobility.  Chapter 2 explores this paradox of freedom and constraint in 
automobility in Ireland.  I interrogate how mediated policy actions in the Irish context 
attempt to curb the unfettered expression of car-based freedoms through the 
construction of individual responsibility as the “ne plus ultra” of road safety.  I highlight 
how, in strategies of governmentality (Foucault, 1978b) articulated through the rituals of 
the mediatisation of the worst road traffic accident ever and predicated on the tenets of 
neoliberalism, freedom is a “mode of organising and regulation” dependent “on the 
capacities of free individuals” (Rose, 1999, pp. 64/145).  Although people are given the 
freedom to drive, this is curtailed by the requirement for responsible behaviour in a 
variety of contexts.  What the chapter shows is the attempted organisation of freedom 
through a range of intermediaries around the individual’s capacity for self-realisation.  
Analysis includes commuters’ reflections on their commuting journeys in relation to 
how they conceive of the freedom the car provides and how they negotiate strategies of 
responsibilization related to road safety.   
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Networks of emotions and affects 
 
What is also absent from both the literature and policy contexts is analysis of the ways 
in which affective and emotional considerations constitute the networks of automobility 
in everyday life.  That’s why Chapter 3 interrogates the work done by the non-rational 
components of the dispositif of road safety that generate, or attempt to generate, specific 
affects within texts and in terms of social meaning structures.  This is important because 
rational choices and rationality remain a dominant framework within policy contexts of 
automobility and shape which courses of action are proposed for citizens (Sheller, 
2005). While policy debates and actors may valorise the formally rational or rational 
choice models in their output, they are also well attuned to deploy a hierarchy of 
emotional appeal when it is in their interests to do so (Ahmed, 2004 a, b).  I argue that 
mediation about road safety is actually enmeshed in multiple rationalities that surface as 
circumstances require, despite the instrumental and formal logic they utilise in 
constructing solutions to the antagonisms of automobility (Maxwell, 2001; Keohane, 
Kuhling, and Horgan, 2002; Sheller, 2005; Bohm, et al., 2006).  The connection 
between this realm of mediation and the emotional worlds that people create with their 
cars has been heretofore unremarked upon.  In order to highlight how automobility is 
actually constituted in terms of these networks of feeling, I apply Ahmed’s (2004a, pp. 
120-121) theory that affect moves between bodies and objects that are sometimes 
invested with “stickiness”.  This makes them sites of affective intensity; where the 
subject is a nodal point rather than the origin or destination of feeling or “passion”.  
Media representations are key sites for establishing chains of associations and 
generating these affective intensities in the dispositif of road safety.  But exploring 
“feelings” surrounding the driving practices of commuters reveals how their 
interpersonal relations and affective needs mobilise emotional intensities that also 
circulate and become “stuck” to the car in a variety of circumstances or ways.  I argue 
that commuter-citizens are nodes in their own networks of rationalities, logics, and 
meanings concerning automobility that adhere and disjoin to varying degrees with the 
concerns of media representation (Ahmed, 2004a).  In this chapter, I describe how 
affective and non-affective rationalities are mobilised together in the messy sustenance 
of the social order of automobility.  
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Networks of resistance 
 
If freedom is a key aspect of driving there must also be resistance.  Accordingly, 
Chapter 4 interrogates how resistances to competing versions of “the programmers’ 
vision of government” (Weir, O’Malley, and Shearing, 1997, p. 510) manifest in 
relation to the networks of automobility.  Matereke (2013, p. 41) outlines a form of 
resistance that Foucault called “counter-conducts”, defined as “struggles against 
processes put in place to guide the conduct of others” (Foucault 1976, p. 95).  In this 
chapter, counter-conducts are identified as those struggles that may push or potentially 
reshape the boundaries of conduct or the programmers’ visions for automobility or 
society (Weir, O’Malley, and Shearing, 1997).   
 
The chapter first briefly examines the disciplinary power of the network of speed 
cameras introduced in Ireland in 2010, before exploring mainstream media’s support for 
their introduction.  Drawing on insights from ANT however, it is necessary to also 
follow other actors as they became central to this facet of the dispositif of road safety in 
order to develop the theme of resistance further.  In this instance, this leads to internet 
forum discussions about driving that are disruptive of a consensus delineated through 
mainstream media reports of camera-burning incidents.  This material is analysed for 
understanding of discourses that are not represented in the mainstream media 
consensus.  The chapter then interrogates the practices of drivers in which counter-
conducts are articulated or where accommodations to the suggestions of governance are 
made. While the media consensus about the introduction of the speed cameras is not 
immanent in the ways in which people talk about counter-conducts in terms of the 
organisation of their lives around the car, commuters’ car-based activities can often be 
resistant to discourses of road safety, for example.  Yet commuters fight to defend the 
space and time spent on practices that constitute forms of “work” which reinforce the 
programmers’ vision for neoliberal society. I argue that commuters’ complex 
negotiations of the life necessitated by the car are constituted by sometimes messy 
sensibilities that are often little concerned with programmers’ visions for automobility. 
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Chapter 1: Problematizing the car 
 
Introduction 
 
Given the problematization of an assumption that the media are central to social 
organisation (Couldry, 2004; Couldry, 2012), the central question of this thesis concerns 
the relationship between how government policy and strategies are framed in the media 
on the one hand and how the practices of automobility are constituted on the other.  But 
in order to understand the ways in which strategies of government actually constitute 
the car-system as it is lived in Ireland, my question first needs to be contextualised in 
relation to what others have already written about the automobile and how they have 
problematized the car.  In this chapter, I first explore much of what Miller (2001, p. 12) 
defines as a dominant genre of literature about the car.  This categorization includes 
histories of car production, design, and its current consequences, social histories of the 
car and accounts that emphasise the automobile as an allegory of modernity, as well as 
some studies of automobile subcultures.  Next, I discuss research that explores the 
“externalities” of automobility, including transportation and road safety studies about 
the car.  Research in this area can attempt to account for how, while we are willing to 
pay driving’s private costs, almost all of problems associated with the car derive from 
external costs we are not willing to pay.  Research of this type is not confined to 
economic analysis however and “has become the basis for a much wider perspective” 
(Miller, 2001, p. 13).  Externalities work has investigated meaning making in terms of 
the intention of individuals, but it is argued not to make enough of the connections 
between the macro entities of the market and the state, and the more personal 
associations the car has enabled and entailed (Miller, 2001), the exploration of which I 
assert is critical for exploring my research problem.  Studies of the car’s “entailments” 
attempt to create some of these linkages between the automobile’s externalities and the 
more personal relationships that are associated with it (Miller, 2001, p. 17).  But the 
investigation of further categorisations of research is still indicated, as I narrow my 
analysis towards the interrogation of studies that directly justify my own 
methodological approach.  I argue that the socio-technical conceptualisation of the 
system of the car that is “automobility” (Sheller and Urry, 2000; Urry, 2005) needs to 
be investigated in order to explore the interconnections between the framings of policy 
strategies in the media and the practices of the car-system.  I also argue that the way in 
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which ANT conceives of a world comprised of networks of hybrid human and 
technological entities also needs to be explored and I contend that the assemblage of the 
car-driver (Dant, 2005) is an appropriate conceptualisation of these hybrids for my 
research context.  Foucault’s (1975) concept of the dispositif is expanded upon to justify 
the interrogation of road safety as an ensemble of elements formed in response to this 
pressing social problem (Thiele, 1986).  I connect-up these frameworks to the everyday 
lived experience of the car that is critical to the problematization of a media-centric 
view of the sociality of automobility.  I argue that the world of commuting is a suitable 
focus for the investigation of everyday life in relation to the car because it is a taken-for-
granted aspect of the quotidian that is seldom questioned, yet is constitutive of social 
actions in which road accidents occur in the Irish context and indeed elsewhere.   
 
In this chapter, I make the case for expanding and complicating the ways in which the 
meaning of cars has been conceptualised.  I suggest that despite the externalities model 
opening up a route into a more systemic conception of the car and its social and 
economic costs and entailments, only “automobility” delineates a full frame of reference 
for conceptualising the car as a system.  The concept of the car-driver assemblage 
provides a theoretically coherent way to explore how this hybrid entity shapes the form 
and content of social action in particular contexts (Dant, 2005), such as in the Irish 
experience.  The idea of the dispositif provides the general rationale and justification for 
interrogating road safety through the mediation of the Donegal accident and the 
introduction of a network of speed cameras, and the ways in which discourses of road 
safety circulate in the lived experience of commuting.  Together, what these frameworks 
suggest is the exploration of the assemblages of cars and drivers circulating in the 
system of automobility in Ireland.  Finally, I rationalise and explain the specific 
methods utilised in the study and describe the way in which the research was 
undertaken.   
 
A dominant genre of literature about the car 
 
Miller (2001) typifies a dominant genre of scholarship about the car as including 
histories of the production and design of the car, with an emphasis on personalities and 
events (e.g. Wolf, 1996; O’Connell, 1998).  Such studies can often also include an 
account of the contemporaneous consequences of the car (e.g. Flink, 1975; Nadis and 
MacKenzie, 1993) or its social history (Gartman, 1994; McShane, 1994; Graves-Brown, 
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1997).  Miller (2001) notes that this dominant genre features alternative histories of the 
car that foreground how the-car-as-we-know-it, with its internal combustion engine, 
was not a foregone conclusion, but could have developed as an electric vehicle for 
instance (see Schiffer, 1994).  Also a factor in these types of studies are histories that 
show how a road network was already in place before the car arrived or how the car 
solved the problems of the horse by removing tons of manure from the streets (Flink, 
1975).  Some critical treatments in this genre also consider the car as a 
trope/synecdoche of modernity (Freund and Martin, 1993) and/or as Conley and 
McLaren (2009) note, a source of national pride.  The genre contains studies of 
disenchantment around the car (Sachs 1984; Wolf 1996) that overlap with histories 
which emphasise class, race and gender divisions (Gartman, 1994; McShane, 1994; 
Norton, 2009; Sachs, 1984; Wolf, 1996), as well as subcultural studies of the car.   
 
Miller (2001) is not alone identifying and exploring literature about the car in terms of 
this genre but others tend to limit their analysis of existing scholarship to this aspect of 
the field and thus are not as wide-ranging in their review as Miller.  Dant (2005, pp. 
61/75), for example, summarises how sociological research about the car is grouped 
into two main divisions – that in which the car is viewed as the exemplar of 
development of capitalist production (Chinoy, 1955; Goldthorpe, et al., 1968; Beynon, 
1973; Flink, 1975, 1988; Altshuler, et al., 1984; Gartman, 1994) or that in which it is “a 
commodity that exemplifies the desired object that motivated consumers in late 
capitalism” (Lefebvre, 1971; Sachs, 1984; Liniado, 1996; O’Connell, 1998; Thoms, et 
al., 1998; Barthes, 2000).  Similarly, Packer (2008, p. 2) divides the American aspects 
of Dant’s (2005) first division into pessimistic and optimistic halves.  In the pessimistic 
version of its history, critics and historians (including Mowbray, 1969; Leavitt, 1970; 
Kelley, 1971; Ant Farm, 1976) argue that the car ripped apart pre-existing forms of 
sociality “as it fuelled individualism, conspicuous consumption, suburban sprawl, 
environmental destruction, highway carnage, and even oil-related military expansion” 
(Packer, 2008, p. 2).  In its optimistic form, the car’s central role in American life is 
viewed as “the offspring of Americans’ restlessness and their desire for freedom and 
wide open spaces” (Packer 2008, p2).  These more optimistic arguments are made by 
writers such as Stephens (1946), Stewart (1953), George (1957), Patton (1986), and 
Finch (1992).  Packer (2008, p. 2) says the “desire” for freedom and open spaces is 
claimed in these arguments to be the progeny of the emerging hegemony of the USA 
and the unifying nature of the development of its “transport and communication 
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infrastructure” which “suffered a midlife crisis in a race to the moon, and survives in the 
quotidian commute”.  Both Dant’s (2005) and Packer’s (2008) categorizations reinforce 
Miller’s (2001) articulation of a dominant genre of scholarship about the car, but it is a 
broad church that merits considerable unpacking to identify what resources can be 
retained from it in the context of my research problem.  It is therefore instructive to 
explore some of this genre’s strengths and weaknesses in more detail, before 
considering the other categorizations of research in relation to the car and narrowing 
towards discussion of the methodological justifications identified above. 
 
The metamorphic car  
 
Miller (2001, p. 1) argues that in the 20th century, “the relationship of much of humanity 
to the world” became increasingly mediated by the car.  However, this revolutionary – 
yet now taken for granted – transformation of society can seem a metamorphosis that 
simply dropped from the sky.  Chant (2003, p. 200) notes that: “Technophiles and 
technophobes alike have tended to present the car as some kind of exogenous 
technological given…impacting upon society like a meteorite”.  Barthes (2000) for 
instance describes the Citroen DS as a messenger of a world above nature, a perfect 
object with no apparent origin, while Brilliant (1989) traces how quickly normative 
behaviours and discourses grew up around the car.  In her Marxist critical history, Wolf 
(1996) interrogates the apparently irresistible rise of the car by tracing the development 
of systems of transport since the dawn of the canal age.  She points out that, by the 
1930s, the spatial separation of the differing functions of “living, working, physical and 
mental recreation, and circulation” predicated on the car were already normalised by 
architects and planners internationally, expressed in the idea of the segregated city and 
enshrined in the Athens Charter of 1933 (Wolf, 1996, p. 155).  This was driven by the 
triumph of the car in the US.  The architectural models of urban space Le Corbusier 
constructed, for example, had in common “a motorway that crosses right through the 
whole city” (Wolf, 1996, p. 156).  Le Corbusier propounded that stilts were the key to 
overcoming the difficulty of “circulation” in existing city structures: 
 
stilts will be recognised as the indispensable foundation of town planning.  The 
rule will appear in all its simple clarity: high blocks of dwellings, palaces, 
schools, houses, etc. will be orientated according to the sun and the best view; 
the ground level or undulating, will be furrowed by communications entirely 
independent of the buildings. (Wolf, 1996, p. 157)  
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By the 1950s one German architect wrote:  
 
Houses can no longer get away from the car.  Where there are houses, there will 
be traffic… Every apartment will be able to have a window that looks out on to 
the motorway.  It will be exciting to watch the cars as they rush past and 
overtake each other, one travelling faster than the other. (Wolf, 1996, p. 157) 
 
In the segregated city, the life-blood of the metropolis was reconstituted under the 
wheels of the car.   
 
Wolf (1996) notes that it is easy to view these voices from history as naive, but in their 
proper context there was little opposition from traditional sources of criticism – the 
labour movement for example – to their vision.  In addition, the motivation of architects 
was social, seeking improvements to the inhuman working conditions extant in the 
1930s, while the pure conception of the architects’ model was not necessarily 
transferred verbatim into reality (Wolf 1996, pp. 158-159).  Wolf highlights how these 
factors in combination with the profit and property needs of the capitalist order 
determined the “unfriendly and inhuman urban structures” that were the epitome of 
modernity, where prosperity in society became conflated with the progress of the car:  
 
The objective tendencies of the car society, tendencies that unfolded, as it were, 
behind the backs of these architects and planners, were partly the product of the 
specific property relations of these societies: it was private property and 
speculation in both land and real estate that determined development in modern 
urban centres.  The importance of city centre for business meant land prices and 
rent rose at a phenomenal rate in these areas.  It was the lower land prices 
outside the city centres that later attracted the shopping malls and cut price 
supermarkets to these locations.  A similar pattern was to emerge in the family-
house construction boom.  In most of the industrialised Western Countries, this 
form of housing was publicly supported (with tax concessions) and was 
promoted as the ideal form of housing for the middle classes.  The effect on 
traffic was inflationary as the city expanded into the greenbelt. (Wolf, 1996, p. 
159)   
 
From Wolf’s (1996) analysis it can be extrapolated that although the car may now 
appear seamlessly integrated into people’s lives, this has involved massive and 
sustained orientation around its exigencies that may seem the outcome of natural 
processes or states of affairs, but are actually a contingent social – or more accurately 
socio-technical – construction.   
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The car and identity politics 
 
Some of the social effects of the automobile are addressed in studies that focus on 
relationship between the car and different forms of identity politics.  Sachs (1984) for 
example reveals much about the massive transformation effected by the onset of the 
automobile system and the inequities and class restrictions that lie within it.  His 
prescient attempt at an “eulogy to the history of the excitement caused by the 
automobile” (Sachs, 1984, p. viii) notes the “sharp perceptual contrast” between the 
automobile age and the era of the horse drawn carriage, and between the individual 
mobility of the car and the collective constriction of rail:  “The horse and carriage, the 
traditional insignia of privilege, had declined in rank over the course of the nineteenth 
century, to the point that whenever a train overtook a coach, the rail passengers would 
laugh sneeringly out of the windows” (Sachs, 1984, p. 7).  Yet the wealthy bemoaned 
the railroad’s relative ignorance of social status and the tyranny of its timetable (Sachs, 
1984, p. 8): 
 
Freedom has been sacrificed to speed.  The train ticket is purchased not only 
with money, but also with the forfeiture of one’s right to self-determination for a 
certain while.  Whosever goes traveling in a railway coach forgoes, for a time, 
his freedom. (Sachs, 1984, p. 7) 
 
Other writers (McShane, 1994; Norton, 2009) reveal similar class tensions in a U.S. 
context. Wolf (1996, p. 48) also expands that the designed-in collectivism and freedom 
from class distinctions provided by the train was countered by the owners of the 
railways who “did everything they could to counteract the egalitarian tendencies.  Class 
society was to be reproduced on the railway”.  Even so, as an inherently individual form 
of transport, the car was much better at expressing class distinction than the railcar, in a 
way that recalled the heyday of the horse-drawn carriage but in a “much improved” 
manner (Wolf, 1996, p. 48).  The car established a primacy to individualised motion 
over other collective forms and connected this individuality to ideas of leisure and 
romanticism (Urry, 1990).  Such individuation did not apply evenly but was based on 
privilege, wealth, and social status.  
Gartman (2005) explores class tensions in relation to the car, describing three eras or 
“ages” in the way that evolving notions of class have underpinned the “cultural logic” of 
the car’s progress.  Adapting Bourdieu’s (1984) idea of distinction to the early era of the 
car in America, where freedom has “always” been conflated with geographic 
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movement, Gartman (2005, p. 171) says the automobile gave its wealthy owners a 
freedom from the constraints of the train timetable.  The car was not used for practical 
transport but instead as a vehicle of leisure and “public ostentation”.  In the US, while 
rural dwellers resented the new freedom of wealthy urbanites to intrude in poorer rural 
communities: 
 
Urban workers… resented bourgeois automobilists on city streets, where they 
disrupted street life and symbolized this class’s arrogant disregard for workers’ 
lives and livelihoods.  At the same time, workers envied this possession of the 
rich. (Gartman, 2005, p. 171) 
 
This provides an ultimately class-based context for Scharff’s (1995, p. 959) earlier 
assertion that “[a]verage Americans had to learn to see their streets not as places to 
socialise or as open areas permitting light and air in otherwise choked cities…They had 
to learn to identify mobility with progress and with their own interests”.  This insight is 
reinforced by Volti (2004, p. 111) who notes how for those who sat on their front porch, 
social interaction with passers-by was a feature of life before the car.   
 
From the above snapshots, it can begin to be seen how a social history of the car is shot 
through with issues of class and urban geography, but it is not reducible to these issues.  
The same argument could be made apply in terms of issues of race.  Those who analyse 
this issue in the context of the car underline how it is always the less powerful members 
of society who suffer the most from “progress”.  The wholesale demolition of black 
neighbourhoods in Detroit, for example, illustrates how African-American communities 
could be decimated by the car:   
 
Huge swaths of city were demolished to make way for expressways, and as was 
the case with so many urban redevelopment projects, black working-class 
neighborhoods were most heavily impacted. The Chrysler Freeway blasted 
through the heart of …black Detroit's main shopping and entertainment districts. 
The…freeways cut through the city's most established black west-side 
neighborhoods. (Sugrue, 2004) 
 
By the 1960s, with car factories relocated to the suburbs, the extent of the spatial 
mismatch between African-Americans and the location of job opportunities was clear.    
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The reality of life organised around the car is nuanced, yet many of those so far 
discussed credit the automobile or other social structures with a determining agency in 
the transformations that the car has entailed.  Wolf (1996), for example, does not engage 
with the meanings users make from lives ordered around the car.  Citing a newspaper 
article entitled “Only fear on the streets”, which investigated how women experienced 
Cologne, Germany, Wolf (1996, p. 206) notes that many respondents were concerned 
with violence in car-based urban settings.  This particular insight is drawn from the 
uncritical incorporation of the results of a newspaper survey however, which is at odds 
with the scholarship applied by Wolf (1996) to the rest of her analysis.  It seems 
simplistic to encapsulate the car’s impact in terms of alienation alone when, for 
example, it is women who are often faced with daily struggles in which the car can 
become an expression of concern and care for loved ones (Miller, 2001, pp. 28-29).  
Research into how the lives of these respondents were organised around the car would 
have made for a more granular picture of the role the car plays in their routine existence.  
This picture is actually required if the relationships between the mediation of 
government policy and the practices of automobility are to be problematized and a 
much richer picture of the social relationships related to the car than so far explored is to 
be painted.  As Sachs (1984, p. 92) notes, “technology does not simply fall from the 
sky: the aspirations of a society or a class combine with technical possibility to inject a 
bit of culture into the design like a genetic code”.  An altered perspective from what has 
so far been discussed is evident in his words; one that suggests a move away from more 
deterministic discourses of the car.  Before exploring these perspectives however, the 
gendered aspects of the identity politics associated with the car merit further discussion. 
 
Although obviously derogatory stereotypes of women drivers have faded somewhat 
from representations of the car, assumptions about the role of both women and men in 
society are still inscribed in the meanings of the automobile and they exist on the 
surface of advertising and popular culture’s discourses about the car.  Scholarship that 
emphasises how the car reinforces gender inequality underlines this point, but lived 
meanings in relation to the car remain underexplored in these studies.  Additionally, 
research that focuses on (often male) subcultures can fail to connect that experience to 
more general everyday experiences of the car, whose meanings can often be taken for 
granted.   
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The fears outlined in Wolf’s (1996) account of a newspaper survey as described above 
constitute a loud echo of earlier work on the subject of gender and the car.  Scharff’s 
(1987, 1988, 1992) explorations of the early history of the intersection of the car and the 
role of women in the US highlights that while transit companies openly and legally 
discriminated against African-Americans in the early 20th century, gender distinctions 
instead played out at the ideological level.  For Scharff (1987, 1988, 1992) as for Wolf 
(1996) preceding eras of transportation – canals and railways for Wolf and urban 
tramways of America in Scharff’s case – provide context for the car’s subsequent 
spread.  Tram services in American cities were represented by media and rights groups 
as dirty and dangerous, particularly for women.  According to Scharff (1992, p. 7), 
politicians in Chicago and Los Angeles found expediency in the idea they were 
protecting female virtue “imperiled by inadequate transport services” when what they 
really faced were funding issues in relation to public transport:  
 
Beneath the welter of political conflicts, there lurked the idea that the very 
character of mass transit set it on a collision course with bourgeois ladyhood.  
The trolley was simply too public a vehicle for the female personification of 
privacy.  How then might a woman preserve her temper, her reputation, her 
constitution, and her gown, and still manage to get around town?  
 
While a partial answer to that question might be “by car”, it is interesting to note the 
variety of ways the car perpetuated women’s exclusion from society.  Indeed, the 
development of urban and sub-urban spaces around the car can be argued to be the 
spatial manifestation of such exclusion.  Scharff (1988, p. 38) notes that by 1920 in 
America, the car, particularly as popularized by Ford’s Model T (from 1908), was seen 
as a progressive solution to the problems of urbanisation. However this was in a context 
“identifying women with private domestic spaces and men with public, productive, 
places…American cityscapes had come more and more to resemble maps of the 
ideology of separate spheres for men and women” . 
 
In a sense, gender roles were becoming “baked into” (Ormrod, 1994) or inscribed onto 
the physical environment by the development of infrastructure deemed necessary for the 
car’s ostensibly inevitable progress.  In this context the woman who dared drive in the 
America of the 1920s was a danger to society, despite the temporary suspension of this 
idea during WW1 when women had served as mechanics and drivers.  The trope of the 
female driver became reproduced in the ideology of jokes and folklore about women’s 
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alleged inability to drive, some of which remains with us today.  According to Scharff 
(1987), women drivers were presented as the subject of ridicule because it could help 
defuse the inherent threat a woman’s independence represented to the dominant male 
order.  Scharff’s account highlights the early realisation that (gendered) meanings 
attaching to the car were important and went way beyond its constitution as a tool for 
transportation.  Writing about the 1920s, Scharff (1987, pp. 218-219) notes: 
 
writers…… remained inclined to dichotomize men’s and women’s reasons for 
buying what they did. [Motor columnist John C] Long contrasted simple 
masculine practicality with complicated female subjectivity. “To father,” Long 
wrote, “the automobile means transportation.  It will take him around on his 
business trips and it will get him out in the air in the evenings.  Similarly, he 
regards his house as a place for keeping the heat in and the rain out”.  If men 
dispassionately regarded cars and houses as tools, women, Long believed, 
expected both the auto and the home to serve as vehicles for domestic cultural 
missions:  “Mother sees the car, like the home, as a means for holding the family 
together, for raising the standard of living, for providing recreation and social 
advantages for the children”. 
 
Much later, Barthes (1963) delineates a central, gendered binary where the car can be 
categorised as either “sporty” or “homely” (“sportif”/ “domestique”; cited in Inglis, 
2005, p. 211).  The way in which the automobile exemplifies the liberty to cut loose on 
the open road or to break away from the “pack” (Barthes 1963 cited in Inglis, 2005, p. 
211) is a meaning attached to the car that goes beyond “simple masculine practicality” 
(Scharff, 1987, p. 219) however, and can be viewed as expressing the autonomy 
attributed to the masculine subject.  The threat of women partaking in and exploiting 
such masculine liberties is problematized in movies such as Thelma and Louise (1991).  
The film tells the story of an ultimately failed attempt by two women to appropriate this 
liberal and masculine trait.  
 
It could be argued that clear-cut gender distinctions have become increasingly irrelevant 
and outdated in contemporary automobility, as evidenced in the myriad of car models 
that appeal to an ever-more finely delineated spectrum of market sectors and life-styles 
that cross gender boundaries.  However, that mixture is still built upon taken-for-
granted notions about what masculine and feminine characteristics in a car and its 
drivers mean, one that Barthes as well as Thelma and Louise might find very familiar.  
A recent advert for “its4women.ie” (2014)  insurance, for example, relies on sedimented 
knowledge of the presumed inferiority of women drivers.  In the ad, a selection of 
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female “talking heads”, including Irish Olympian Katie Taylor, assert the obsolescence 
of such clichéd assumptions. “We’ve all heard the jokes about parallel parking… but 
we’re saying, cheerio to cliché, so long to stereotype” the women explain, before 
adding:  “We know we drive more safely than guys, sometimes in some pretty 
challenging footwear.  We’re not afraid to ask for directions and so what if I want to 
give my car a name?” (its4women.ie, 2014).  The inference, borne of knowing glances 
and smug looks, is that this ad represents a crusading challenge against such 
sensibilities.  However, the irony is that in ostensibly exploding one set of clichés about 
women and cars the ad simply asserts a different programme of (bio-essentialised) 
assumptions about gender and femininity, based more on consumption habits than 
perceived and erroneous driving deficiencies, grounding the common-sense of the issue 
(Fowler, 1991, p. 41).   In the world of the ad, women have overcome their earlier 
subjugation “almost precisely to the extent that…[they]…have been able to participate 
in and facilitate the wider project of neoliberalisation” (Gilbert, 2013, p. 17) by 
becoming more efficient consuming subjects.  In such an environment, the message is 
that insurance products tailored for female drivers (whatever that can actually mean in 
practice1) are the synecdoche of liberation against the tyranny of men. 
 
Masculine associations with the car are just as problematic however.  Redshaw (2008) 
notes how displays of masculinity are encouraged, not least by car manufacturers, 
despite the danger associated with the automobile.  Young males make up a 
disproportionate number of accident victims (RSA, 2007, p. 9), for example.  In 
advertising, masculine, individual, and competitive themes are drawn-on and 
connections can be made between these constructions, their interpretation, and extant 
road behaviour (Redshaw, 2008).  Redshaw (2008, pp. 19-20) notes that “masculine 
desires” have actually dominated the car’s ubiquitous presence, and while the male 
perspective is important, so too are the voices of women, the elderly and the young, in 
the context of the exploration of driving practices.  The voices of these actors though 
tend to be absent from histories of the car progress.  Indeed, studies that have looked at 
the car’s meanings for contemporary youth cultures (Carrabine and Longhurst, 2002), 
                                                          
1 Gender can no longer be used to rate risk, so women drivers do not routinely get 
cheaper premiums compared to the days before risk equalisation (RTE, 2012).  
Its4women.com (2015) does offer “handbag cover” for women in Northern Ireland 
however, for example.  
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its misuse including car accidents and joy riding (Campbell, 1993; Walker, 1998, 
Walker, Butland and Connell, 2000), or the particular sub-cultural significances of 
motorbikes (McRobbie and Garber 1976; Willis 1978; Hebdige 1979) tend to focus on 
male subcultures and moreover examine the exceptional nature of meanings about cars 
or motorbikes to particular social groupings.  This in effect cauterises the connectedness 
of that experience to society in general.  An agreed-upon set of shared societal meanings 
for automobility is assumed or envisioned, from which the subcultural practices 
explored in the study diverge, but such everyday meanings have not been directly 
generated in these studies from the exploration of quotidian practices such as 
commuting, for example.  As Miller (2001, p. 9) puts it, in such work “there is the 
obvious problem in extrapolating…to the more general and mundane contemporary 
relationships with cars which remains woefully unexplored”.   
 
The above exploration of a dominant genre of scholarship and literature about the car 
shows that while the story of the metamorphic car is infused with questions of class, 
race and gender that play-out still, such arguments suffer from a form of reductionism.  
Though highlighting much of value, it has been shown that these studies can imbue 
institutions or the car itself with a deterministic agency that obscures the perspective of 
those whose lives were transformed by it or obscure the everyday lived experience of 
life with the car.  Miller (2001, pp. 8-9) underlines these deficiencies, arguing that, with 
some exceptions (e.g. Sachs, 1984; Brilliant, 1989), the dominant genre neglects an 
empathetic account of car culture; one that would focus on the feelings, thoughts, and 
attitudes that circulate daily in relation to car consumption, as opposed to merely 
emphasising the car’s consequences.   
 
Indeed, Miller (2001, pp. 2-3) is keen to emphasise the car’s “humanity”, though he 
agrees this “is not something that is easily accepted”.  The car’s humanity lies in the 
degree to which the car is taken for granted  “so that we think our world through a sense 
of the self in which driving, roads, and traffic are simply integral to who we are and 
what we presume to do each day” (Miller, 2001, p. 3).  The dominant genre neglects 
such human components; how the car evokes the agency that mobilises it, “and the 
networks of relationships that…driving permit[s]” (Miller, 2001, p. 3).  Therefore, if the 
relationships between how policy and strategies are framed in the media and how the 
practices of automobility are constituted are to be explored, it cannot be assumed that 
the car and social institutions are totalising deterministic forces or that the quotidian 
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experience of living with the car simply doesn’t matter.  The car’s “humanity” and the 
networks of relationships that Miller (2001) evokes need to be explored and the 
negative features of the car need to be reconciled with the private benefits it confers.  In 
the next section, a further range of research is discussed that attempts to account for a 
much wider conceptualisation of the car’s consequences. Yet important gaps will 
remain that need to be bridged in order to properly explore the relationship between the 
framing of government policy and the constitution of the practices of automobility. 
 
Externalities  
 
The study of the car’s external costs or “externalities” starts from the position that the 
benefits of car use such as status, mobility, and pleasure, accrue to individuals while the 
full costs of the car are borne by society at large and often in variable ways by different 
groups in society  (Conley and McLaren 2009, p. 4).  Although drivers pay for 
ownership, fuel, insurance, and maintenance, the car generates costs in terms of 
“economic, social, health, environmental, and institutional externalities”, which are not 
always visible (Porter, 1999; Miller, 2001; Conley and McLaren 2009, p. 4).  
Externalities work can highlight the external costs of road traffic accidents and the large 
investment in infrastructure that is required to maintain the system of automobility, for 
example (Freund and Martin, 1993).  Miller (2001, p. 140) notes a critical strand in the 
genre that sees the denial of externalities “as the legacy of a powerful car lobby that has 
sought to prevent the car being burdened with its own consequences”.  In that strand, 
Davison (2004) for example, outlines the particular political machinations that produce 
the car as an essential component of the urban landscape.  He highlights the role of 
motorists’ lobbies and the relative power of private transport government departments 
over public transport ones in the contingent proliferation of the car and in the 
proliferation of associated costs.  Conley and McLaren (2009 pp. 3-4) highlight how 
public institutions are oriented towards the needs of automobility, and even while these 
are funded by taxpayers, the costs are often hidden.   
 
Externalities work has become prevalent over the last 20 years or so (Miller, 2001), but 
much earlier research such as Kain’s (1968, pp. 175-176) investigated unacknowledged 
external costs associated with the car.  In this case, the link was made between 
segregation in the housing markets of Detroit and Chicago and the distribution and level 
of African-American employment in these cities.  For the first time, statistical 
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connections between these two factors were found.  Kain (1968, p. 179) found that the 
distance and difficulty in reaching certain jobs from ghetto areas imposed costs high 
enough to discourage African-Americans from looking for employment in these 
relatively distant neighbourhoods.  In effect, residents in these low income areas were 
forced to choose between buying a car and spending a disproportionate amount of their 
income on transportation, embarking upon a circuitous commute via public transport if 
available, or ignoring the opportunity: “More often than not, they will not even seek out 
the job in the first instance because of the difficulties in reaching it from possible 
residence locations” (1968, p. 181).  Despite processes of African-American 
suburbanisation, these divisions persist in US society.  Kain (1968, pp. 180-1) showed 
that the costs for transportation between ghetto neighbourhoods inhabited by African-
Americans and many workplaces were seriously underestimated “because of the 
indirectness or complete absence of public transit services from ghetto residential areas 
to outlying or suburban districts”.  In Kain’s (1968) analysis, the benefits of car 
ownership accrue only to those who can afford cars, yet those who can’t are still subject 
to its external costs.   
 
As far back as Keats (1958), critics had been arguing for a more systemic conception of 
road safety, exemplified in Ralph Nader’s (1972) celebrated case that outlined 
manufacturers’ responsibilities for designing safety features into cars.   From the 1960s 
in the US, according to Wetmore’s (2009) analysis of the development of the airbag, the 
road safety debate encompassed two ideological camps: those who considered it was 
incumbent on road users to change their behaviour in order to improve safety, and those 
who believed that technical solutions should be found to the mitigate the effects of 
accidents.  Wetmore’s (2009) research shows how the consideration of technical and 
social factors together brought about the pervasive implementation of this revolutionary 
safety device.  He highlights the benefits to all when a much greater distribution of 
responsibilities is achieved across all sectors of society in such a debate (the state, 
industry, and road users for example).   
 
Yet research which attempts to mitigate some of the car’s externalities, such as the 
consequences of road traffic accidents (Irwin 1985; Lundin 2008 for example), still 
defines road safety as a matter of individual behaviour, albeit with public interventions 
(see McAndrews, 2013, p. 756).  According to Redshaw (2008, p. 11), for example, 
social psychological research can highlight how feelings of control and invulnerability 
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contribute to road accidents (Parker, et al., 1995) and how personal characteristics can 
be associated with risky behaviour (Parker, Manstead and Stradling, 1995).  Indeed, 
there is a large body of psychological research about the car that Redshaw (2008, pp. 4-
5) notes focuses on individual psychology, rather than “the social and cultural factors 
through which individuals develop and cars are articulated or inscribed with meaning 
and made part of daily practice”.  This also extends to SUV research attributing “higher 
aggressivity” to drivers of SUVs (Wenzel and Ross, 2005).  Redshaw (2008, p. 7) 
argues that psychological studies of road safety (for example Freund and Martin, 1993; 
Dahlen, et al., 2005) tend not to confront mobility as a system, where normative 
behaviours would connect back to “manufacturers and motoring organisations, 
governments and cultural values”.  Miller (2001, p. 10) suggests psychological literature 
also contains crude assumptions about the nature of speed and its relationship to the 
brain’s ability to process data, which leads to rushed conclusions about the actual nature 
of contemporary mobility.  Transport studies has also investigated meaning-making in 
relation to the car (Steg, 2004; Anable and Gatersleben, 2005) but as Miller (2001, p. 
13) argues, these studies are concerned with “the consequences of the car for the 
provision of infrastructure”, rather than the general culture of the car.  Such scholarship, 
for example, does not place much weight on themes of cultural studies of car 
advertising such as “power, control, individuality and freedom” (Redhaw, 2008, p. 11).  
Limited to the intentions of individuals, these studies are less concerned with how 
norms of driving culture (implicit approval of speeding for example) are developed and 
contribute to these behaviours.   
 
What seems common from these types of analysis is the neutrality of the car; that is, the 
way in which it shapes social action is overlooked (Dant, 2005).  However, 
Featherstone (2005, p. 4) presages more recent writing in the area of road safety by 
highlighting the World Health Organisation’s 2004 bid to reclassify road traffic 
accidents as a public health issue, thereby “shifting away responsibility from the 
individual to the system”.  McAndrews’ (2013) describes how thinking about road 
safety is evolving to collapse structural and individual considerations into a more 
systemic way of conceptualising the car and its impact on society.  McAndrews’ (2013, 
p. 749) account of the Vision Zero strategy in Sweden, which seeks to entirely eliminate 
injuries from road accidents, outlines how that programme requires road safety experts 
“to have causal responsibility for injuries”.  Road safety experts in this analysis 
comprise experts in behaviour and enforcement, vehicle safety, infrastructure design 
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and transportation, as well as transportation experts from research institutes, industry, 
and policy sources (McAndrews, 2013 pp. 753-754).  In this approach, ownership of the 
public issue of road safety remains firmly planted in the transportation sector, however 
(McAndrews, 2013, p. 769).   
 
Other research in the externalities space highlights costs associated with the SUV 
(Sports Utility Vehicle) in relation to their comparative inefficiency, increased risk of 
rollover, and the detrimental impact of their size in collisions with other road users and 
pedestrians (Bradsher, 2002; IIHS, 2005; Redshaw, 2008; Conley and McLaren, 2009).  
McLean (2009) wonders how the motor industry might respond to increased concerns 
about SUVs’ contribution to the costs of climate change (Conley and McLaren, 2009).  
She notes that people who dislike SUVs can buy smaller four-wheel drive vehicles – 
crossovers – instead, “believing that they are doing less harm to the environment, which 
is precisely how advertisers portray them” (Gunster, 2004; McLean 2009, p. 70).  
Indeed, crossovers have proliferated recently, supplanting the traditional SUV for those 
buyers attracted to their perceived benefits (commanding driving position, protection, 
comfort, flexible space, image) but repelled by the SUVs traditional drawbacks (fuel, 
economy, safety, pollution, awkward handling).  However, by using the same 
parameters of how this harm is measured (Co2 and fuel efficiency [McLean, 2009, p. 
72]), crossovers have evolved to almost entirely close the gap in terms of environmental 
and safety concerns between SUVs and other types of cars, while retaining the 
perceived benefits of the SUV2.  The shift to crossovers exemplifies how critique in 
relation to the automobile that focuses on the reconciliation of particular externalities, 
such as the environmental or safety consequences of SUV use, can be undermined by 
rapid adjustments in technology or markets that address the particular externality but 
leave the system of the car undisturbed.   
 
                                                          
2 An examination of typical variants of the Ford Focus (a medium sized hatchback) and 
Nissan Qashqai (a crossover alternative) shows, for example, that both models have 
similar Co2 emissions (Ford Focus 1.6tdci Edge 5d 109g/km; Nissan Qashqai 1.5dci 
Visia 99g/km) and combined fuel economy (Ford 3.5/100km, Nissan 3.2l/100km) and 
that both are “5 star” cars for safety, for example (honestjohn.co.uk, 2015a, b; 
EURONCAP, 2015 a, b). 
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Overall, externalities research does not address the issue of the car’s systemic 
embeddedness in everyday life, where automobile use, for example, expresses love and 
care for significant others as much as it does a rational solution to transport problems 
and needs (Maxwell, 2001).  In providing a potential solution to the perceived 
profligacy of the SUV, crossovers can simply reinforce the system of the automobile 
itself and arguably make it stronger.  Conley and McLaren (2009, p. 13) underline this 
point by noting that individual acts of stopping car use or switching to other forms of 
transport, for example, also have the effect of enabling other car users to reach their 
destinations “so the cumulative impact may be less than hoped-for unless there are 
changes in urban design that give priority to non-car modes of transportation” (also 
Newman and Kenworthy, 1999).  But this is not just a question of ethical car choice or 
remembering to include urban design in the mix of externalities to be accounted for.  
The idea of the individual “accepting the responsibility or the moral implications of the 
consequences” of car use (McLean, 2009, p. 71) through consumer choice alone 
unravels when these moral implications extend to the social consequences of non-use in 
a car-centred world.  Without a systemic awareness of the everyday meanings of car 
use, a message of individual responsibility is easily assimilated into product-based and 
market-led solutions to cars’ consequences that never question their source nor connect 
them to wider questions about what the car entails. 
 
For Miller (2001, p. 15) the concept of externalities goes a long way towards 
developing critical understanding of car culture and its future, because it moves away 
from reasoning that emphasises the car as simply a force, such as in the reductionist 
arguments typical of the dominant genre.  Instead it drives more nuanced consideration 
of the car’s implications and costs for society as a whole.  Externalities rejects the 
assumption that the car and the systems around it are immutable, opening them up to 
strategic interventions by a range of other determining actors.  While Bohm, et al. 
(2006) condense externalities into the antagonisms of the car – carnage, congestion, oil 
dependence, and environmental catastrophe – this does not sufficiently encompass how 
the car is both a product of particular cultural contexts as well as a force that shapes, 
rather than determines, social action.  Consider, for example, the ways in which the car 
can be perceived positively in a world that is already organised around its exigencies.  
For Miller (2001, p. 17) the presumption that we know what the car is, implicit in 
assessments of the car that have so far been explored, must be set aside if the car is to be 
understood as the product of particular cultural contexts.  Despite research into 
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externalities being critical to future considerations of the car (Miller, 2001, p. 15), the 
biggest issue of this field is that it “conspicuously fails”…“to find a new way of 
connecting the larger aggregate effects of the car and the involvement of wider forces 
such as the state and the market with the more personalised and intimate relationship 
between cars and their users” (Miller, 2001, p. 22).  Exploring these relationships is 
about the systemic nature of the car and driving, and tracing the macro and micro 
interconnections that make visible more of what the car entails.  This tracing is also 
essential if the assumption that the media are central to “the dynamics of contemporary 
life” is to be problematized (Couldry, 2004, p. 5) and the relationship between 
automobility’s practices and how its policies and strategies are framed in the media is to 
be explored.  The investigation of a much more synthetic conception of who and what 
can be considered as actors in the constitution of automobility is warranted then, if the 
questions this project raises are to be properly investigated.   
 
Entailments  
 
Studies of externalities assume the car is a known quantity “and that the problem is only 
to acknowledge all those consequences that have become disconnected from the car as 
their point of origin” (Miller, 2001, p. 17).  Studies of the car’s entailments, by way of 
contrast attempt to create some of the necessary linkages between the car’s externalities 
and the more personal relationships associated with the automobile (Miller, 2001, p. 
22).  Entailments work can start from both particular and personal aspects of car use – 
such as its sound systems (Bull, 2001) – or from a much larger aggregate effect, such as 
gender (Garvey, 2001).  What these studies have in common is that they work “back 
towards some new sense of what the car seems to be when viewed from that 
perspective” (Miller, 2001, p. 17).  On the subject of the car’s direct associations with 
race, for example, Gilroy (2001, p. 82) asserts that the history of slavery and repression 
has made the freedom the car provides “uniquely intense” for African-Americans.  The 
tacit acknowledgement of this past may reinforce the “sometimes ostentatious and even 
excessive” patterns that are characteristic of African-American automobile consumption 
(Gilroy 2001, p. 83).  Gilroy (2001, p. 87) explores these patterns, highlighting in the 
case of what he calls “transgressive” car use how desegregation coupled with the car to 
create the possibility for young African-Americans to date white people in other, 
previously inaccessible, parts of their communities.  He illustrates “excessive” 
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manifestations of car use, for example, by quoting from a magazine interview with an 
African-American pop-star on the subject of car-audio equipment: 
 
“Let’s just say I spent a nice piece”, says Usher of his CR210 car stereo with 
removable face plate and six bass box speakers all by Becker/Porsche, and his 
two 250 watt Rockford Fosgate Punch amps…Usher…says he’s hitting about a 
block and a half on the Ghettometer.  (The Source 1988 cited in Gilroy, 2001, p. 
97) 
 
Gilroy (2001, p. 84) says that African-Americans’ “distinctive history of 
propertylessness and material deprivation has inclined them towards a disproportionate 
investment in particular forms of property that are publicly visible and the status that 
corresponds to them”.  From this angle, freedom becomes merely “the opportunity to 
shop on the same terms as other more privileged citizens”, so that the effects of 
subordination can be reversed or mitigated through consumption of objects such as cars 
(Gilroy, 2001, p. 86).  On the one hand, “status purchasing” of cars by African-
Americans can be transgressive, according to Gilroy (2001, p. 84), because it suggests 
that “official scripts of respectable domesticity and deferred gratification” can be 
surpassed.  He says: “here the ‘official’ value given to these prizes by a world of work 
and wages is supposedly altered or at least ironically commented upon in a counter-
axiology which may become quite elaborate”.  On the other hand, African-American car 
use is “defined most obviously by the mood of anxious individuals who want to answer 
the impact of racism on their lives by buying in rather than dropping out [and who 
accept] these objects as a means to seem wealthier, prouder and thus more respectable” 
(Gilroy, 2001, pp. 86-87).  In either case, for Gilroy (2001, p. 87) these effects represent 
the “victory of car culture” and must be considered as “secondary to our grasp of the 
destructive and corrosive consequences of automotivity and motorization”.  
As Miller (2001, p. 22) argues, what Gilroy illustrates is the repression hidden behind 
what can seem like an expressive relationship, exposing understandings “that fail to 
comprehend the implications of consumption for core alignments and misalignments as 
here between race and class”.  By exploring how the car can be understood as the 
product of this particular cultural context, Gilroy (2001) creates a much more nuanced 
and far-reaching argument about the question of what the car means or how it acts and 
generates social action, even though its status as a destructive force is never in doubt.  
These explorations go much deeper than the concerns of externalities work, for 
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example, by focusing on what else the car has entailed aside from questions about 
safety, congestion, and environmental harm – no matter how crucial these may be.  
Studies of entailments also go much further than the dominant genre of research into the 
car, because, despite its special force, the car is not a totally determining actor.  Far 
more than a mere product, an inert commodity, or a neutral piece of technology, the 
automobile is an “index of hegemony”, becoming “a social and political actor that 
shapes the industrial and de-industrialising worlds through which it moves even as it 
damages both them and us” (Gilroy, 2001, p. 86). 
 
Jain (2004, p. 61) highlights the inequity of a world where pedestrians cannot hold car-
manufacturers responsible for design deficiencies that can cause them serious injury or 
even death.  Jain (2004) makes contingent taken-for-granted legal and social assumption 
that manufacturers are not generally liable for vehicle design deficiencies.  She argues 
that subject positions such as the “bad mother”, “the clumsy child”, or “negligent 
driver” that feature in the legal framework of automobility in the US: 
 
undergird the criminalization and hyperregulation enabling the cultural and 
economic hegemony of the car in their serving as explanatory models for death 
and injury. The illocutionary adjectives of bad mother or clumsy child make the 
process of subject formation as invisible as the injurious results of unregulated 
automobile design. (Jain, 2004, p. 82) 
 
Her research highlights that one who buys a Volvo or SUV for the safety of their own 
children, “may just as soon kill the child in the driveway” (Jain 2004, p. 85).  Unlike 
externalities work, this particular type of “making strange” in relation to the car sheds 
light upon sources of some of the taken-for-granted personal and shared values and 
relationships that are held about automobility (Miller, 2001, p. 17), while at the same 
time situating the car in its wider politico-economic context.  
 
The question of how these relationships are directly experienced from the everyday 
point of view of those who experience them remains open in these cases however.  
Gilroy (2001) illustrates his points with reference to song lyrics, for example.  However, 
Wiese’s (2004) history of 20th century suburbanization actually provides some 
ethnographic perspectives on the effects of this (suburbanization) process and is written 
from the point of view of African-Americans who were affected.  According to Wiese 
(2004, pp. 40-41/43) the car not only cut a swathe through African-American 
neighbourhoods, creating socially dispersed yet spatially segregated spaces in the 
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process, it also worked to continually enforce and renew the segregation that had 
already been a feature of discriminatory trends in public policy, public space, land use 
planning, banking, and real estate.  Wiese (2004, p. 7) alludes to the contingency of 
social identity which “gives life to persistent racial and class identities through time” 
and traces the coextensive emergence of the African-American middle class and black 
suburbanization.  His analysis is enriched by the inclusion of in-depth interviews with 
African-Americans who had been affected or displaced by suburbanization, which lends 
this crucial sense of how transformative change affects the lives of actual individuals 
touched by it – or “humanity”, as Miller (2001) would describe it.  However, Wiese’s 
(2004) analysis is primarily concerned with housing and does not really provide a 
perspective on how the car itself was implicated in this process. 
  
Many of the studies that fall into the category of “entailments” actually include accounts 
of lived experience (e.g. Bull, 2001; Garvey, 2001; Maxwell, 2001; O’Dell, 2001; Stotz, 
2001; Verrips and Meyer, 2001, and Young, 2001)3.  Yet nearly all focus on exceptional 
or sub-cultural experiences (O’Dell, 2001; Garvey, 2001), the lived experiences of 
minorities contextualised in opposition to dominant social groupings (Stotz, 2001; 
Young, 2001), or contexts that are vastly different to the concerns of this project 
(Verrips and Meyer, 2001).  However, Maxwell’s (2001, p. 203) study of the 
experiences of Cambridge commuters is exemplary for including everyday lived 
perspectives, demonstrating how “deep public concerns for both social and 
environmental consequences of increasing levels of car use” coexist with positive 
meanings “embedded in social relations which are only articulated in extremely 
fragmented form”.  Presenting an analysis of in-depth focus group discussion, Maxwell 
(2001) pivots the study of Cambridge commuters around the anxiety and guilt many of 
them feel towards their car usage, which manifests in strategies where commuters 
struggle to make sense of car use in light of their emotions.  The themes of commuter 
                                                          
3 Two essays in Car Cultures more fully acknowledge the significance of technology to 
the constitution of social life and Miller (2001) categorises them as studies of the car’s 
entailments.  However, both of these are concerned with a specific sub-set of practices 
associated with the everyday – audio-system usage (Bull, 2001) and road rage (Michael, 
2001) –  and do not investigate the connections between media framing of policy and 
the range of practices of the system.  Nevertheless, Michael (2001) is discussed below 
in the context of ANT and hybridity. 
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strategies include a lack of choice in relation to car use, a lack of acknowledgement of 
their own agency in contributing to the consequences of car use, a delegation of 
responsibility to the government and others, as well as the mitigation of anxiety through 
the actual reduction of car use and dependence.   
 
While “entailments” research provide new horizons for what the automobile means, 
only Maxwell (2001) explores a range of quotidian practices associated with the car, 
particularly ones that are shared and not just individual.  These everyday practices are 
critical to the exploration of my problematic.  However, it cannot simply be assumed 
that the UK perspectives of commuters are identical to the Irish experience, and in 
addition Maxwell (2001) also does not directly investigate how policy and strategies 
about automobility are framed in the media.  But in order to properly interrogate the 
interconnections between this framing and the practices of the system, the socio-
technical characteristics of the automobile first need to be explored in more detail, 
before the justification of my investigation of car-commuting practices in the Irish 
context is opened-out. 
 
Towards methodological considerations   
 
The existing research already explored has been argued to suffer from a number of 
issues.  These variously include the lack of a socio-political or economic 
contextualisation of the car, a tendency towards technological determinism where a 
limited range of actors involved in the constitution of automobility are conceptualised, 
or the need to draw more effectively on the lived experience of driving.  However, 
much better scaffolding for thinking about my research problem can be achieved by 
building on frameworks that fully emphasise the systemic nature of the car and driving 
and the socio-technical constitution of this system.  Analysis of these frameworks 
begins in this section with the concept of “automobility” (Sheller and Urry, 2000; Urry, 
2005), before exploring the car-driver assemblage (Dant, 2005), ANT (e.g. Callon, 
1986; Law and Hassard, 1999), and linking these to the argument for thinking about 
automobility in terms of the dispositif of road safety in Ireland (Foucault, 1975).  Each 
of these concepts augments the previous one and provides the scaffolding from within 
which the current research is designed.  First, the concept of automobility highlights the 
full extent of the systemic nature of the car as a socio-technical system.  Next, Dant’s 
(2005) car-driver assemblage is offered as a theoretically coherent way to interrogate 
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the car-driver or passenger as a socio-technical hybrid circulating within the system.  
The concept of the dispositif is then elaborated upon to provide a rationale for the 
investigation of the road safety aspects of the system that have been researched for this 
project.  I argue in this section how these methodological considerations offer a 
framework to disrupt media-centric assumptions about the constitution of the networks 
of automobility in Ireland, because they point to the complex and diverse materiality of 
the system instead. 
 
Automobility and the socio-technical constitution of the car 
 
While some of the interconnections between cars, people, culture, and society have 
already been highlighted, it is Sheller and Urry (2000) and Urry (2005) who most fully 
address the potential breath of these relationships, considered in terms of 
“automobility”.  This concept is arguably the most comprehensive attempt to consider 
the car in a fully systemic way.  As a “viral” system that emanated from America at the 
end of the 19th century, automobility “locked-in” economies to the infrastructure, 
products, and services of the petroleum-steel motorcar, and societies to an 
individualised conception of mobility that “is neither socially necessary nor inevitable 
but has seemed impossible to break from” (Urry, 2005, p. 27).  Urry’s (2005, p. 26) map 
of the broad dimensions under which automobility can be addressed encompasses 
apparently discrete issues of political and economic theory, social history, culture, and 
consumption but connects them together as part of the same socio-technical system.  
For Urry (2005, pp. 25-26), automobility is made up of six components that together 
constitute its “specific character of domination”.  These comprise the automobile as the 
quintessential manufactured object of the 20th century, where sociological concepts such 
as Fordism and Post-Fordism derive;  “the major item of individual consumption after 
housing” which telegraphs values such as “speed, security, safety, sexual desire, career 
success, freedom, family”, and masculinity; a powerful technical and social complex 
constituted through its linkages with industry; “the predominant form of ‘quasi-private’ 
mobility that subordinates other mobilities…and recognizes how people negotiate the 
opportunities for, and constrains upon, work, family life, childhood, leisure and 
pleasure”; “the dominant culture that sustains major discourses of what constitutes the 
good life”, and “the single most important cause of environmental resource use”.  
Because of its systemic nature, research into automobility requires interdisciplinarity 
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and is challenging.  However, according to Conley and McLaren (2009, p. 17), 
“[w]orking across disciplines allows for greater insight into how automobility is 
entangled with material and social life globally and in specific cultural contexts”.   
 
The socio-technical nature of automobility – that is how the technology “and its culture 
are embodied in… economic organisations and social institutions” (Constant, 1989, p. 
229) – and the complex actor-networks of human-object assemblages it engenders, are 
some of its differentiating features compared to the other approaches that have already 
been explored.  The evocation of the technical or socio-technical does not necessarily 
imply a focus on complex computerised systems, however.  Instead, the term “socio-
technical” draws attention to ways in which social functions are performed or shaped by 
technology conceived as meaning both simpler and more complex systems (Cooper, 
2008, p. 13).  Although a complex system, the car has been around for approximately 
125 years, so how it shapes social action is not just expressed by the way it has 
integrated more recent telecommunication technologies.  It is also described in how the 
car continually shapes social relations and has done for more than a century, in ways 
that are impossible without the peculiar coming together of technical and social 
elements and human and non-human entities.  Urry (2005, p. 28) illustrates some of this 
capability here:  
 
Automobility is a source of freedom, the “freedom of the road”. Its flexibility 
enables the car-driver to travel at any time in any direction along the 
complex road systems of western societies that link together most houses, 
workplaces and leisure sites (and are publicly paid for). Cars extend where 
people can go to and hence what they are literally able to do. Much “social 
life” could not be undertaken without the flexibilities of the car and its 24- 
hour availability. It is possible to leave late by car, to miss connections, to 
travel in a relatively time-less fashion.   
 
The utility of the model of automobility can be seen in its application to and extension 
within various empirical studies.  For example, Edensor (2005, p. 101) considers 
everyday mundane settings which generate a sense of nationhood.  Emphasising the 
fluid patterning of automobility, while also underlining how it is always contextually 
based, Edensor explores how the matrix of nationhood intersects with that of 
automobility.  Edensor (2005, pp. 108/112) combines analysis of diverse representations 
of iconic cars in Britain and detail of the specific nature of “national motorscapes” in 
Britain, India, and America, with an observational account of driving “performances” in 
India.   The inclusion of “motorscapes” and “performances” highlights the contextual 
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specificity of national manifestations of automobility.  Edensor (2005, p. 118) finds that 
certain models of cars have symbolic meaning in national contexts which coincide with 
lived everyday experience.  While he argues that globalizing processes redistribute 
national identity, he finds little evidence that “post-national identities are emerging out 
of globalizing processes” (Edensor, 2005, p. 118).  Instead, the matrix of nationhood 
expands to incorporate extraordinary (e.g. Rolls-Royce) and everyday objects (e.g. the 
Mini4) that reproduce the sense of national identity.  Edensor (2005) brings together 
analysis of representations of cars in England with an account of driving in India, in a 
coherent examination that illuminates the global and contextual nature of automobility 
and emphasises nationhood as an actor within local constitutions of automobility.  Such 
a juxtaposition might otherwise seem disjoined were it not for the structuring logic of 
the automobility framework.   
 
Kosher (2005, p. 123) also interrogates conceptions of nationhood and the car to find an 
historical “exchange and synthesis across national borders… out of which both 
relatively stable and transient definitions and representations of the car’s national 
belongingness emerge”.  He argues that the way in which cars are constituted as 
national possessions is conditioned by meanings that are transnational and permeate the 
car to include car parts (such as fins) which also constitute national identity:  “Such 
part-whole relations reflected how transient auto-meaning could be, shifting abruptly 
from certain parts of cars to the whole, then to national or even international levels” 
(Kosher, 2005, pp. 132-133).  Kosher’s (2005) analysis of car magazines’ discussions of 
the Anglo-German facets of the car not only traces ways in which their characteristics 
have been represented as nationally specific, it also problematizes the notion of the car 
as a stable object, because the car as a thing-in-itself appears as just one level of 
meaning-making around national identity in specific contexts of automobility, 
reemphasising its networked and complex nature. 
 
 
                                                          
4 The original Mini perhaps fits the description of the everyday car, but its “classless” 
characteristics have always been appropriated by celebrity and the wealthy.  The 
reinterpreted, 21st century BMW Mini foregrounds the more aspirational characteristic, 
arguably at the expense of its everyday credentials.   
45 
 
Like Edensor (2005), Merriman (2005) positions mobility not as movement across 
space but as the performance of place.  Merriman (2005, p. 146) critiques a view of 
place considered as “meaningful, lived, rooted, organic and symbolic sites with which 
individuals develop fairly long-standing attachments”.  Writers such as Augé (1995), for 
example, conceive of motorways and airports as “non-places” lacking sociality because 
they are merely “spaces of circulation, communication and consumption” rather than 
occupation (Augé, 1996, p. 178).   But for Merriman (2005, p. 146), places are actually 
ordered together “through the folding … of different materials, atmospheres, spaces and 
times”.  This allows Merriman (2005) to consider the meaning of spaces as subject to 
change through time and context.  For example, he traces the topology of the M1 
motorway in England that emerges through its plans, maps, construction materials, and 
objections to the road, to find historically specific constructions of the motorway and its 
services as exciting and much-visited public areas, rather than the boring places they 
subsequently became.  Merriman (2005, p. 151) criticises Augé for failing to recognise 
that while “sociality and solitariness are seen as functions of unmediated human 
interaction”, this overlooks the way in which human interaction is mediated in non-
places by ever increasing “texts, screens and images”.  Thus, rather than asocial non-
places, “social networks are bound up with the production of...environments” such as 
motorway service areas.  As Latour (1993) has done before, Merriman (2005) argues 
that Augé ignores the socio-technical nature of human relationships and how virtual 
relations can “construct a familiar sociality” (Frow, 1997, p. 77).  While motorway 
services or airport terminals may indeed engender boredom and solitariness, this is not 
an essential characteristic, nor indeed is boredom limited to places such as these.  
Instead such characteristics are relational and/or historically specific, partial, and 
incomplete.  As already highlighted, Merriman (2005, p. 158) shows how “drivers and 
vehicles perform in, and are constituted through, complex networks of sociality and 
materiality”.  This draws attention to the ways in which the traceable characteristics of 
these entities will also always be contextually specific, as well as to the full extent of the 
actors and practices involved in the constitution of the system.   
 
Studies of automobility show how ostensibly eclectic sites and methods of research can 
be weaved together and that it is actually necessary to do this in order to trace and make 
coherent the constitution of the complex networks of the car-system.  The insights of 
these studies also inform us that automobility is constituted in a contingent socio-
historical present where concepts such as nationhood, place, car, and driver are not 
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merely defined by borders, geography, or location, but by material manifestations of 
systemic arrangements of cars, humans, culture, environments, and technologies.  These 
arrangements reflect social and cultural conventions and power relations that are in 
themselves complex networks of contingent entities, which vary for their conceptual 
stability, persistence, and globalised characteristics.  All of these insights highlight how 
automobility in Ireland should be considered in similarly complex networks that are 
unique to the Irish context, but which at the same time are contingent and subject to 
change.   
 
Hybrid entities, the car-driver assemblage and ANT 
 
One feature that is implied in terms of the socio-technical constitution of the car in 
automobility is the notion of hybridity.  For Urry (2005, p. 26) “the car-driver is a 
hybrid assemblage of specific human activities, machines, roads, buildings, signs and 
cultures of mobility”.  But the ways in which this hybrid can be conceptualised varies, 
so it merits further discussion.  I argue for the adaption of Dant’s (2005) concept of the 
car-driver assemblage, as opposed to conceptualising this human-machine entity as a 
hybrid or cyborg for example, and explore the incorporation of ANT into the 
conceptualisation of this assemblage and into the concept of automobility itself.   
 
Dant (2005, p. 61) notes the absence of research into the car’s ability to shape “the form 
and content of social action” in the way automobilities particularly enables.  His 
purpose is to explore the ways in which “the assemblage of the driver-car”, a social 
being that produces a range of social actions associated with the car, co-constitutes 
automobility (Dant, 2005, p. 61).  These social actions include “driving, transporting, 
consuming, polluting, killing, communicating and so on” (Dant, 2005, pp. 61-62).  
Dant’s (2005, p. 62) aim “is to begin to develop a theoretical understanding of the way 
in which this assemblage [of car-driver] is formed”.  He wants to find out how 
collaborations between people and machines together contribute to societal formation 
and also “give them particular characteristics and features” (Dant, 2005, pp. 62-63).  
 
Dant (2005) is dissatisfied with the nature of the subject-object that emerges from some 
socio-technical theorisation, arguing against the car-driver considered as a cyborg or 
hybrid.  As a cyborg, the car-driver becomes reified and fixed or permanent, whereas 
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the car “is a temporary assemblage within which the human remains complete in his or 
her self” (Dant, 2005, p. 62).  He argues that neither the car nor the driver acting 
separately can bring about the type of actions that they can when combined.  For Dant 
(2005, p. 62), it is that forms of social action associated with the car-driver have become 
“routine and habitual”, rather than fixed.  As a temporary assemblage the car-driver is 
de-essentialised and the forms of social action that constitute this assemblage become 
visible for analysis.   
 
Dant’s (2005) criticisms of ideas of hybridity and cyborgs in favour of the idea of the 
assemblage emphasises the particularity and contingency of the combination of driver 
and car that the implied permanence of these alternative entities does not address.  For 
example, writers such as Thrift (2005) also explore the more theoretical nature of the 
socio-technical complex of automobility.  Thrift (2005) emphasises the hybridisation of 
the car with other technical rather than human systems, although these can of course be 
viewed as socio-technical in themselves.  In Thrift’s discussion of hybridity, facets of 
the car’s operation normally undertaken by humans become delegated to other 
technological networks such as active cruise control systems or autonomous braking, 
for example.  These technical systems work within fixed software-written parameters 
(scripts), despite their ability “to sense (their) environment, make judgements and act 
accordingly” (Featherstone, 2005, p. 10).  Although these systems can typically be 
switched in and out, to the extent that they are in operation they can be viewed as 
permanent combinations of similar object types, i.e. hybrids (Dant, 2005, p. 62 after 
Latour, 1996, p. 150).  Dant’s car-driver assemblages on the other hand “can be 
endlessly re-formed and re-assembled” (Dant, 2005, p. 61).   
 
According to Dant (2005), applying ANT to the routine of driving works is useful 
because it draws attention to the expanse and sociality of the connections and networks 
that make up the assemblage of driver-car.  The concept of the actor-network recognises 
“that actors build networks combining technical and social elements of these networks 
and that the elements of these networks…are, at the same time, both constituted and 
shaped within those networks” (Stanforth, 2007, p. 38).  Technologies, such as the car, 
are conditioned “by the interplay of a range of heterogeneous forces” within these 
networks (Stanforth, 2007, p. 38).  In other words, technology does not follow “a 
predetermined course with a logic of its own” (Dusek, 2006, p. 4).  It could be argued 
that the concept of automobility itself draws enough attention to the connections that 
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constitute it.  However, ANT more explicitly accounts for how actors are transformed 
when they come together.  Other concepts such as the “affordance” (Gibson, 1982; 
Dant, 2005) also attempt to grasp how objects and people relate to their material 
environment.  Yet Dant (2005) criticises affordance as overemphasising human agency 
and ignoring the complexity of social processes and intentions that create new kinds of 
agency in drivers and cars together that ANT makes visible.    
 
As already noted, ANT conceives of a world filled with fluid networks of temporary 
hybrid entities, such as the car-driver assemblage, the conception of which negates the 
need for their human and non-human components to be analysed separately.  Callon 
(1986, p. 196) proposes the equal treatment of hybrids in an idea he calls “agnosticism”, 
privileging neither the technical nor the social, the human or the non-human.   Indeed, 
ANT posits the abandonment of distinctions between the different worlds of the social, 
technical, or natural (Callon, 1986).  ANT says that it is possible “to consider a path of 
an innovation in which all the actors co-evolve” (Latour, 1991, p. 117).  It is not that 
there are no divisions (true/false, big small, agency/structure, human/non-human, 
power/knowledge and so on), rather they are all understood as effects or outcomes (Law 
and Hassard, 1999, p. 3).  Instead of questioning whether an entity is “social” or 
“technical” then, ANT asks “is this association stronger or weaker than that one?” 
(Latour, 1988, p. 27).  Essentialist distinctions and divisions between the technological 
and the social are abandoned and “thrown on the bonfire of the dualisms” (Law and 
Hassard, 1999, p. 3).   
 
Citing Latour’s (1999) famous example of how neither the gun nor citizen act alone, 
killing only when they are combined, Dant (2005, p. 70) says that the citizen-gun acts 
 
towards a quite different goal than either could have achieved independently.  It 
is in this sense that the assemblage of the driver-car brings about a form of social 
being and set of social actions that is different from other forms of beings and 
action.   
 
Going-on to point to the limits of ANT, however, Dant (2005) argues that while objects 
are lifeless they are made by people with intentions and these intentions are designed 
into objects.  As a result, all non-human actors are suffused with the intentionality of 
humans. Despite how people’s actions are shaped and limited by institutions, this does 
not make humans and non-humans equivalent in terms of their agency (Dant, 2005, p. 
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71).  Dant (2005, p. 69) also notes ANT’s tendency towards “textual gloss”, that is, the 
diminution of all social actions by the theorist to communicative ones, as well as  “the 
general absence of any attempt to explore how the human and non-human actors 
interact”.  As a result, as in the case of Latour’s (1996) study of the failed Aramis 
transport system, ANT “leaves much unsaid about the routine, everyday, lived, 
embodied relationships between human beings and material objects around them”, 
relationships that – as has already been argued – are critical to the exploration of my 
problematic (Dant, 2005, p. 71).   
 
The applicability of ANT can be seen in Michael’s (2001, p. 80) essay, for example, 
that focuses on the particular problem of road rage and how emotions become structured 
by “the complex but mundane technology” that is the car.  Michael (2001) traces how 
the car “as a material and semiotic object…contributes to emotional conventions in their 
ambiguity”.  For Michael (2001) this ambiguity reflects contradictory “scripts” that are 
encoded in the technology of the car.  These include invocations to be good, careful, 
forgiving; or, fast, efficient, and aggressive (Michael, 2001, p. 80).  Sometimes these 
roles are in unison and sometimes they conflict.  In the case of cars, culturally 
embedded rules are convoluted, inconsistent, both semiotic and material, and “serve in 
the reproduction of complex, even antithetical” and “subversive modes of behaviour”.  
But Michael (2001) does not include insights from drivers themselves, focusing instead 
on specific discourses about road rage, and one particular set of practices, rather than 
the range of practices associated with the quotidian world of automobility that I am 
interested in.   
 
Dant (2005, p. 75) invokes Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) Phenomenology of Perception to 
surmount the issues he perceives with ANT and give proper credence to “the embodied 
and intentional nature of human relationships with objects”.  Possibilities of action are 
produced by the driver-car assemblage that become ordinary tangible forms of social 
action.  People become oriented to a social world that is partially constituted by the 
forms of action the car-driver assemblage makes possible: 
 
Social institutions – legal systems, the conventions of driving, traffic 
management – develop to embed the co-ordinated habits of driver-cars within 
the social fabric.  The use of cars is not simply functional, a matter of 
convenience, nor is reducible to individual, conscious decision.  (Dant, 2005, p. 
74) 
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Dant’s (2005) contribution is to elaborate on automobility’s insights, revealing an 
assemblage of the driver-car that acknowledges the intentions of people, the intentions 
baked into objects (Ormrod, 1994) and the embodied or material (rather than merely 
textual) nature of the relationships they together produce (see also Merriman 2005).  
This implies the inclusion of these experiences in the consideration of how the car 
shapes social action.   
 
My project draws on insights into the range of both human and non-human actors, 
including the temporary assemblages of car-drivers, that constitute the networks of 
automobility.  But while ANT urges us to follow and accumulate actors as they become 
important to the constitution of the network (Latour, 2005, p. 29) and draws attention to 
the salient question of which associations of actors are stronger or weaker in a network 
(Latour, 1988, p. 27), it does not provide guidance on which aspects of the associations 
to focus on in the first place.  Dant (2005, pp. 61-62, as quoted above) elaborates some 
of the forms of actions the car-driver assemblage makes possible.  But the range of 
potential actions and associations are immense and complex, so these insights need to 
be properly applied to the context of my research. 
  
Automobility and the dispositif of road safety 
 
Mapping the concept of the dispositif (Foucault, 1975) on to the issue of road safety in 
Ireland provides a rationale for an exploration of the system of automobility that can 
address the central question of my research.  A dispositif or apparatus is a successful 
formation of power/knowledge relations (Thiele, 1986).  The idea of power/knowledge 
relations conceives of power not as a commodity or possession of an institution or 
person (Townley, 1993, p. 520).  Instead, power/knowledge emphasises how power is 
associated “with practices, techniques, and procedures…employed at all levels and 
through many dimensions” and is thus relational (Townley, 1993, p. 520).  Rather than 
viewing the site of research (for example an institution) as a discrete entity, Foucault 
“cut reality in a different way” (Rabinow and Rose, 2003, p. xv).  As has already been 
introduced, a dispositif or apparatus is a “heterogeneous ensemble of discursive and 
non-discursive elements” that 
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are linked together by their common response to an “urgent need” at a particular 
historical moment.  They all address, or rather figure in, the attempted resolution 
of a particular problem (which may stem from political, economic, demographic, 
or other factors). Unified into general strategies, these relations of power-
knowledge lend each other the common support necessary for their victory, 
which in turn is expressed in their formation and in the maintenance of an 
apparatus.  (Thiele, 1986, p. 255)  
 
The particular relations that comprise a dispositif “condition, shape, and constrain our 
everyday actuality” (Hamann, 2009, p. 43).  The dispositif that is produced as a solution 
to problems in society is characteristic of the society that gives rise to it and exists 
among other possible solutions that could be proffered, but have failed (Thiele, 1986, p. 
255).  The car, for example, is a successful solution to the problems of transportation, a 
given answer to the question of how to extend the distance and speed that can be 
travelled by horse.  But it is only one answer, others of which have manifested in the 
train, the bus, the plane, and the Ekranoplan (figure. 1).  Most cars are also still fossil-
fuelled, rather than electric.  In turn, the form of sociality and the self, and the 
underlying apparatus the car generates or is generated around it, are distinctive to the 
histories and societies developing them.  As Wolf (1996, p. 111) points out, the car did 
ideological work for both capitalism and communism (see also Rajan [2006] for 
example).  This reemphasises the insight that while the car is a global phenomenon and 
can have generic features, how it manifests as practices and shapes subjectivities in 
particular contexts is shaped by the needs, norms, and culture of that society.  These 
also shape the particular ways solutions to the problems the car solves manifest, for 
example in the Irish context.   
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Figure 1:  An Ekranoplan. 
 
As well as being the solution to a problem, the apparatus of the car also contains within 
it sets of solutions to other problems it has itself created (Foucault 2001).  Virilio (1999) 
for instance notes that every technology is accompanied by an integral accident.  The 
road traffic accident is arguably the most immediate and personal antagonism of car-use 
from the perspective of its users in that it contains within it the very real possibility of 
imminent death (Bohm, et al., 2006).  The car crash is an answer to the question:  “what 
is the consequence of the limitations of control strategies whose urgent need is to 
prevent road traffic accidents or mitigate their outcomes to within socially acceptable 
limits?”  As such, the “solution” of the road traffic accident is a telos of a range of 
interventions, practices and experiences promulgated as failures of strategies of control.  
In the example of the road traffic accident, in order to explore my problematic, the task 
becomes the investigation of the dispositif of road safety that addresses this particular 
problem and sometimes outputs in the car-crash.  The dispositif is often articulated in 
policy documents which are in turn mediated by the news media and popular cultural 
texts and in the everyday practices of drivers.  The dispositif is what links together the 
range of actors and objects into a temporarily coherent system that addresses this urgent 
need within automobility – one that expresses a more or less coherent ideological 
framework.  In the current research, the dispositif of road safety therefore represents a 
way-in to better investigate the sources of some of the taken-for-granted relationships 
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“that we have and hold around automobility” (Miller, 2001, p. 17).  The mediated 
policy context of the Donegal accident and the introduction of a speed camera network 
in Ireland enable us to explore the dispositif of road safety in order to begin to 
problematize a media-centric view of the relationships between how policy is framed 
and the practices of the system of automobility and highlight the complexity of their 
material and social forms instead.   
 
Lived experience and the everyday: denaturalising car-commuting in 
Ireland 
 
It is important to emphasise though that the investigation of the problematic of the 
current research also requires exploring driving practice from the point of view of the 
users of automobility.  That ANT studies have been argued to omit the direct 
investigation quotidian relationships between humans and objects (Dant, 2005, pp. 70-
71), such as those between the car-driver and the system of automobility itself, 
underlines the importance of this aspect of the research.  Indeed, Foucault was 
concerned “to develop an analytic that could make visible the vectors that shape our 
relation to ourselves” (Rabinow and Rose, 2003, p. 14) and considered the human 
subject “the site of a multiplicity of practices or labors” (Rabinow and Rose, 2003, p. 
15).  Exploration of these vectors and practices is less complete without the inclusion of 
lived experience in that equation.  Both Miller (2001) and Redshaw (2008, p. 10) 
emphasise the need to consider the car and driver at the same time, “rather than simply 
viewing each separately and emphasising one at the expense of the other”.  Thrift 
(2005), Dant (2005), and de Certeau (1984) all emphasise the consideration of “the 
embodied practices of driving and being a passenger, produced by the system of 
automobility” (Redshaw, 2008, p. 15).  It is preferable, as Redshaw (2008, p. 15) notes, 
to focus on both the car and “the lived experiences of people engaged with cars, traffic 
and systems of automobility” if one wants to more directly consider these practices 
together.   
 
Researchers who have included qualitative insights from the lived experience of 
automobility and attempt to relate the car to a wider everyday context include Maxwell 
(2001), Laurier (2005), and Laurier, et al. (2008).  Laurier’s (2005, p. 265) empirical 
work which included “observations of and reports from drivers” was produced in the 
UK and does not emphasise the mediated nature of automobility, nor the role of 
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mediated articulations of road safety.  Nevertheless, Laurier’s valuable insights are 
explored in Chapter 4, as they are generated with specific reference to automobility’s 
implications for work-life, which that chapter explores.  As noted previously, in his 
interviews with Cambridge drivers Maxwell (2001, p. 215) found that anxiety around an 
increasing awareness of the social and environmental consequences of the car clash with 
positive associations about its use:  “Car use can often be an expression of help, care or 
love” when journeys are taken with family members, he notes.  Maxwell (2001) argues 
convincingly that such positive characteristics should be included by transportation 
policymakers – who instead concentrate on increasing choices by improving public 
transport alternatives – and by academic studies which (also) can assume a model of 
behaviour which is too individualistic.  By exploring practices around car-commuting, 
what can be highlighted are the vectors of understanding that emerge within the 
dispositif of road safety and the ways such engagements go toward the constitution of 
actually existing social practices in automobility.  With the inclusion of this lived 
experience, a clearer picture of the extent to which mediated policies of road safety 
figure in people’s practices – or not – can be drawn, problematizing a media-centric 
assumption about the constitution of social life (Couldry, 2004).   
 
However, Latour (1999, p. 23) argues that the durability of a network results “when 
actors feel no need to spend time opening and looking inside black-boxes, but just 
accept these as given”.  Accepted as “given” is exactly how commuting by car has come 
to be viewed.  Commuting is often a sphere of back-grounded, unthought-of, or 
autonomic activities “which take up so many hours of our lives but are rarely the source 
of cultural anxiety or contestation” (Moran, 2005, p. 28).  As Moran (2005, p. 16) notes, 
media stories about everyday life such as commuting, “involve the construction of 
normalcy without obvious signifiers of otherness”.  Moran (2005, p. 59) argues the 
ordinary representation of the commute in media and political discourse is “a ritual of 
democratic belonging…essentially apolitical, ignoring more problematic issues about 
transport, work, and public space”.  For Moran (2005, p. 27), the “apparent inertia of 
daily routine” also hides “historical and political contexts that are never acknowledged 
as such”.  To make commuting strange then, to explore its problematic contexts and 
issues, the factors that make it lose its familiarity and certainty or which provoke “a 
certain number of difficulties around it” need to be highlighted (Rabinow and Rose, 
2003, p. 13).  The road traffic accident allows us to prize open the “black-box” that the 
car-driver represents when conceived as a simplified node in the commuting network 
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(Latour, 1999).  It helps us view the assemblage of car-driver, not as “a ‘point object’, 
but an association of heterogeneous elements themselves constituting a network” as part 
of automobility (Tatnall and Gilding, 2002, p. 959; Law, 1992).  Commuting has its 
own imperatives which in actuality are also a loose “ensemble of practices, imaginings, 
logos, knowledges and artifacts” (Mackenzie, 2006, p. 95), of which the dispositif of 
road safety plays a part.   
 
Maxwell (2001) explores how debates about the car emerge and clash with the concerns 
of commuters, and as noted, he does so without explicitly analysing the back-drop of 
media debate about the car in which the apparatus of the road safety is an important 
visible factor.  But it cannot be simply taken for granted how road safety policy and its 
mediation shapes commuters into “a thinkable and manageable form” (Rabinow and 
Rose, 2003, p. 15).  This needs to be investigated.  Road safety policy and its mediation 
offers a route into analysing commuting as a social problem.  Road traffic accidents can 
result from commuting journeys, so road safety is an arena in which commuting 
becomes uncertain, unfamiliar, and potentially fraught with difficulties (Foucault, 
1984a, p. 23).   The dispositif of road safety is an actor in how the social practices of 
commuting are experienced and understood.  To explore commuting practices is to 
problematize the media’s centrality to these practices.   
 
The dispositif of road safety is not the only route available to the investigation of 
automobility in Ireland however.  Issues of congestion could also open up the realm of 
commuting, as would issues of environmental harm for example, in line with a 
consideration of automobility’s antagonisms (Bohm, et al., 2006).  Arguably, neither of 
these areas are as obviously and graphically mediatised and emotive in the everyday 
context.  Congestion and environmental concerns have articulations in government 
policies such as those around electric cars and in the everyday experience of traffic jams 
that find their mediated articulation most obviously in drive-time radio reports of 
commuting congestion.  But instances from these contexts would arguably not evince as 
much insight into how automobility shapes the form and content of social action (Dant, 
2005) in the way the dispositif of road safety and the lived experience of commuting 
can together.  Research could also be conducted about other types of car journeys such 
as those taken for enjoyment and pleasure, those taken by enthusiasts, and those taken 
by professional drivers (for example taxi drivers - Verrips and Meyer [2001]).  
However, in these cases the connection to the generic experience of the quotidian use of 
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the car would be lost or insights would be restricted to times that constitute exceptional 
experience.  While some such insights become included in the experiences of driving 
practices explored here, the focus on everyday commuting experience more 
appropriately contextualises any exceptional insights as parts of a whole, rather than the 
nexus of research itself.   
Methods 
 
Having rationalised my focus on the dispositif of road safety and the lived experience of 
commuting, in this section I will describe the methods used in the study and how the 
research proceeded.  As already introduced, in order to examine how strategies of road 
safety policy circulate in automobility constituting the dispositif of road safety in 
relation to both mediation and practice, a punctuating point is needed.  This is required 
because of the impossibility of analysing all of the dispositif given the potentially 
infinite nature of its networks.  The mediated policy context of the worst accident ever 
provides one such a point of rupture; a place to start that enables us to follow networks 
of actors and the relationships between them as a transient network of meaning-making 
objects that constitute the dispositif of road safety in Ireland.  As argued, the Donegal 
accident is where the failure of government initiatives to manage road safety to within 
socially acceptable limits is thrown into sharp relief.  Analysis of this context brings 
into view the actors – textual and non-textual – that mediate automobility.  Included 
here are The Irish Times, bodies like the RSA, and policy documents such as the Road 
Safety Strategy.  However, where indicated, actors are followed to online discussion 
fora as these become important sites where the dispositif of road safety is further 
mediated and contested.  In addition, it is necessary to explore practices of car-
commuting in order to understand how people engage with the mediation of the 
dispositif of road safety and how such engagements go toward the constitution of 
actually existing social practices in automobility.  This necessity is underscored by 
Dant’s (2005) notion of the car-driver assemblage which indicates that actors are 
transformed when they come together and that the assemblage can shape social actions 
in particular contexts that are lived.  How the assemblage works in these ways cannot be 
understood without investigating these lived contexts. 
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Print media, policy and online texts 
 
Within the point of rupture of the mediated policy context of the Donegal accident, it is 
further necessary to create artificial, yet properly justified barriers around the selection 
of texts in order to facilitate and focus the analysis.  As already noted, my exploration of 
the Donegal accident begins with its representation in The Irish Times.  This is because 
The Irish Times is still considered the newspaper of record both by writers and 
academics (Mulcahy, 1995; Conway, 2006; Fahy, Trench and Clancy, 2012; Mercille 
2014, p. 291), despite its self-stated movement “from being a newspaper of record to a 
newspaper of reference” (O’Sullivan, 2014).  Resolutely middle-class, white and urban 
(Conway, 2006; De Brún, et al., 2012), The Irish Times presents an authoritative stance 
and represents a readership not identifiable as part of a political party, but rather as 
secular and liberal (Conway, 2006).  The Irish Times can be argued to be central and 
influential to the constitution of the dispositif of road safety and its coverage of the 
Donegal accident is likely to reflect and refract key dimensions of the apparatus.  
Following a review of its coverage of the Donegal accident, analysis of Irish Times 
articles focused on the day in which most of its coverage appeared in the paper (13th 
July 2010).  The articles included in the analysis are listed below and were chosen 
because of their prominence (in the case of the front page article, for example) and 
because they encompass the range of actors and entities that appear in Irish Times 
coverage of the crash.  
 
One of the most important of these actors is the RSA, as already introduced.  Even a 
cursory examination of The Irish Times reportage about the Donegal accident indicates 
the RSA should be followed as the key quasi-autonomous administrative body involved 
in the constitution of the dispositif of road safety in Ireland.  The RSA is an official 
statutory body and was established in 2006 to be Ireland’s primary road safety 
organisation (RSA, 2015a).  According to MacCartaigh and Turpin (2011), the set-up of 
the RSA was finally precipitated by a number of events.  These included a government 
report about the shortcomings within the existing driver testing system, the success of 
the Driving Standards Authority in Britain, and the government’s 2003 decentralisation 
plans.  However MacCartaigh and Turpin (2001) also detail the 2005 Kentstown bus 
crash in which five school children were killed, and another crash in county Offaly, as 
leading “to considerable political pressure for greater regulation of drivers and road 
vehicles” and providing impetus for the establishment of the authority.  The authors 
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state that “road safety came to particular prominence in 2005 with public and media 
attention focusing on the high level of road deaths in Ireland…This public attention has 
had a direct causal influence of the creation of the RSA” (MacCartaigh and Turpin, 
2011).  As already argued, the establishment of the RSA can be viewed as an attempt to 
reorganise public opinion and produce popular truth about road safety (Packer, 2008, p. 
31) and make the RSA indispensable to other interested agents, actors, and stakeholders 
for the provision of solutions to the problems road safety presents (Callon, 1986).  The 
RSA seeks to secure other actors in particular positions with respect to the formation of 
power/knowledge relations in the dispositif of road safety.  It does this by interposing 
the Road Safety Strategy into these relations to (re)define the nature of linkages between 
actors and the roles of different actors in the network (Callon, 1986).  In simple terms, 
the Road Safety Strategy is a key document through which the policy aspirations of the 
RSA are articulated.  The RSA’s status rationalises the exploration of the strategy 
document in order to explore the proposed nature of the linkages and power relations 
between actors in the network and this is why it has been chosen for analysis.   
 
Every year the RSA produces an annual report.  The punctuating moment of the 
Donegal accident leads us to the Annual Report 2010, where the RSA outline a response 
to the worst accident in Irish history, rationalising the exploration of that report as part 
of the analysis.  Both the Road Safety Strategy document and this report draw attention 
to the launch of a network of speed cameras and highlight the importance that is placed 
on this initiative and its mediation for the RSA’s goals of improving road safety.  As 
already noted, the Road Safety Strategy states that the camera initiative required a major 
public awareness campaign to make road users aware of cameras’ role in enhancing 
road safety (RSA, 2007, p. 28).  The risk in implementing the cameras was that public 
support would be lost if they were not “experienced as reasonable and proportionate to 
the lives saved and the injuries avoided” (RSA, 2007, p. 28).  In my analysis, actors 
including Gay Byrne (the then Chairperson of the RSA), Noel Brett (then CEO of the 
RSA), and Noel Dempsey (then Minister for Transport) are followed from these policy 
documents back to Irish Times coverage of the camera network’s launch.  The particular 
articles analysed are also listed below and were chosen after a review of Irish Times 
coverage of issues associated with the launch.  The significance of the articles chosen 
also relates to their prominence and to how they encompass the range of actors and 
entities implicated in mediating public support for the cameras.  In the language of 
ANT, the RSA and its policy strategies try to borrow the force of other agents such as 
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The Irish Times to turn these “into their representatives or spokespeople” – a process 
called mobilization (Callon, 1986; Stanforth, 2007, p. 41).   
 
Mapping coverage of the cameras network’s launch in The Irish Times indicates other 
actors for whom the cameras do not appear as legitimate at all, however.  If, as The Irish 
Times indicates (Lally and McAleer, 2011), resistance to the launch of the camera 
network appears on online discussion forums, then boards.ie is likely to reflect how 
forms of resistance to the cameras manifest online.  This is because boards.ie  is 
Ireland’s largest online community (boards.ie, 2015) and it is an important site for the 
mediation of policy, including policy related to automobility on its Motors forum.  With 
over 1.9 million posts across more than 110,000 threads, the Motors forum is popular 
with a very wide audience within the context of boards.ie, which in total has 630,000 
members and generates 17,000 posts per day (boards.ie, 2015).  Although some 
contributors to this forum are car enthusiasts, posting pictures of unusual cars they have 
spotted that day for example, many other posters are looking for advice on buying their 
next car, advice on how to import a car from the UK, or want to discuss policy 
initiatives from the RSA.  After a review of threads on boards.ie about the launch of the 
network of speed cameras and camera-burnings in particular, one thread (“Another 
speed camera van burned!!”[boards.ie, 2011a]) stands-out.  This thread expresses the 
nature and range of actors’ resistances that can appear in a more fragmented form in 
other threads that vary in terms of their relationship to the topic of road safety and 
policy around this issue, and it speaks to The Irish Times assertion (Lally and McAleer, 
2011) that resistance to the cameras appears online.  However, the review of forum 
threads also identifies another thread in which a key actor, Gay Byrne, is highlighted as 
articulating resistance to how road safety may be undermined by cuts in resources for 
traffic enforcement.  This thread (boards.ie, 2011b) refers to the Irish Independent 
article in which Byrne’s comments appear.  The analysis follows this actor as he 
illustrates how the dispositif of road safety can be constituted by contestation (McKee, 
2009, p. 474) that can emanate from official sources as well as internet forum posts.   
 
Policy and print media coverage as well as internet forum discussion of the events under 
analysis are considered as part of the same textual mesh which constitutes the dispositif 
of road safety in Ireland.  Weir, O’Malley, and Shearing (1997, p. 511) write of the 
tendency in Foucauldian work to restrict research to “serious statements”, rather than to 
include “everyday discourses that are casual and transient”.  Both the policy documents 
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and newspaper articles I analyse can be deemed “serious statements” in this context.  
Weir, O’Malley, and Shearing (1997, p. 512) also argue that “[t]he serious statements of 
governance are never able to insulate themselves from reconstitution by agency…that 
may take the form of simple social variation or…social antagonism”.  The authors 
assert that “a broader range of social institutions and actors needs to be accepted as 
sources” (Weir, O’Malley, and Shearing 1997, p. 512).  Indeed, Foucault saw the 
boundary between serious and casual statements as unclear.  This provides the 
justification for including and following internet forum actors on boards.ie in the same 
way as policy and print media actors in order to illustrate user-generated content’s 
relationship to the ways in which RSA policy is represented in print media – and show 
the extent to which this may be exposed to “reconstitution by agency”.   
 
Actors that constitute the networks of the dispositif of road safety could continue to be 
followed ad infinitum.  However, Gay Byrne’s intervention forms a barrier around my 
selection of texts because the constitutive entities and concerns of the dispositif of road 
safety connected to the Donegal accident and the launch of the network of speed 
cameras are well represented at this point. 
 
The principle texts and documents analysed are the following: 
 
Policy documents: 
Road Safety Strategy 2007-2012 (RSA, 2007)  
Annual Report 2010 (RSA, 2011)  
 
Newspaper articles: 
The Irish Times, 13th July, 2010: Front Page 
“Community in Inishowen Mourns loss of eight men” (Duncan and Jackson, 2010). 
 
The Irish Times, 13th July, 2010: Page 3  
“RSA says families shattered in “split second” (Kelly, 2010). 
“Taoiseach extends his sympathies to families of crash victims from NY” (Minihan, 
2010). 
“Latest crash brings back painful memories” (Duncan, 2010). 
“Council was working on a new safety plan” (Edwards, 2010). 
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The Irish Times, 13th November, 2010: Page 5 
“Privatised speed check vans go live on Monday” (Carroll, 2010). 
 
The Irish Times, 27th November, 2010: Page 6 
“Attack on new speed survey vehicle condemned by Garda Commissioner” (O’Brien 
and Lally, 2010).  
“DUP conference told republican paramilitaries a ‘severe’ threat” (Moriarty, 2010). 
 
The Irish Times, 16th April, 2011: Page 3 
“No clear pattern to the burning of speed vans” (Lally and McAleer, 2011). 
 
Irish Independent, 29th December, 2011 Page 4 
“Gay Byrne’s warning on road safety is ‘crude’ – garda chief” (Kelpie, 2011). 
 
Internet Forum: 
boards.ie ,9th April, 2011 
“Another speed camera van burned!!” (boards.ie, 2011a) (81 posts) 
 
boards.ie, 29th December, 2011 
“Gaybo does it again.  Is there no stopping this dinosaur windbag?” (boards.ie, 2011b) 
(125 posts) 
 
Discourse Analysis 
 
Foucault saw the elements of a dispositif  “as joined and disjoined by a strategic logic 
and a tactical economy of domination operating against a background of discursive 
formations” (Rabinow and Rose, 2003, p. xvi).  Consequently, the key method used in 
the analysis of the actors that constitute the dispositif of road safety is discourse 
analysis.  Gee (2001, p. 1) argues that while language fulfils many functions its primary 
role is not simply the communication of information.  Instead language scaffolds both 
“the performance of social activities (whether play or work or both) and…human 
affiliation within cultures and social groups and institutions” in a way that connects both 
together in a mutually constitutive fashion (Gee, 2001, p. 1).  In other words, social 
activities cannot occur without a social grouping or institutional setting; similarly, social 
groups or institutions do not exist without the (re)production of social activities.  
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Approaching linguistic analysis from the point of view of the inseparability of language 
and social context is characteristic of a media studies approach to linguistic analysis and 
distinguishes it from the traditional study of languages (Deacon, 2007, p. 151).  From 
this standpoint, language-in-use or “discourse” is inextricably linked to its social 
situatedness and to “discourses”.  Situatedness refers to the reflexive properties of 
discourse and how it both reflects social reality and constructs it in a certain way (Gee, 
2001, pp. 80-82).  Discourses are powerful and ingrained ways of understanding society 
that “deeply permeate what is allowed as legitimate knowledge in particular domains of 
social life, and rigidly exclude other possibilities and other perspectives on those 
domains” (Deacon, et al., 2007, p. 152).  Discourses express “values, attitudes, beliefs 
and emotions” that “enact specific identities and activities” or ways of seeing and being 
in the world (Gee, 2001, p. 7).  Foucault attempted the identification of the regulative 
underpinnings, as well as the properties and roles, of dominant discourses that condition 
how people act and think (Woofitt, 2009, pp. 448-449).  For Foucault, discourses, as 
systems of statements help shape participation in society “because they furnish subject 
positions, roles or parts with expectations about…behaviour” (Woofitt, 2008, p. 449).  
Discourses have a regulatory function because they “make available subject positions 
and construct objects or processes” (Woofitt, 2008, p. 449).  As such “discourses 
facilitate and limit, enable and constrain what can be said (by whom, where, when)” 
(Parker, 1992, p. xiii) and their analysis enables us to investigate the particular 
constitution of the dispositif of road safety and networks of automobility in Ireland.   
 
Gee (2001, p. 4) defines discourse analysis “as the analysis of language as it is used to 
enact activities, perspectives and identities”.  While there are many different varieties of 
discourse analysis, what unites them is the concern with language use in social life and 
the relationship between this usage and social structures (Deacon, et al., 2007, p. 151).  I 
have drawn on a number of different models and tools for discourse and textual analysis 
such as Fowler (2001), Gee (2001), Richardson (2007), and Carvalho (2008).  In 
practice, discourse analysis is an iterative rather than stage-by-stage process that 
requires a fluid movement through aspects of applicable stages and texts to confirm and 
develop emerging insights.  However, I draw particularly on Deacon, et al. (2007) who 
outline a model of analysis that I have appropriated and adapted for my own purposes as 
is now described.   
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Analysis of newspaper articles begins with a focus on the “position, composition and 
immediate intertextual relations” of an individual story (Deacon, et al., 2007, pp. 181).  
This emphasises its formal staging and how it is assigned a role within a broader 
structure, for example, of that day’s paper and is what Carvalho (2008, p. 167) calls 
layout and structural organisation.  Analysis involves the examination of the story’s 
position and prominence in the publication, and its composition – that is, the way in 
which it is arranged on the page – in terms of how the nucleus of the story (main 
headline, secondary headline if present, and initial summary paragraph [Deacon, et al., 
2007 p. 182]) is presented.  In addition, the way in which any photograph connects or 
anchors the narrative of the piece is considered (Deacon, et al., 2007 p. 182).  The 
intertextuality of the story, that is, the relationship the story has to others appearing in 
the paper, is examined, and links to themes on the same page or in other parts of the 
publications are also established (Deacon, et al., 2007, p. 182).   
 
The focus then moves to the text’s thematic structure and discourse schema (Deacon, et 
al., 2007, p. 183).  Analysis of thematic structures involves establishing the underlying 
propositions and central thread of what the text is actually about.  This is not just the 
way in which themes refer to certain events or realities, but focuses on these themes as 
constitutive of those realities – what Carvalho (2008, p. 167) calls “objects”.  Analysis 
of discourse or textual schema involves making sense of the narrative constitution of the 
piece, in terms of the work that particular parts of the text do in narrative development 
as the story roughly follows the pyramid structure5 of news text.  According to Deacon, 
et al. (2007, p. 183) discourse schema are the “narrative conventions for combining, 
ordering and hierarchically assigning the different category units of the text into a 
structured whole”.   
 
In practical terms, thematic structure and discourse schema are analysed together.  
Journalists assemble their material in “an implicit order of accreditation and 
                                                          
5 Deacon, et al. (2007, p. 175) note that news follows a pyramidal structure that starts 
with an initiating statement of who did it, followed by events, circumstances, outcome, 
and comment, with each succeeding part “providing amplification and support for this 
initiating statement”.  The point is that this structure is particular to news and differs to 
crime fiction (for example), revealing the way in which news is a construction, rather 
than simply unproblematic and objective communication of an event. 
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importance” (Deacon, et al., 2007, p. 184).  This order can be interrogated through 
coding data in terms of the underlying propositions contained in the text.  For example, 
in relation to coverage of the Donegal accident in The Irish Times it is possible to 
identify themes of mourning, speculations of blame and suppositions of cause and effect 
in relation to how the accident occurred.  The articulation of fear about accidents and 
their apparent randomness commonly features, as well as recurring associations of 
certain themes with particular actors.  It is possible to recognise the strategic positioning 
of expert authority and how national experts are represented, for example, as 
enunciating solutions to the problems of road safety in ways that other actors are not 
allowed to engage in (Carvalho, 2008, p. 168).  Such associations can be followed 
between newspaper and the RSA texts.   
 
The relative prominence of government or RSA sources in relation to local community 
members in newspaper texts is also significant, and the relative importance of their 
comments for the narrative of the article can be probed:  Does the story support the 
underlying stance and values advanced by official representatives in the piece and the 
Road Safety Strategy or do other sources create a countervailing view point that might 
challenge an official narrative?  Deacon, et al. (2007, p. 184) also set out a line of 
questioning here:  “How do the attributed sources and discourses vary in terms of 
degree of certitude, qualification, authority and emphasis of phrasing and tone, and how 
are these qualities evident in register, vocabulary and figures of speech?”  While this is 
very useful, it is in practice not always possible to comprehensively analyse a given text 
for each and every point this question raises.  What is important at this stage is 
establishing the extent to which particular points of view are favoured over others; what 
these are, who is allowed to enunciate them; how they vary between Irish Times articles 
and RSA policy texts, and in what ways. 
 
When a number of texts have been analysed in this fashion it is possible to identify 
discourse formations that become familiar between the thematic structures and textual 
schema across both strategy documentation and the range of newspaper texts under 
analysis.  This involves comparing thematic and schematic elements as one follows 
actors across different editions of, for example, The Irish Times, as well as between 
publications (the Road Safety Strategy document, the Annual Report 2010, and The 
Irish Times), and across different events.  Although the Donegal accident and the launch 
of the speed cameras are discrete in terms of when they occurred, similar framings of 
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the issues of road safety can be found in the construction of these events by The Irish 
Times, and commonality can be drawn between these constructions and how the issue of 
road safety is framed in the Road Safety Strategy document (and in the Irish 
Independent).  For example, the way in which road safety is framed as an issue of 
individual responsibility is common across these events and publications and structures 
what is said and by whom in relation to road safety, as well as the nature of appropriate 
responses to the issue (Deacon, et al., 2007, p. 161).  Individual responsibility is 
therefore an important constitutive element of how discourses of road safety are formed 
and framed.   
 
In the process of analysis, lexical choices and grammatical markers are also considered 
for how they support the thematic structure of individual texts (Deacon, et al., 2007, p. 
185).  Both Fowler (1991) and Richardson (2007) outline how the choice and meaning 
of words and linguistic concepts can help in analysis by showing the ideological 
implications of words, for example.  Naming and reference can affect how actors are 
viewed:  Calling interested parties in road safety “stakeholders” in the Road Safety 
Strategy links to discourses of economics and finance, where a stake is a financial 
consideration, for example.  This not only projects a certain kind of value onto these 
actors, it suggests the nature of the relations between these actors is one predicated on 
monetary, rather than social or political considerations (Richardson, 2007, p. 50).  
Sentence construction and syntax are factors in this type of analysis.  “Transitivity” 
describes relationships between actors and the roles they play in a text, and the way in 
which actions are represented can vary with respect to “who (or what) does what to 
whom” (Richardson, 2007, p. 50).  For example, the process of deleting agents – where 
events are represented as occurring through natural processes rather than the agency of 
actors – allows responsibility for the events in question to become muddied (Van 
Leeuwen, 2009, p. 156-7).  Additionally, the use of cliché has an ideological function 
for Fowler (1991, p. 41), who connects its comfortable familiarity to the grounding of 
common-sense view-points on an issue.  As Van Dijk (2001; 2003) notes, there are 
thousands of relevant dimensions of language and structure that could be analysed, so 
an exhaustive discourse analysis is out of the question.  Consequently, a variety of 
linguistic analysis tools are deployed and lexical choices considered where they become 
instructive to understanding the texts under analysis and their relationships to other 
texts. 
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The thematic structures and discourse schema of internet forum material can be 
analysed in a similar fashion to newspaper articles and strategy documentation.  
However, a forum thread has a much more fluid or organic construction than the 
pyramid structure of a newspaper article.  In practical terms, this means analysis of the 
forum material involved noting the concerns of the posters as they react to the posts of 
others, noting the progress of themes that emerge from the discussion and which of 
these become more frequently referred to.  Lexical and grammatical markers are also 
assessed.  It is instructive, for example, to note the degree to which posters are 
committed to the claims they are making (Richardson, 2007, p. 59).  Posters’ attitudes 
can be much more strongly presented than in newspaper articles, with people who don’t 
agree with particular points of view being described as “fools” for example.  The 
relative anonymity of internet forum posts can mean people can be censorious in their 
viewpoints compared to other contexts.  The phenomenon of the “keyboard warrior” 
(Zhang, 2015, p. 15) also means one must be wary not to over-emphasise throwaway 
remarks that communicate emotion and place them in the context of the wider emerging 
themes of the material under analysis.   
 
Commuter data  
 
The justification and method outlined above provides a secure framework for analysing 
how the dispositif of road safety is constituted from “the actions of a chain of agents, 
each of whom translates or shapes it according to their own objectives” (Stanforth, 
2007, p. 40).  Neither the RSA, the Road Safety Strategy, The Irish Times nor boards.ie 
determines the constitution of the dispositif of road safety though.  As such, although 
the RSA could be argued to be entrepreneurs who attempt to engineer the dispositif, 
how it is lived “is a contingent outcome that is determined… by the result of contested 
interests and actors linked together in complex networks” (Stanforth, 2007, p. 51).  It is 
not simply the causal outcome of the implementation of the “technology” of the RSA or 
the Road Safety Strategy itself, for example, nor indeed of its expression in officially 
sanctioned forms as suggested by media-centric policy approaches.   Therefore, as 
already argued, the analysis of the dispositif of road safety as it manifests across various 
textual media must be set against the lived experience of drivers.  This is why the 
experiences of car-commuters are interrogated and it requires a shift in focus from the 
discursive analysis of mediated texts to methods that access the meanings being made 
by commuters. 
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Discourse analysis cannot confine itself to mediated texts alone because these cannot 
describe the lived experience from which meanings are made by commuters themselves 
(Schram, 1993; Chen, 2001).  Consequently, I also focus on the ways in which the 
concerns of mediated texts circulate with and as meanings-in-use, from the point-of-
view of the assemblage of car-drivers and occupants (Akrich, 1992; Dant, 2005; Tatnall 
and Burgess, 2002; Latour, 2005) that also constitute the dispositif road safety and the 
networks of automobility in Ireland.  This calls for an ethnographically-informed 
approach, a central assumption of which is that in order to understand what people are 
doing and why, one needs to understand meaning; that is, how people themselves 
interpret and evaluate the situations they face and their own identities  (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007, p. 169).  My research is an interpretation of the views of car-
commuters and the goal is to share their perspective in so far as is possible (Harper, 
1987).  To that end, a series of focus groups were convened to address issues of 
commuting by car and driving.   
 
Focus group interviews are chosen both for their inherent methodological strengths and 
for pragmatic reasons.  They can be viewed as a useful means for accessing meaning-
making behaviour because they are social contexts in themselves.  Bryman (2008, p. 
476) argues that, in one sense, focus groups are more naturalistic than individual 
interviews, because processes of understanding of social phenomena are not undertaken 
in isolation but are “something that occurs in interaction and discussion with others”.  
Deacon, et al. (2007, p. 57 citing Richardson and Corner, 1986) also note that the focus 
group setting can “mimic the way that everyday media interpretations tend to be 
‘collectively constructed’ by people in social, familial and professional networks”.   
 
Bryman (2008, p. 474) explains that focus groups contain elements of two methods – 
the group interview and the focused interview.  The focused interview selects 
participants on the basis of their involvement in a particular situation and they are asked 
about their experiences of this topic.  To this method, the focus group adds the 
interactive component of the group interview, but is more targeted around a specific 
topic than the group interview can be, although sometimes the two terms are used 
interchangeably (Bryman 2008, p. 473).  Focus groups facilitate the development of 
understanding about “why people feel the way they do”, allowing individuals to be 
probed by other group members.  They allow for the challenge and modification of 
initially proposed subject positions and discussion of positions on topics that group 
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members may not have thought about or been aware of beforehand.  According to 
Bryman (2008, p. 474), “these possibilities mean that focus groups may also be very 
helpful in the elicitation of a wide variety of different views in relation to a particular 
issue”.  Thus, focus groups have the potential to provide the greatest in-depth analysis 
involving multiple participants in a variety of settings.   
 
Focus groups have become very popular in media and cultural studies research around 
audience reception studies, after Morley’s (1980) The Nationwide Audience for 
example.  Significant studies in this general area include McGuigan (1992), Livingstone 
and Lunt (1994), and Fenton, Bryman, and Deacon (1998).  Morley’s key insights were 
about how different categorisations of people can interpret texts differently, thus 
confirming how meaning is not only situated in texts (Bryman, 2008) which is a critical 
insight for my research.  However, Maxwell (2001, p. 205), acknowledges some of the 
limitations of focus groups, pointing out that the views expounded by his commuters 
express “discursive repertoires” which, by their nature, are “institutionally, situationally 
specific, culturally familiar, public ways of talking”.  There is always the risk with this 
type of research that participants will say what they think the researcher wants to hear 
rather than what they actually think.  This is mitigated by good focus group design and 
judicious probing, and questioning that can also penetrate the group dynamic that 
constructs an apparent consensus from the strongly held views of one or a few 
participants.   
 
Sampling 
 
Because the research focuses on transient assemblages of actors that constitute the 
dispositif of automobility, a generalizable data set that covers the demographic spectrum 
is not required.  The concern of the study is to explore social processes (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967) involved in driving and commuting practices, not test predetermined 
hypotheses, nor extrapolate to a whole population (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981, p. 
145).  Thus probability sampling (Bryman, 2008, p. 697) is unnecessary and a 
combination of convenience sampling and snowball sampling has been used to select 
participants.  Bryman (2008, p. 183) notes that: “A convenience sample is one that is 
simply available to the research by virtue of its accessibility”.  Thus, a pilot study of 
family members of the researcher was initially convened to discuss everyday issues of 
commuting and driving.   
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Snowball sampling involves initiating contact with a small group relevant to the topic 
being researched and then using these contacts to make contact with other potential 
participants who are also relevant to the research (Bryman, 2008, p. 699).  An initial 
connection was made through representatives of the mature students’ society in 
Maynooth University, who agreed to publicise the study on their Facebook page and by 
way of posters in the mature student’s room at the university.  Connections were further 
made with “gatekeepers” (Rudestam and Newton, 2014) in a large local multi-national 
computer company, a city-centre banking organisation, and Ballyfermot College of 
Further Education (BCFE) where three focus groups were held.  The strength of 
snowball sampling in terms of producing referral chains (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981) 
was important in generating potential participants in these organisations.  Most, though 
not all, of the groupings are natural in that frequently participants are known to each 
other (Bryman, 2008, p. 482).  This is valuable in generating and sustaining a 
comfortable naturalistic setting for data gathering (Coleman, 1958).  The desire was to 
draw commuters from beyond the confines of Maynooth University, while also 
including the university in the research.  This is because, as Lunt and Livingstone 
(1996, p. 15) argue, “groups might be better conducted when composed of diverse 
rather than consistent membership” and the research is about the dispositif of road 
safety in Ireland, not Maynooth per se.   
 
As sampling continued, an increasing variety of demographic indicators were 
nevertheless drawn into the research with respect to gender, age and social class, for 
example6 (Barbour, 2007, p. 61).  The impact of these demographic differences on the 
meaning-making of individuals is beyond the scope of this thesis, however exploring 
these dynamics within the dispositif of road safety provides avenues for further 
investigation.  Nevertheless, the sampling method generated “a full array of multiple 
perspectives” in so far as is practically possible (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, p. 40).  
Sampling for this type of research is supposed to proceed until no new relevant data 
emerges and the categories of analysis are well developed (Rudestam and Newton, 
2014, p. 125).  However, in practice, as Josselson and Lieblich (2003) point out, true 
saturation is not achievable because each participant has something to add and it is 
usually saturation of the researcher that occurs.  Therefore, the key was to ensure the 
                                                          
6 For a more detailed breakdown of the participants demographic characteristics, please 
see Appendix A. 
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fullest possible development of emergent thematic categories and sampling continued 
until “sufficient data to represent the breadth and depth of the phenomenon” was 
collected (Rudestam and Newton, 2014, p. 125), thereby meeting the criteria of 
adequacy (Morse, 1994).  In addition, Bryman (2008, p. 478) shows published research 
projects which have had as few as eight sessions; given the resources available for this 
project and the quantity of data generated, the number of groups held was deemed 
sufficient at nine in total.   
 
The nine focus groups of commuters were convened as follows:   
 
Focus group 1 (f1): five participants – pilot group of extended family members. 
 
Focus group 2 (f2): four participants – friends of the researcher.   
 
Focus group 3 (f3): three participants – mature students of Maynooth University.   
 
Focus group 4 (f4): three participants – employees of a large local multi-national 
computer company. 
 
Focus group 5 (f5): four participants – students of Maynooth University. 
 
Focus group 6 (f6): six participants – employees of a Dublin city-centre multi-national 
banking organisation. 
 
Focus group 7 (f7): two participants – students of BCFE. 
 
Focus group 8 (f8): four participants – students of BCFE. 
 
Focus group 9 (f9): two participants – students of BCFE. 
 
Of the three focus groups held at BCFE, two had only two participants each due to “no-
shows” on the day, despite over-recruiting for these sessions.  Although not ideal focus 
group conditions, it was nevertheless decided to continue with these sessions involving 
two people.  Both Bryman (2009, p. 478) and Barbour (2007, p. 60) suggest three as the 
minimum number of participants to make a focus group meaningful.  However, Bryman 
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(2008, pp. 479-480) indicates different sizes of groups have their inherent advantages 
and disadvantages.  In analysis, data from these two sessions was useful both in 
confirming the commonality of themes emerging throughout the data set of focus 
groups and in providing a conclusion to the data gathering process as the breadth of 
issues were well represented at that stage.   
 
A topic guide/ interview schedule7 was developed around everyday issues of 
commuting and driving with session discussions proceeding in a relatively unstructured 
manner, after each group viewed stimulus material.  The prior analysis of mediated texts 
and a pilot focus group also suggested themes and yielded insights that were then used 
to develop and hone the interview schedule as the focus groups continued.  In general 
terms, insights generated from the analysis of the media texts informed exploration of 
the extent to which commuters reproduce the subjectivities, modes of action, and 
representations suggested by such texts in their everyday commuting practices.   
However, the group dynamic took discussion into territory that connects mediation to 
commuter practices in ways that could not be foreseen prior to research.  The sessions 
were led by me as an unobtrusive yet subtly guiding facilitator throughout (Karger, 
1987).  Data collection for focus groups took place over a six month period.  All 
sessions were audio-recorded and systematically transcribed and all contributors were 
anonymised. The Ethics Committee of Maynooth University evaluated the proposal for 
research with human participants and ethical approval was granted.   
 
Analysis of commuter data 
 
Livingstone and Lunt (1994, p. 184) note that qualitative data coding is always 
problematic, for example it is difficult to delineate practical boundaries in the 
identification of the units to be coded.  Barbour (2007, p. 117) cautions against using 
the topic guide to generate themes or code data into categories because this can work 
against the incorporation of themes which emerge from group participants.  In practical 
terms, codes were assigned to ostensibly minor themes in the data before agglomerating 
these into much broader themes (Barbour, 2007, p. 117).  Analysis of the commuter 
data is not so different from the method of analysis of newspaper and policy data – after 
                                                          
7 See the Appendix B for sample participant information sheet and consent form used 
during the research and Appendix C for interview schedule/topic guide. 
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all, what is analysed in both cases are forms of text.  For example, I interrogated the 
thematic structure and discourse schema of my transcripts (Deacon, et al., 2007, p. 183), 
analysing underlying propositions and attempting to make sense of the conventions 
participants use in ordering the narrative of commuting and driving issues.   
 
More specifically, emergent themes from this analysis included descriptions of the 
routine of commuting; what car-commuting facilitates in terms of relationships and 
responsibilities; references to media representations; the rationale for taking the car over 
other transport; using driving time to complete other tasks; attitudes to the impact of the 
car on the environment; the state of the roads, and road behaviour.  Ultimately, some 
themes were dropped as they fell out of the scope of the analysis, were wrapped up into 
other broader themes, or were not picked-up on by other participants across the 
sessions.  Themes also overlapped.  But from this iterative and recursive process, in 
which actors were followed as they become important to the constitution of the 
dispositif of road safety and the networks of automobility, broader themes emerged 
organically from the material.  These are not simply the points of view of the Road 
Safety Strategy transposed against the views of commuters alone however.  It is the 
recursive process of going back and forth between the projections of policy strategies, 
their representations, and the practices of actual users of system that allows access to the 
“crucial relationships” that constitute the system (Akrich, 1992, p. 209).  The thematic 
frames of Chapter 2 (freedom), Chapter 3 (emotion) and Chapter 4 (forms of resistance) 
are those that emerged from this interrogation of key concerns in both commuter focus 
groups and the various other texts explored in this study.  
 
The analysis builds upon the diversity and commonality of concerns circulating among 
commuters’ discussions as well as mediated texts.  Constructions made from 
commuters’ data as presented “are empirically grounded in those of the participants who 
are the focus of the study” (Flick, 2009 cited in Rudestam and Newton, 2014, p. 132).  
Although the research involves relatively small numbers of commuters in specific 
settings, focus groups “generate rich believable data” (Lunt and Livingstone, 1996, p. 
15) that explores the meaning-making assemblages which go towards the constitution of 
the dispositif of road safety and networks of automobility in Ireland.   
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Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, the questioning of the assumed relationship between mediated policy 
strategies and the practices of automobility has prompted the targeted investigation of 
existing problematizations and scholarship in relation to the car.  In the dominant genre 
of such research, via explorations of the metamorphic car, the assumption of the 
automobile as a deterministic force, reconstituting the social and physical world as it 
inexorably spread across the landscape, was traced.  Although infused with studies of 
class, race and gender, I argued the genre suffered from a form of reductionism, 
imbuing institutions or the car itself with a determining agency.  I argued that studies of 
car subcultures share a neglect of the quotidian experience of car users with studies that 
emphasise the car’s metamorphic qualities, as both are predicated upon the assumption 
of common social meanings about the car in the everyday world.  But these everyday 
meanings cannot be assumed and in fact are crucial to problematizing a media-centric 
view of the interconnections between policy and practice that is the principle concern of 
my research. 
 
I have suggested that studies into the externalities of the car and driving offer a more 
nuanced and wider accounting for the car’s social effects.  But where such studies have 
investigated meaning-making in relation to the car, for example, they emphasise 
individual intentions and ignore the way in which the car shapes social action 
(Redshaw, 2008).  Externalities research uncovered more of the environmental and 
safety consequences and costs of the car, highlighting shared responsibility around road 
safety for example, and was argued to be critical to the consideration of the car’s future 
(Miller, 2001).  But it was also argued that such research can simply reinforce rather 
than question the system of the car itself and take for granted that we know what the car 
is.  While externalities studies open the door to a fuller problematization of the car’s 
consequences, it does not go far enough to connect the larger effects of the car, in terms 
of the globalised forces of the market and the state, to the more personal relations 
associated with and expressed about it every day (Miller, 2001).  To do this is to present 
a much richer picture of what the car entails, but it is only through the exploration of the 
car as a socio-technical system of relations, rather than a singular object, that these 
interconnections can be fully countenanced.   
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Consequently, I argued for building upon the insights provided by conceptualising the 
car-system in terms of “automobility” (Sheller and Urry, 2000; Urry 2005).  
Automobility shows how an array of forms and sites of inquiry can be interconnected in 
the ways necessary to investigate the particular and peculiar constitution of the networks 
of sociality and materiality of the car in the Irish context in all their complexity 
(Merriman, 2005, p. 158).  Automobilities approaches conceptualise the car not as a 
discrete essence but as a hybrid entity made up of networks of cars, drivers, policy, 
infrastructure, and media texts, for example.  Underscored by insights from ANT, I 
argued for the adoption of Dant’s (2005) concept of the car-driver assemblage to 
express the transformation that occurs when actors come together and the contingent 
ways this assemblage can shape social actions in particular lived contexts.   
 
Foucault’s notion of the dispositif or apparatus has indicated that the system-ness of 
automobility can be thought of in terms of how aspects of it constitute a heterogeneous 
network of power-knowledge relations, formed as a response to an urgent social need 
(Thiele, 1986).  The Irish dispositif of road safety has been chosen as such a response, 
the ensemble of elements of which is frequently articulated through government policy 
around automobility and its mediation.  This is to be explored through the mediated 
policy context of the Donegal accident and the introduction of a network of speed 
cameras.  I have argued that commuting journeys – not often conceptualised as a social 
problem, yet constituting embedded forms of social action in which road accidents 
occur – can provide suitable and adequate practices from which the problematic of 
research can be investigated in relation to the lived experience of the system of 
automobility.  In order to build a map of the types of social actions associated with the 
dispositif of road safety as it became visible through the investigation of these contexts, 
I have justified and described the methods used in the project.   
 
The punctuating point of the mediated policy context of the Donegal accident and the 
launch of the network of speed cameras allow for the exploration of both the dispositif 
of road safety and the constitution of the networks of automobility.  This exploration is 
not confined to pre-conceived categorisations of actors such as The Irish Times or even 
to what being an actor means, however.  My approach enables deeper nuanced insight to 
develop about how mediation and practices interact, overlap, and become embedded 
together – or do not as the case may be.  This approach is justified because the project 
demanded a broad yet deep focus, in which actors are followed as they become 
75 
 
important to the constitution of the dispositif, but where initiating moments are also 
required to facilitate analysis of the apparatus given its potentially infinite nature.  The 
exploration of the themes that emerges from these various methods follows, beginning 
with the centrality of freedom in the mediated contexts of road safety in Ireland. 
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Chapter 2: Networks of freedom 
 
Introduction 
 
It is said that the car exemplifies freedom and confers the status of “free” on its user 
(Urry, 2005).  For Rajan (2006, p. 113) contemporary western society – late modernity 
– describes qualities of cars and the experience of driving, such as “the quiet pleasures 
of the open road, speed, power and personal control”, as being the most salient features 
of automobility.  These characteristics complement “the functionality of covering 
distance, managing time and maintaining certain forms of individuation” that the car 
also provides (Rajan, 2006, p. 113).  Together with the promise that one can freely 
decide where and how to live and work, and when and how far one wants to travel, the 
ontology and teleology of the car reinforce each other establishing “characteristically 
that which is modern and by definition permanently desirable” (Rajan, 2006, pp. 113-4).   
 
However, policy actions in the Irish context attempt to curb the consequences of the 
unfettered expression of car-based freedoms, for example through the construction of 
individual responsibility as the “ne plus ultra” of road safety.  This sets up a binary of 
freedom and constraint in terms of automobility in Ireland which seems to exemplify 
contemporary western government.  According to Rose (1999, p. 62), “[t]he politics of 
our present, to the extent that it is defined and delimited by the values of liberalism, is 
structured by the opposition between freedom and government”.  Liberalism “is 
commonly understood as a political doctrine or ideology concerned with the 
maximisation of individual liberty, and, in particular, with the defence of that liberty 
against the state” (Hindess, 1996, p. 65).  However, for Rose (1999, p. 68):  
 
The importance of Liberalism is not that it first recognised, defined or defended 
freedom as a right of all citizens. Rather its significance is that for the first time 
the arts of government were systematically linked to the practice of freedom… 
Individuals…must come to recognise and act upon themselves as both free and 
responsible, both beings of liberty and members of society, if liberal government 
is to be possible.    
 
By this logic if the way in which automobility is actually lived in Ireland is to be 
investigated and understood the binary of freedom and constraint needs to be seen as 
false. 
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Instead, policy initiatives and their articulation through the media, for example, should 
be considered strategies of governmentality (Foucault, 1978b), a form of power 
relations that “not only refer to political structures or to the management of state; …it 
[also] designates the way in which the conduct of individuals or groups might be 
directed” (Dean, 1999, p. 47).  Governmentality emphasises a definition of government 
as establishing parameters for “the conduct of conduct” (Foucault, 1982, p. 138; 
Foucault, 1994, p. 237; Dean, 1999, p. 11; Miller and Rose, 2008; McNay, 2009, p. 60), 
which focuses attention on the examination of the regulation of human activity, rather 
than the search for the origin of power and identification of those who possess it.  
Governmentality does not position freedom as an abstracted ideal or pre-existing realm 
of individuality, autonomy, and choice to be evaluated and defended in terms of the 
constraints placed upon it (Rose, 1999).  Rather, this chapter draws on the idea that 
liberal freedom has always been “a mode of organising and regulation…a certain way 
of administering a population that depends upon the capacities of free individuals” 
(Rose, 1999, p. 64).  Freedom, therefore, is “material, technical, practical, [and] 
governmental” (Rose, 1999, p. 63).   
 
In this chapter, I explore the articulation of the dispositif of road safety through the 
mediated policy context of the Donegal accident.  I argue that what is attempted in the 
rituals of mediatisation of Ireland’s worst traffic accident is the organisation of freedom 
– through a diffuse range of intermediaries – in terms of the individual’s capacity for 
self-realisation and self-regulation (Ouellette and Hay, 2008, p. 473).  I first elaborate 
upon the opposition between freedom and constraint extant in car advertising and some 
academic literature about the car in order to elaborate upon the prevalence of this 
binary.  Then, I use a discourse analytical framework that closely analyses The Irish 
Times’ representation of the Donegal accident on the day (13/07/2010) that it was first 
covered in the paper.  I connect this coverage to the concerns of the Road Safety 
Strategy (RSA, 2007).  Circulating within policy documents of road safety and between 
these and coverage of the Donegal accident, I find responsibilization strategies that 
promote particular subjectivities and suggest particular relationships between 
institutions and the self constituting the dispositif of road safety.  A key point is that 
these interventions are based on the tenets of an evolved version of liberalism called neo 
or advanced liberalism:    
 
 
78 
 
Put simply, neoliberalism, from the moment of its inception, advocates a 
programme of deliberate intervention by government in order to encourage 
particular types of entrepreneurial, competitive and commercial behaviour in its 
citizens, ultimately arguing for the management of populations with the aim of 
cultivating the type of individualistic, competitive, acquisitive and 
entrepreneurial behaviour which the liberal tradition has historically assumed to 
be the natural condition of civilised humanity, undistorted by government 
intervention.  (Gilbert, 2013, p. 9) 
 
Obviously, it is not possible to explore every facet of neoliberalism.  So in this chapter I 
concentrate on aspects of responsibilization, media ritual, and the threat of discipline in 
discursive constructions around the Donegal accident to exemplify the constitution of 
neoliberal freedom in terms of the dispositif of road safety and contemporary 
governmentality.  I go on to examine how assemblages of car-drivers negotiate and 
interpret strategies of responsibilization by analysing car-commuters’ experiences of 
how they conceive of the freedom the car provides.  This is an exploration of how 
neoliberal freedom constitutes the practices of the dispositif of road safety and the 
system of automobility in Ireland.  I find responsibilization strategies resonate to 
varying degrees in commuter experiences of commuting practices and road safety 
issues.  The analysis explores the ways in which subjects messily construct and enact 
the conditions of their own freedom in practice (Rose 1999, p. 72), albeit not always in 
the ways intended by authorities, highlighting the ubiquitous and dispersed nature of 
power relations (governmentality).   
 
The binary of freedom and constraint 
 
Popular culture references and academic research around the car often contain similar 
assumptions about what the freedom of the automobile means.  In popular culture, these 
assumptions play out in in advertising whose mechanisms draw “upon images of 
individualized freedom, flight and speed to sell the latest auto models” (Inglis, 2005, p. 
209).  Such depictions rely on a conception of freedom in which an autonomous subject 
is set against an object of power – the binary of freedom and constraint (Rose 1999; 
Lemke, 2002).  For example, in BMW’s “Joy” advert broadcast on Irish television, a 
three second segment shows an engine rev-counter rapidly rising, the grabbing of 
another gear, and the silently expressed “yeah!” on the face of the driver, as he takes 
flight in his car to escape (LienderNick, 2009).  Illustrations like this express Rajan’s 
(2006, pp. 113 -114) argument that the pleasures of the open road, power and control 
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are automobility’s most salient features, complementing the desirability of the car’s 
functionality and the individuation it enables.   
However, the limitations of the unfettered expression of this freedom as well as the 
constraints it necessitates are never far behind their discursive expression.  For example, 
with road safety in mind, the International Chamber of Commerce’s code on advertising 
motor vehicles – that all European advertising standards authorities apply – cautions the 
avoidance of “messages based on speed, performance and acceleration” (Easa-
alliance.org, 2013).  The BMW ad, in connoting rather than denoting speed, can be read 
as the ritual negotiation of these rules.  Sometimes manufacturers fall foul of the 
provisions, however.  A recently banned Jaguar campaign, also broadcast in Ireland, 
contained the slogan “Jaguar.  How alive are you?”  It depicted a car speeding on an 
empty mountain road at night (The Daily Telegraph, 2014).  Indeed, the empty road is a 
common trope and conceit of car advertising.  But the UK advertising standards 
authority banned the Jaguar campaign because “we considered that speed was the main 
message of the ads and the ads portrayed the cars being driven in a dangerous manner” 
(The Daily Telegraph, 2014).  It concluded the ads were irresponsible and condoned 
dangerous driving (The Daily Telegraph, 2014).  Jaguar’s unsuccessful appeal against 
the ban was based on including a disclaimer stating the ads were filmed on closed 
sections of road, in the process calling attention to the illusory nature of the car’s 
provision of freedom and escape in practice (Beckman, 2005).  At the same time, the 
disclaimer underlines that the car is a sign-vehicle for such meanings.  The story of the 
ads’ censorship exemplifies the way in which the speeding car can structure an 
opposition between freedom and government, where the car is ritually implicated in the 
“maximisation of individual liberty” or, indeed, the negative consequences of this 
(Hindess, 1996, p. 65; Lemke, 2002; Rose, 1999).  
The academic literature can also conceptualise the car in the same binary of freedom 
versus constraint.  For example, Gartman’s (2005) analysis merits further exploration 
here for its treatment of the freedom the car provides.  Gartman (2005, p. 169) argues 
the culture of consumerism charges the car with meanings that stretch beyond its 
immediate utility (Urry, 2005, p. 26; Rajan, 2006), such as the freedoms depicted in the 
above advertisements.  Gartman’s (2005) three ages of the automobile pit the car’s 
freedoms against the constraints it necessitates.  This is summarized succinctly by 
MacGregor (2009, p. 96): “each auto age is motivated by a dialectical process in which 
contradictions growing within it are at once preserved and resolved in the succeeding 
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age, which in turn, carries the seeds of its own eventual destruction and overthrow”.  In 
the first age, the car confirms the freedom of the wealthy from the constraints of 
necessity; in the second age the car offers “false” freedoms that fail to compensate for 
the freedoms denied by the factory floor (Gartman, 2005).  In the third age, the car 
addresses that same need: “compensatory individuality in a society that deprives people 
of economic autonomy”, but in a more intensified and fragmented fashion (Gartman, 
2005, p. 191).  This need is driven both by the fragmentation of class and cultural 
identities and manufacturing innovations that produce cars targeted at increasingly 
specialised “lifestyle” market niches.  Even though his analysis is articulated in the 
context of automobilities literature, Gartman (2005, p. 193) encapsulates his approach 
in terms of a search for a single underlying dynamic that he uses to explain the ages of 
the automobile: “the confrontation of potentially autonomous human beings with an 
economic market system that thwarts their self-determination with an alien logic all its 
own”.  Here, once again, is a binary of freedom and constraint, one in which 
individuals’ agency is ultimately subordinated to the determining forces of class and 
production, the car and capitalism. 
 
MacGregor’s (2009) analysis extends Gartman’s (2005) work.  MacGregor (2009) 
explores “the safety race” that constitutes, for him, a fourth age of the automobile.  In 
this, he conceptualises road safety as an issue that implicates a wide array of social 
actors responsible for ensuring safety on the roads, including the role of human agency 
and the critical position of the state.  However, MacGregor (2009) ultimately defers to 
the potentially autonomous subject set against power in his linking of the 
interconnections between government and society:  He repeats Gartman’s (2005) 
argument that “mobility concerns the ultimate goal of freedom: transcendence of space 
and time in the rapid and secure fulfilment of multiple social connections” (MacGregor, 
2009, p. 96).  MacGregor articulates Gartman’s (2005, p. 170) point that the underlying 
influence of three ages of the automobile is “the search for individual identity within a 
capitalist society that holds out the promise of autonomy but simultaneously denies it in 
the heteronomy of the economy”.   
 
MacGregor’s (2009) analysis also mirrors Gartman’s (2005) in insisting that each age 
progresses in a dialectical fashion, where contradictions are “preserved and resolved in 
the succeeding age” (MacGregor, 2009 p. 96).  However, unlike Gartman (2005), whose 
cultural eras are based on class and production, for MacGregor (2009, pp. 95-96) each 
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era is focused on the dialectic of motion within them.  These dialectics consist “of the 
complex interrelationships of government and civil society with respect to safety and 
speed (that) helps to explain why safety consciousness has become an integral aspect of 
automobility”.  Indeed, there are further differences between these two writers.  
MacGregor (2009, p. 96) sees a future based on the emancipatory potential of 
technology to ultimately overcome the constraints on freedom that the risk of road 
traffic accidents implies for the “secure fulfilment of social connections”.  Meanwhile, 
Gartman (2005) suggests the continued domination of the car in the absence of some 
form of revolution.   Yet these explanations of the car, as well as the advertising 
frameworks that have been explored, ultimately contain the same assumption about 
freedom: it is a sphere of identifiable and albeit debatable rights that can be 
subordinated or enhanced by removing constrictions on a potentially autonomous 
subject.   
 
But in arguing instead that freedom is negotiated through the capacities of people who 
are constituted as free in very specific ways (Rose, 1999, p. 87), I assert that a much 
more complex analysis is possible, one that emphasises the way in which the 
constitution of freedom is immediately and systematically linked to forms of (self) 
government (Rose, 1999, p. 58).   Exploring the mediated policy context of the Donegal 
accident and the practices of commuters in this context opens the “black-box” of the 
almost imperceptible ways the car shapes the form and content of possible social action 
(Latour, 1999; Dant, 2005; Rajan, 2006) and allows for a nuanced examination of the 
media’s role as an intermediate agent and actor of responsibilization (Ouellette and Hay, 
2008, p. 474) in the dispositif of road safety and networks of automobility.  
  
Ireland and road traffic accidents:  the worst crash ever 
 
On the evening of Sunday July 11th 2010, Spain beat the Netherlands in the World Cup 
final after an extra-time goal from mid-fielder Andres Iniesta put the team 1:0 ahead in 
the 116th minute of the game (FIFA, 2010).  One hour later, at approximately 10.40pm, 
eight young men who had been watching the match, left the North Pole pub near 
Buncrana in county Donegal (Duncan and Jackson, 2010).  On the road between 
Clonmany and Buncrana, their black Northern Ireland registered Volkswagen Passat 
clipped the driver’s side of a white Renault Megane, before continuing 200m further 
down the road and crashing into a Toyota Corolla (Duncan and Jackson, 2010; The 
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Belfast Telegraph, 2010).  Both the Passat and the Corolla left the road as a result of the 
impact and landed “in a ditch” (Duncan and Jackson, 2010).  Eight people, including the 
older driver of the Corolla and seven passengers in the Passat were killed.  The driver of 
the Megane was unhurt and the driver of the Passat survived.  Despite the fact that 2010 
had been the best year to date for road fatalities and although there were other multiple 
fatalities that year, the Donegal crash was the worst single road traffic accident in 
Ireland’s history (RSA, 2011, p. 3).  The seven dead who were travelling in the Passat 
were all under the age of 24 (Duncan and Jackson, 2010).   
 
The accident came too late for the next morning’s The Irish Times print edition, 
although the paper was able to include extensive coverage of Spain’s win at the World 
Cup, despite the marginal difference in the timing of both events.  The 12th of July 
edition of The Irish Times led with coverage of a report published by the Health Service 
Executive (HSE) advising the closure of institutions for people with intellectual 
disabilities (O’Brien, 2010a).  The front page (figure 2) also covered a $500m bid to 
make Ireland the “innovation hub” of Europe as part of the Government’s “smart 
economy” framework, the plan for which was due to be launched in New York that day 
by then Taoiseach Brain Cowen (McGee and Marlowe, 2010).  World Cup coverage 
included an article and picture on the front page of the paper (Humphries, 2010), 
additional articles about the World Cup within the main body of the paper, as well as 
comprehensive coverage of the tournament fallout in an included sports supplement.  
 
It is Tuesday 13th July 2010’s edition of The Irish Times that contains coverage of the 
accident.  It is not accorded lead-story status on the front page (see figure 3), which 
instead continues the theme of criticism of the HSE (O’Brien, 2010b).  This is almost 
certainly because the crash was no longer breaking news more than 36 hours after the 
event and given coverage on more immediate media outlets before The Irish Times went 
to press (for examples of this coverage see Jackson [2010] or breakingnews.ie [2010]).  
The crash is granted the “off-lead” or second most prominent story position in an article 
headlined “Community in Inishowen mourns the loss of eight men” (Duncan and 
Jackson, 2010) underneath pictures of the seven young men who died in the crash.  The 
story’s off-lead status is reinforced by the headline which does not reference the manner 
in which the men died, and the first line of the story itself, which begins “the car crash 
in which eight men died in Co. Donegal on Sunday night…” (as opposed to, say: “A car 
crash killed eight men in Co. Donegal on Sunday night”).  These constructions 
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presuppose the prior common knowledge of the accident amongst the readership of the 
paper (Richardson, 2007).  The time elapsed affords a detailed account of the event 
itself, as well as quotes from national and local community actors (a representative from 
the RSA and two local priests), report of comments from a related Garda press 
conference, as well as the Taoiseach who was still in New York.  The article ends with 
the modest signpost “Reports: page 3”.  The third page of The Irish Times that day 
(figure 4) is taken up almost entirely with articles about the accident, with the exception 
of a short side-bar on a different accident in Co. Limerick in which a woman was killed 
(Hayes, 2010).  
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Figure 2: The Irish Times front page, 12th July, 2010. 
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Figure 3: The Irish Times front page, 13th July, 2010. 
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Taking responsibility  
 
A key motif from this coverage is the idea of responsibility.  On page 3 of The Irish 
Times on the 13th July 2010, an article begins: “The Road Safety Authority has urged all 
drivers to take responsibility for their actions following the multiple fatality in Donegal” 
(Kelly, 2010).  The then chief executive of the RSA, Noel Brett says: “A split 
second…has absolutely shattered the lives of eight families and an entire community”.  
He is then reported as explaining it was important “that no-one jumped to conclusions” 
about the cause of the accident, but that it was “equally important that lessons were 
learned”.  He goes on:  “When we have a tragedy like this…we have to try to take 
something positive from it and we would ask people to take personal responsibility for 
their actions on the roads”.  Despite the cause of the crash not having been established, 
Brett here sets out the idea that responsibility for it and other accidents lies with 
individuals.   
 
Lemke (2002, p. 12) explains that, for governmentality, government is “a continuum 
which extends from political government right through to forms of self-regulation, 
namely ‘technologies of the self’”.  Lemke (2002, p. 12) notes that in neoliberalism: 
 
The strategy of rendering individual subjects “responsible” (and also collectives, 
such as families, associations, etc…) entails shifting the responsibility for social 
risks such as illness, poverty etc. and for life in society into the domain for 
which the individual is responsible and transforming it into a problem of “self-
care”. 
 
Brett’s words reflect such an approach, with “responsibilization” describing the strategy 
of transferring the responsibility for road safety, traffic accidents, and other social risks 
to individuals, forcing them into “free” decision-making in these fields of action 
(Lemke, 2002, p. 5).  The strategy of responsibilization exemplifies not only 
government as a form of self-regulation, but by implicating other actors including the 
state and intermediaries such as the media and the RSA, it also emphasises the 
continuum of government in the process of responsibilization. 
 
Brett’s comments alternate between rational exhortations that attempt to responsibilize 
drivers, an emotive encapsulation of the impact of the crash on those involved, and a 
return via mixed metaphor and cliché (to “jump to conclusions”, to “learn lessons”, and 
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“to take something positive”) to the neoliberal rationality of responsibilization (Kelly, 
2010).  Fowler (1991, p. 41) notes that cliché vouches “for a robust honesty”; if the 
“mode of discourse” is “familiar and comfortable” to readers “they may also regard the 
ideology which it structures embody as ‘common sense’”.  Harvey (2005 p. 39) argues 
that “‘common sense’…typically grounds consent”.  This assumption of a common 
sense consensus is also created, for example, in Brett and other national actors’ use of 
the collective “we”.  Fowler (1991, p. 16) notes that this “we” – as well as appeals for 
people to “pull together” in editorialising comments such as Brett’s – indicate how  
“‘we’ are supposed to behave”.  Common sense narratives are problematic (Fowler, 
1991; Harvey, 2005)8, not least because they have the power to deflect criticism and 
create the impression of consensus about contentious issues by assuming consensus 
already exists.  To highlight the particularity and contingency of this example of 
common sense discourses, consider another framing possibility: the reporter may have 
been antagonistic towards the RSA chief, interrogating him as to why strategies of road 
safety have failed to prevent this accident or querying structural causes such as road 
quality or limited policing in these areas.  Although failure is implied in Brett’s words, 
his attempts to account for the accident are deflective and this deflection is allowed to 
stick because the reporter does not challenge it.  Brett is one of the authoritative national 
actors who constitute the discourses of the Donegal accident, speaking directly and in 
an editorialising way towards road users in his capacity as RSA chief.  Indeed, there is 
little explicit critique of the RSA or government in the reportage discussed here, which 
may be expected given the framework of objectivity in journalism is ostensibly just that 
– not to offer judgement.   
                                                          
8 Fowler (1991, p. 16) notes  that “although consensus sounds like a liberal, humane and 
generous theory of social action and attitudes, in practice it breeds divisive and 
alienating attitudes, a dichotomous version of ‘us’ and ‘them’”.  Harvey (2005, p. 39) 
argues that common sense can “be profoundly misleading, obfuscating or disguising 
real problems under cultural prejudices”, because it is “constructed out of long-standing 
practice of cultural socialization often rooted in regional or national traditions”.   
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Figure 4: The Irish Times page 3, 13th July, 2010. 
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The deference of the article’s writer towards Brett’s authority suggests Brett’s stance is 
or should be uncontested and that his comments should be accepted as common sense.  
That is ideology masquerading as objectivity, where selection and artifice have been 
subsumed (Davies, 2009, p. 111).  It reveals that the rationalities in play are not 
themselves to be subject to examination and so personal responsibility becomes a 
condition of this consensus, “or the prerequisites of acceptance” of the reality of this 
accident (Lemke, 2002, p. 4).  
 
The implication from the article is that drivers are not taking responsibility.  The subtext 
is that individual actions – whatever they might entail – actually ensure road safety, 
somehow, by themselves.  If the Donegal crash is encompassed, as Brett says, by a 
“split second” (Kelly, 2010, p. 3), there would appear to be no events outside of that 
timeframe or no other social actors upon whom to apportion blame.  Despite signalling 
that its cause is unclear9, Brett essentially blames the victims of the accident for its 
occurrence (Ryan, 1976).  By encompassing the accident in the fragment of time he 
describes, he asserts the neoliberal rationality that “the consequences of action are borne 
by the subject alone, who is also solely responsible for them” (Lemke, 2002, p. 12).  
This rationality sees actions and choices as “the expression of free will on the basis of a 
self-determined decision” (Lemke, 2002, p. 12).  The RSA or the Gardaí or politicians 
or local councils are not included in Brett’s articulation of this sphere of truth and 
falsity, of violence and consensus (Lemke, 2002), even though as the RSA (2007) and 
MacGregor (2009) describe, agencies such as these are included as some of the potential 
range of actors involved in road safety.  This individualisation of responsibility is a key 
discourse formation of this coverage and a hallmark of neoliberal governmentality.  
 
In their evocation of freedom and free will, strategies of responsibilization rely on 
claims about freedom that exemplify how neoliberalism is “a political project that 
endeavours to create a social reality that it suggests already exists” (Lemke, 2002, p. 
13).  Both liberal and neoliberal programmes of governance operate “with a conception 
of the subject which sees individuals as prior to society, bearers of natural rights, and 
either utility maximising agents or rational subjects” (Mouffe, 2000, p. 95).  Within his 
                                                          
9 This would subsequently be established by process of law: The driver of the VW 
Passat involved in the accident was sentenced to four years in prison, with two years 
suspended, in December, 2014 (Harkin, 2014). 
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conceptualisation of this binary of freedom and constraint, Berlin (1969) identified 
opposing poles which he termed positive and negative liberty.  Positive liberty means 
making people free, coercing them “in the name of justice, rationality or public health to 
become wiser, healthier, more virtuous than they were, in order to enable them to 
realize what their freedom was and to exercise it” (Rose, 1999, p. 67-68).  Negative 
liberty means leaving individuals or groups alone to do what they desire (Rose, 1999, p. 
67).  The idea that it is necessary to sacrifice some freedom in order to guarantee some 
liberties or enjoy the state’s protection has a long history however and can be found in 
Hobbes (1981) and Rousseau (2003) for example (see also Gray, 2000).  But for Berlin, 
positive liberty could easily lead to totalitarianism, such as was the case in the USSR.  
As a result he favoured negative liberty, which is also emphasised in neoliberal 
ideology such as in the writings of Hayek (1944), and more recently Berlin’s analysis of 
freedom has been taken up by US writers in the liberal tradition such as Rawls (1993).  
This model of liberty is particularly relevant to the concerns of this study.  Rajan (2006, 
p. 118) says that the dominant position suggests this negative liberty has largely been 
achieved “in the late modern West”, with the car as one of its most “conspicuous 
expressions”.  As Rajan (2006, pp. 113-114) argues:  
automobility is not only well attuned to the demands of late modernity, it is also 
perhaps the most important modern development that could fulfil the 
unremitting liberal demand for individual autonomy.  The single consistent 
theme running through liberal political theory is the ideal of a free person whose 
actions are her own. Automobility, on its part, has become the (literally) 
concrete articulation of liberal 
society’s promise to its citizens that they can freely exercise certain everyday 
choices: where they want to live and toil, when they wish to travel and how far 
they want to go.  
 
But in a neoliberal context, the maintenance of this freedom actually requires constant 
reinforcement and “reform” of government and social institutions (Rose, 1993); it 
requires positive liberty.  The contention of governmentality is that it is this very 
maintenance – through “technologies of government” including “technologies of the 
self” such as the taking of individual responsibility – that constitutes the subject as free 
in specific and contingent ways (Rose, 1989; Lemke 2002, p. 12).  As a result, rather 
than being opposed to government, it can be seen that freedom is the product of 
government.  In Brett’s words, and the insistence on individual responsibilization, 
people are ostensibly extended the freedom to drive as they wish but it is a freedom 
constrained by the insistence on responsible action across various social contexts and 
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particularly in relation to driving.  Both negative and positive strategies of governance 
are mobilised in this discussion.  Brett articulates how liberalism produces freedom, 
“but this very act entails the establishment of limitations, controls, forms of coercion, 
and obligations relying on threats, etcetera” (Foucault, 2008, pp. 63-64).   
 
The strategy of responsibilization is echoed by state actors represented in the article.  
Noel Dempsey, then Minister for Transport, concludes the report by explaining how, 
within the previous two weeks, he had ironically accepted an EU award for progress 
made by Ireland in reducing road accidents (Kelly, 2010):  “Today we are vividly 
reminded that we can never ever become complacent about road safety”, he says.  
Dempsey’s is the voice of state government, another powerful actor in the constitution 
of discourses of the dispositif of road safety and his words – “that we can never become 
complacent” – also utilises the common sense  “we” so that it includes all right thinking 
citizens, as well as the RSA, in the net of responsibility for road safety.  As Dempsey 
notes in the introduction to the Road Safety Strategy (RSA, 2007, p. 2): “I expect full 
and timely delivery from each of the agencies responsible for action and I have every 
confidence that each agency will take its leadership role seriously”.  However, he goes 
on to add: “As politicians and legislators, it is our job to create the context and 
awareness to allow Ireland to become one of the safest countries in the world.  When 
every citizen takes responsibility, that objective will become more than an aspiration”.   
So while including state or official agencies, Dempsey ultimately defers to the agency 
of the citizen in the cause of road safety.  To paraphrase Dean (1999, p. 72), Dempsey’s 
words exemplify the meaning of governance through freedom: the creation of 
conditions in which subjects enact responsibilities that constitute their liberty.  Although 
Dempsey invokes the autonomous free citizen, it can again be seen that responsibility is 
the effect of government which requires and constitutes the subject as free to make 
responsible choices and only in relation to the particular context the government creates 
(Rose, 1989).  Both Brett’s and Dempsey’s construction of the accident cohere.  Their 
words can be viewed as a salutary lesson for “everyone” on the consequences of bad 
choices, where the assumption is these choices are self-determined and the 
responsibility of the subject alone, who is constituted within a common sense rationality 
of neoliberalism (Lemke, 2002, p. 12).   
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Media ritual, deflection and the redistribution of social responsibility  
 
When authorities such as Brett and Dempsey speak of causes and responsibilities (and 
their implications) in the way they do here, it represents the dominant framing of the 
articulation of strategies of road safety. This is a familiar enough framework to be 
deemed a “media ritual”, implicated, in this case, in the constitution and reinforcement 
of personal responsibility in road safety as a value that inheres to “our” world (Couldry, 
2003).  To create the fiction of the responsibilized self, however, also requires 
deflection and distancing of the subject from “the state” in a way that traces more of the 
dimensions of the rationality of neoliberalism.  In the Road Safety Strategy (2007, p. 2) 
expert authority is redistributed among a range of agencies and “stakeholders” who exist 
at degrees of remove from the state (“…full and timely delivery from each of the 
agencies responsible”) in relations predicated on monetary considerations (Richardson, 
2007, p. 50).  However, responsibility ultimately defers to the citizen (“When every 
citizen takes responsibility”) as the key site of government intervention.  Concomitant 
with the ritual constitution of autonomous, personally responsible subjects then is the 
detachment of “the substantive authority of expertise from the apparatuses of political 
rule” (Rose, 1993, p. 285).  The ritualised mediated articulation of this detachment acts 
to further reinforce personal responsibility and the responsibilized citizen as common 
sense: as “our” values (Fowler, 1991).  The distancing is exemplified by Dempsey’s 
stating of the ritual mantra of neoliberal government, already signalled: the job of 
politicians and legislators is to create “awareness” and “context”, rather than actually 
taking-on direct responsibility for, in this case, road safety.   
 
This deflection of responsibility is the presumption of an institutional authority (the 
neoliberal state) that sees its job as the redistribution of social responsibility and the 
reassembly instead of a sovereign responsibilized citizenry (Gilbert, 2013).  The 
contrast between this strategy and the way other liberal ethics are organised can be 
traced.  In neoliberalism or what Rose (1993; 1999) calls advanced liberalism, the 
strategy of government “does not seek to govern through society, but through the 
regulated choices of individual citizens” (Rose 1993, p. 285).  In the formulation of 
government under the welfare state, however, the state itself had become transformed 
“into a centre that could programme – shape, guide, channel, direct, control – events and 
persons distant from it”.  Thus authority and expertise inhered to it rather than to “a 
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market governed by the rationalities of competition, accountability and consumer 
demand” (Rose, 1993, p. 285).   
 
In the context of neoliberalism, a taxonomy of authorities and experts in relation to the 
distribution of responsibilities around the Donegal accident or the dispositif of road 
safety in general would include the words of other actors such as TDs in their capacities 
as local representatives, as well as local priests, or the local council for example10.  
Indeed, local representatives such as TDs and priests ritually appear in Irish public 
discourse to speak on behalf of responsibilized citizens and this functions to create 
distance from official state authority.  As will be shown in Chapter 3, local 
representatives are authorised as experts in the reporting of the emotions of the local 
community, where ordinary citizens despite their responsibilization become the cyphers 
of government.  Because of their exclusion from the rational discourses of policy 
solutions to issues of road safety however (Sheller, 2005), the roles of these local 
representatives can differ substantially from that of other authorities.  These include the 
diffuse agencies and experts that act on a national level, from whom the minister 
expects “full and timely delivery” of the strategy’s initiatives (RSA, 2007, p. 2).   
Indeed, it is worth examining the role of the then Chairperson of the RSA, Gay Byrne, 
in relation to the taxonomy of authorities, because it is exemplary of how national actors 
are ritually accorded the facility to articulate rational solutions to the problem of road 
safety.  Specifically, in the context of this chapter’s concerns, Byrne has an important 
                                                          
10 Donegal County Council is given scant coverage in these reports about the accident, 
however.  It is described, ironically, as already working “on a new road safety plan in 
advance of Sunday’s multiple fatality following a spate of other road deaths in the 
county” (Edwards, 2010).  An un-named spokesperson is briefly quoted as saying the 
council hoped to publish this plan “early in the summer”, in an article that is 
substantially concerned with listing multiple fatality road traffic accidents that had 
occurred in Donegal since 2004 (Edwards, 2010).  However, as some of the agencies 
from which the minister expects results (RSA, 2007, p. 91), local councils are clearly 
implicated in the distribution of social responsibility around road safety, predicated on 
market governance and instrumental rationalities.  Yet they are not given a similarly 
authoritative voice to articulate rational solutions to road safety, as national actors are in 
this context, and simply reinforce the official consensus. 
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role in endorsing the deflection of expert authority from the state to the regulated 
choices of individuals (Rose, 1993).  Couldry (2012, p. 81) notes that celebrity matters 
“because it condenses a call to attention towards something common and shared that 
‘we’ need to follow”.  Byrne’s status as a broadcaster and entertainer on its own confers 
scant qualification for the role of Chairperson of an authority concerned with the 
constitution of the dispositif of road safety.  But his celebrity not only works to 
authorise and legitimate the Road Safety Strategy as something common and shared and 
worthy of attention, its media locus telegraphs the assumed centrality of the mainstream 
media to the organisation of society in the manner envisioned by the strategy (Couldry, 
2012).  Byrne’s authority differs from the technical authority of Brett or the political 
authority of Dempsey because it is predicated upon the ritual attachment of media 
celebrity to the cause of road safety.  Byrne authorises and legitimates the strategy by 
mimicking the instrumentally rational language of Brett and Dempsey.  In the 
introduction to the Road Safety Strategy, for example, Byrne sets out how the authority 
advises the Minister for Transport who then develops policy for road safety, before 
ritually deferring to the responsibility of the citizen: 
 
We must all take personal responsibility for the way in which we behave; this 
strategy seeks to engender a sense of public and personal pride about our 
behaviours on the road and our performance as a nation... 
 
The RSA will report on implementation of this policy and on progress against 
the targets set out.  In addition the strategy document is a handbook for those 
with responsibility for making road safety happen.   
 
On behalf of the RSA Board I commend this strategy to you and assure you that 
we will do all that is humanly possible to ensure it is delivered in full so that you 
and those close to you do not become a tragic statistic… 
 
But I hope the comprehensiveness of this strategy does not detract from one 
central truth – Road safety comes down to individual behaviour.  (RSA, 2007, p. 
3) 
 
The way in which the operation of the policy is set out by Byrne – the focus on targets, 
handbooks, progress, statistics, performance, and the ultimate foregrounding of the 
individual – indicates how the authority of expertise becomes detached from the state 
and instrumentalised in the form of particular actions and the organisations of people 
and things diffused throughout the social infrastructure.  Byrne describes not only how 
responsibility is deferred to the individual, but also the conditions under which the 
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competitive market in road safety can operate:  In talk of generating targets and 
performance he speaks of competition and enterprise; in referring to reporting and 
progress he speaks of accountability, and in bracketing the same equation in relation to 
personal responsibility, Byrne speaks of the ethic of good neoliberal citizenship 
(Gilbert, 2013; Lemke, 2002; Ouellette and Hay, 2008, p. 474).  This ethic constitutes 
the morality of how subjects are “obliged to be free”, through “choice, autonomy, self-
responsibility as well as the obligation to maximise one’s life as a kind of enterprise” 
(Rose 1999, p. 87; Rose; O’Malley, and Valverde, 2006, p. 91).   
 
Indeed, responsibilization constructs subjects “whose moral quality is based on the fact 
that they rationally assess the costs and benefits of a certain act as opposed to alternative 
acts” (Lemke, 2002, p. 12).  Dean (2010, p. 19) argues that government is therefore an 
“intensely moral activity” where government presumes knowledge in relation to what 
constitutes responsible conduct – right and wrong – and articulates this knowledge 
towards individuals in these entrepreneurial terms.  In his capacity as Chairperson of the 
RSA, Byrnes words implicitly emphasise the continuum of government, because he is 
the totem of an agency constituted at a remove from the organs of the state tasked with 
implementing processes of responsibilization around road safety.  In setting out the 
conditions under which the market operates, Byrne’s words become exemplary of how 
neoliberal rationalities can be ritually applied to define understanding of any social 
problem and how these act outside of purely economic calculations to become “a new 
regime of truth” that encompasses morality and ethics (Foucault, 1975; Read, 2009, p. 
28).  The communicative frame evident in these documents – of responsibilization of 
individuals on one side of the coin and the deflection of responsibility (for expert 
authority, for example) on its obverse – constructs the detachment of responsibility from 
the state as part of a natural centre of “our” way of life.  This in turn is predicated upon 
an assumption that the media’s natural stake in this process is to reflect this “fact” 
(Couldry, 2003; Couldry, 2008a, p. 96).  The need for the state is to find a way to 
account for the indeterminate nature of human action.  Government needs something 
that reinforces but simultaneously deflects attention from the contingent “forms of 
knowledge, strategies of power and technologies of the self” immanent within 
neoliberalism (Lemke, 2012, p. 7) while redistributing the state’s own responsibilities 
along the continuum of government, ultimately to individual citizens.  Strategies of 
governmentality address this need admirably.  The mediated policy context of the 
Donegal accident is not just about the moral constitution of assemblages of car and 
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drivers or the dispositif of road safety then, it is illustrative of the constitution of society 
as it “ought” to be.   
 
Governmentality and the discipline of vigilance  
 
As well as encouraging responsibilization and the creation of distance between authority 
and the state, strategies of governmentality work in another way: by pitching the threat 
of the removal of freedom as the price of freedom itself.  On page 3 of The Irish Times 
on the 13th of July, the Taoiseach ritually offers his condolences to those affected by the 
accident:  “I am deeply saddened to learn of these deaths and I want to extend my 
sincere sympathies to everyone who lost loved ones.  Each death is tragic and brings 
untold suffering to families, friends and the entire community” (Minihan, 2010).  
However, the Taoiseach also takes the opportunity to note that road deaths have halved 
in past decade and adds: “that is no consolation to the loved ones of those who have 
died this weekend.  We must continue with our efforts to improve road safety and 
everyone needs to be vigilant on our roads”.  The repeating concept of vigilance is most 
significant here (It also appears in the story by Kelly [2010] for example).  The word 
exists as the obverse of freedom.  Contained within its foregrounding is an implicit 
threat – if the price of freedom is eternal vigilance, a failure to maintain vigilance 
becomes tantamount to the removal of freedom.  The call to vigilance is another 
example of the way in which the binary of freedom and constraint is invoked in 
discourses of road safety where liberty is to be defended against the power of the state 
(Hindess, 1996, p. 65) – ironic here, given this is enunciated by the most powerful of 
state actors.  However, in terms of governmentality the irony disappears and the 
Taoiseach’s words actually represent the recasting of disciplinary power as a technology 
or instrument of government.   
 
In the Taoiseach’s equation, freedom pertains to those who keep the “vigil” on the 
roads, with freedom, life even, taken away from those who do not.  “Vigilance” 
signifies a rational heed of real danger, although at first it is not especially clear how 
this is actually achieved.  However, when one considers that threats to freedom emerge 
not only from the possibility of accident, but also from potential censure by an enhanced 
set of disciplinary instruments and measures mooted as part of the Road Safety Strategy, 
the attempted constitution of a subject who lives her freedom by avoiding these threats 
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becomes much clearer.  The Road Safety Strategy includes 24 separate enforcement 
“action numbers” for example.  These include: 
 
the rollout of Garda Traffic Corps across all Divisions to planned manning 
level and with all necessary equipment, technology and administrative support… 
Achieve a target level of compliance with speed limits for cars and motor 
cycles… Implement a Safety Camera Network in the region of 6,000 hours 
enforcement per month…determine the incidence of drink driving in Ireland and 
achieve a target level of compliance with drink driving law… Expand the range 
of road safety related offences covered by way of penalty points and 
administrative fines… Develop and ensure effective sanctions for all vehicles 
and drivers on Irish roads.  (RSA, 2007, p. 56-59) 
 
That there is never certainty about when one becomes subject to the gaze of these new 
disciplinary instruments, as perhaps most clearly illustrated in the case of the 
introduction of speed cameras, is a given.  Consequently, vigilance is required to 
mitigate the threat not only of accident but also of detection and punishment of 
transgression.  This illustrates how “discipline” is also implicated in the construction of 
the “subjectivity which is necessary to the successful operation of a particular regime of 
power/knowledge” (Stewart, 2001, p. 18).  Subjects are made free, empowered in a 
sense by the threat of discipline that constitutes some of the terrain upon which 
responsibilized citizens can “freely” work on themselves, in a manner congruent with a 
neoliberal rationality (Lemke, 2002, p. 12).  Therefore the constitution of freedom on 
the road is dependent upon the forbearance of the powerful through technologies of 
discipline and the threat of domination that inheres to these, as well as upon 
responsibilized vigilance as a form of self-regulation.  As a continuum, government 
does not abandon strategies of discipline nor the potential for domination.  These co-
exist as instruments of governance along with technologies of the self (Lemke, 2002)11.   
 
The risk to life and limb that exists in unforeseen events such as road traffic accidents, 
as well as the risk of punishment, is mitigated through vigilance (O’Malley, 1992), but 
these risks are not expunged.  This is explicitly recognised in the Road Safety Strategy: 
“The RSA accepts that to strive for 100 per cent compliance is desirable but recognises 
that it can never be achieved” (RSA, 2007, p. 56).  This illustrates the limitation of 
strategies of responsibilization: while framing the accident in terms of such strategies 
                                                          
11 The ways in which the cameras operate as a disciplinary power is more specifically 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
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might endeavour “to create a social reality that it suggests already exists” (Lemke, 2002, 
p. 13), this reality cannot simply be enacted through utterance or media reports.  
However, this is not so much because of the failure of programs of government or the 
media in the face of reality.  It is because of the operation of “different realities and 
heterogeneous strategies” (Lemke, 2002, p. 9) of the actors that constitute the 
assemblages of car-drivers, the dispositif of road safety, and the networks of 
automobility in all their complexity.  This draws attention attention to how actual 
drivers conceptualise their freedom and responsibility on the road. 
 
Responsibilization and the practices of freedom   
 
The neoliberal paradox is that the responsibilized subject can be made to materialise 
through strategies of intervention, but is also the assumed entity at whom strategies are 
aimed.  Questions remain as to the extent to which this free subject actually emerges in 
practice however; that is, how the agency of the users of the system of automobility not 
only cohere with and diverge from exhortations to be responsible, but also how 
heterogeneous strategies circulate within and mesh with lived experience.  Discourse 
analysis of media representations alone cannot describe the experience of car use from 
which meanings are made by users themselves (Schram, 1993; Chen, 2001).  
Commuting, with its collective commitment to “rational, universalistic, legal and formal 
rules of the road”, as described by Keohane, Kuhling, and Horgan (2002, p. 50), 
expresses well the dominant mentality of automobility in action.  By analysing the 
experiences of commuters about their driving practices some the processes of meaning-
making involved in these practices can be explored.  Specifically, the ways in which 
policy contexts of responsibilization and freedom are lived outside of the analysis of 
media representation (Flick, 2002; Kirby 2002) can be analysed, and the extent to which 
responsibilized subjects materialise in the lived reality of the dispositif of road safety 
and networks of automobility can be discussed.   
 
Escape potential: “The dream of how we’d like our lives to be”  
 
In the following account from Barry (f1), it can start to be shown how concepts of both 
freedom and constraint already explored are lived in responsibilized commuting 
practice:  
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I remember when (my uncle) left his job commuting from Greystones to 
Donnybrook.  And he had counted – what was driving him mad – he had 
counted the number of traffic lights he had to go through every day.  And 
eventually that was breaking point.  He left the job and he went down to county 
Kerry to set up a restaurant.  Something completely different.  But often that was 
in the back of my head you know?  Because that’s the kind of commute that I 
have.   I don’t even want to know how many traffic lights I go through.  So em, 
No.  I wouldn’t be thinking. Radio on in the background.  I have a few calls – 
work related mostly. 
 
Barry’s words contain a lament: a cauterised desire to break free from the daily grind, 
the chance of a better life tantalisingly offered yet also taken away by the exigencies of 
work and the environmental requirement to drive.  Barry’s autonomy and freedom is 
here set against the demands of work, but he still expresses faith in the inherent 
potential for escape the car is said to provide.   
 
While Barry’s comments represent the desire for a break from the “tyranny” of the daily 
commute, other commuters describe how the car can enable minor rebellions in the face 
of quotidian needs, as well as facilitating its toil.  What is indicated is that commuters 
conceptualise their autonomy in a complex freedom / constraint binary in which neither 
absolutely negates the other.  The car is both constraining and liberating.  Indeed, 
notions of escape associated with the car, set against implicit constraints, really resonate 
with commuters:  
  
 Evelyn: I often get into the car and just drive around.  I’m a Sunday driver!  
 
 Gerard:  It’s the potential. 
 
 Dermot:  It’s the potential – you could do it like.  (Evelyn, Gerard, Dermot f5) 
 
Susan noted that she made fewer of these journeys than before: 
  
They’re slightly fewer and further between at the moment because everything is 
revolving around college – But yeah even just in the evening time driving out 
the coast road and going to Howth and that area and just looking out over the 
city it’s absolutely beautiful. (Susan, f8) 
David, a car enthusiast, also lamented his own associations with the freedom the car is 
said to provide: 
…I keep going back: I think the 25 year old David just loved cars and it’s funny 
how cars I bought for a couple of grand back when I was 25, I probably enjoyed 
my driving experience more then than I do now. 
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 Facilitator: Why is that? 
 
David:  I think maybe it’s because maybe everything was new to you – I think 
every spin down to the shop, every spin to work was just great craic.  And 
you’re younger. I was picking up <my wife>, dating <my wife>. 
 
 Michelle: There was an independence to it. 
 
 David: There was an independence to it as alright.  And it was all great fun.  
        (David and Michelle, f4) 
 
Evelyn delineated her own notion of self-determination associated with the car, saying:  
“I liked the freedom, you’re not relying on anyone – I suppose it’s independence isn’t 
it”? (Evelyn, f5).  “Autonomy”, Gerard added (Gerard, f5).  Una differentiated between 
driving in the city and the country in terms of the freedom they offer:  “I like the 
strangeness of it, because I’m city driving every day – it’s great to get a blast out of the 
car”, she said (Una, f6). Caroline noted that on her days off, her own experiences of 
escape centred on the freedom from having a set destination, as well as freedom from 
the interference of others: 
 
I'm a great one for disappearing.  I get up in the morning and I'm gone – People 
are ringing me going “Where are you”?  “I’m gone for the day”…Leave me 
alone stop ringing me!”…I take the car and I’m deciding where I'm going as I’m 
going.  So if I hit a bit of traffic or this road is driving me mad – I’ll just go off 
on another road and it doesn’t matter…then it becomes much more relaxing – 
then it’s just out for a  spin – freedom.     (Caroline, f7) 
Similarly, Susan related her love of driving to “that sense of complete freedom to go 
wherever I wanted” experienced on her first long distance journey as a driver (Susan, 
f8).   
 
But even while elaborating on what the freedom of the car meant to him, Barry (f1) 
encapsulates the ambiguity attached to all these experiences:  
 
Just the flexibility – freedom to – flexibility – free will – I want to go to Galway 
this evening – just go. 
 
 Facilitator: Do you ever do that? 
 
 Brid: It’s individual – it’s individual freedom 
 
 Barry: What?  The odd time when I, eh. 
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 Facilitator: When was the last time you said – “feck it I’m going to Galway?”! 
 Barry: Or yeah – okay – that’s a bad example! (General laughter)    
     
(Barry and Brid, f1)  
While Barry’s and others’ reflections rely on dualist conceptions of freedom and 
constraint, they actually describe how the conditions of freedom and autonomy are 
constituted and lived in practice as technologies of the self (Rose, 1999, p. 72; Lemke, 
2002, p. 12) and how the ideal of freedom is materially instantiated and sacrificed to the 
exigencies of work and life. For commuters, for example, freedom was “freer” in the 
past, but the responsibilities of work and college increasingly denied and encroached 
upon the potential autonomy provided by the car.  Alternately, freedom could only be 
experienced at certain times of the day or week or outside of work.  This delineates 
some of these commuters’ self-described obligation to be free (Rose, 1999, p. 87) in that 
they are required to self-regulate their car-based freedoms around the exigent demands 
of their work and study lives.  In other words, commuters maintain a level of freedom 
by negotiating constraints on it through their responsibilized choices – to continue 
working, to not break free, to see the potential to “escape” as one that would disappear 
if the choice were taken too often.  So these choices are managed and freedoms are 
taken parsimoniously, at weekends and at odd times that constitute the specificity of 
their obligation to be free, and thus constitute how their freedom is lived.  In 
commuters’ reflections on their driving, technologies of the self, specifically in the form 
of the self-regulation of their choices, emphasise the broader conception of government 
considered as a continuum (Lemke, 2002).   
 
That some construed the diminution of their opportunities to experience car-based 
freedom as a lament is predicated on the idea that the freedom the car provides is also 
true, “permanently desirable” (Rajan, 2006, pp. 113-4), and a common sense of life that 
requires little consideration or exploration.  As was the case in the mediated policy 
context of the Donegal accident, the freedom to drive is immediately constrained by 
required responsible conduct across social contexts – and for these commuters this 
manifests in practices related to work, study, and the need to support families and make 
a living. 
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The potential of the car to be a substitute for freedom is validated by commuters, 
whether or not it is actually provided.  Commuters recognise the car as a sign-vehicle 
for dominant, yet highly contingent, meanings about freedom such as those articulated 
in car advertising.  But rather than finding the disjuncture between the car’s potential for 
freedom and its reality alienating, they see it as aspirational and desirable.  Fiona (f1) 
encapsulates this point in the context of advertising, in a way that reinforces my earlier 
analysis of how car advertising structures the opposition between freedom and 
constraint:  “They’re selling a driver experience there without a doubt.  Your commute 
is probably not your ‘driving experience’ …They’re selling you a little dream and we all 
want buy in to that...Our dream of how we’d like our lives to be”. 
 
Overall, while commuters’ articulation of the desirability of breaking free aligns with 
the neoliberal emphasis on the desirability of, in Berlin’s (1969) terms, negative 
freedom similar to that explored in the mediated policy context of the Donegal accident, 
the maintenance of freedom requires constant reinforcement and negotiation.  
Commuters’ freedom, as they practice it, is a product of these negotiations and their 
self-government.  
  
Dimensions of the responsibilized subject: economically moral actors and the 
ubiquity of the car 
 
The foregrounding of the importance of work and study has revealed important factors 
that condition freedom within discourses of responsibilization such as those explored in 
the mediated policy context of the Donegal accident.  The discussion has thus identified 
some of the terrain upon which responsibilized citizens work on themselves through 
forms of self-regulation in this context.  A responsibilized subject negotiating the 
conflicting demands of life and the freedom provided by the car quickly materialises.  
There are more dimensions involved in the conditioning of this car-driver subject 
however and the economically moral actor that will now be explored is another 
important facet of how freedom is constituted through the networks of automobility in 
Ireland.  
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Brendan (f6) complained that the pleasure of driving in Dublin city had disappeared 
because of the extent of congestion and added that the high cost of cars actually 
increased traffic because it made sense for people to use them as much as possible: 
 
You’re not going to leave that major investment sitting in your driveway rusting 
and getting on to relatively poor public transport…I know a lot of people who 
would absolutely say … I’ve spent so much money on buying this car – there’s 
no way I’m going to leave it for…five days a week and…get public transport in. 
         (Brendan, f6) 
 
Brendan’s words connect with those of Gay Byrne, as quoted above, where Byrne 
relocates expertise to within a market governed by neoliberal rationalities and ultimately 
deferred to the responsibilized self (Rose, 1993, p. 285).  This is because Brendan 
shows the same equation between morality and a cost-benefit analysis that Byrne does 
(Lemke, 2002, p. 12; Gilbert, 2013).  This ethic of good neoliberal citizenship 
(Ouellette and Hay, 2008, p. 474) can be deployed in practice to rationalise any social 
problem where citizens look to themselves as responsibilized actors, not only 
concerning solutions to these problems, but also reagrding their cause.  Here moral 
economic behaviour has been articulated by Brendan, making congestion its effect.  By 
mobilizing the neoliberal rationality that consequences are borne by subjects alone 
(Lemke, 2002, p. 12), Brendan also philosophically aligns with the assumption in Noel 
Brett’s analysis that a “split second” encompassed the accident in Donegal.  The context 
is different, but what is highlighted is the assumption of the autonomous subject further 
articulated in relation to the practices of the networks of automobility.  The point is that 
the conceptualisations, ethics and morals assumed by Brendan correspond with those of 
Byrne and Brett.      
 
Focus group two was asked how they managed the freedoms associated with the car in 
relation to its potential risks, such as the danger of traffic accidents.  This led to 
discussion of accidents in which these commuters had been involved.  The conversation 
took place late in the session, long after focus group participants had been eased into 
discussion, when they seemed comfortable with the exploration of what is a potentially 
sensitive topic (Barbour, 2007, p. 83).  Brian (f2) offered his own experiences: 
 
 
104 
 
I hit a cyclist one night in Dublin – I was going through a green light and out of 
nowhere this cyclist was in front of me and suddenly he was over the bonnet…I 
was very lucky – because the car coming up from the other side was a cop 
car…But he was thrown and he was sprawled out across the other side of the 
road.  And of course, I was petrified because I thought this is the end of me I 
will never drive again because I’m going to be loaded to the hilt…Turned out 
that cops took charges against him, for driving without a light on his bike and 
going through a red light.  So I mean there are risks and there are things that you 
could not imagine happening.  (Brian f2) 
 
Like Brendan, Brian understands the incident he describes economically and 
rationalises his morality “according to a particular calculation of cost for benefit” (Read, 
2009, p. 28).  His foregrounding of anxiety around risk minimisation makes it seem as if 
Brian is more concerned with his insurance premiums than the fate of the cyclist.  As 
Rose (1999, p. 160) notes: “This prudent person is no longer mutualised but 
autonomized.  Thrift is recast as investment in a future lifestyle of freedom”.  Brian is 
made a locus of action, but is also atomised, made to consider only his own future rather 
than the welfare of others in the fragmentation of the social space (Rose, 1999, p. 160) 
that his market-mentality represents.  His future freedom relates to his future 
insurability to drive.  Brian’s expression of this “new prudentialism” occurs in a 
scenario where morality or ethics, as has already been shown in Brendan’s case, 
becomes synonymous with economic calculation (Rose, 1999, p. 159; Browne, 2003, 
pp. 13/15).  The economically moral actor is, therefore, not only constituted in the 
discourse formations of the mediatisation of the Donegal accident.  These examples 
indicate that, in practice, a moral economy defined by individualised self-care is a 
dimension of the technologies of the self of responsibilized neoliberal citizens.   
 
The articulation of the unknowability of others’ conduct in relation to the equation of 
morality to economic behaviour occurs in further scenarios, continuing the practice of 
the ritual application of market rationality to delineate all social forms (Maddison, 2013, 
p. 106).  Chris and Geraldine (f2) had recently been involved in a road traffic accident 
and they explained how it changed their driving practices.  Geraldine noted that at the 
junction the accident occurred, she now drove in the other lane, a risk management 
strategy.  Chris directly reflected on the consequences of the accident: 
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It worries me more that it wasn’t your fault. That’s made me more aware that 
despite what I do, something bad can happen to me – the one thing I do feel 
uncomfortable about is stopping at a traffic light and knowing that somebody 
could potentially ram  into the back of me and paralyse me and there’s nothing I 
can do about that.  So that’s one thing I took from that – like we were lucky, but 
I would say that how it affects you is mostly determined by how damaged you 
are – we weren’t really that damaged.  (Chris, f2) 
 
Discussions in focus group two continued around the idea that one cannot eliminate all 
risk associated with travel by car.  Geraldine noted that if the risks were at the forefront 
of your thinking all the time “you would never drive” (Geraldine, f2), while Beth said “I 
try and dull those voices down because that would really freak you out” (Beth, f2).  
Chris argued that even when confronted with an actual accident on the road, people had 
very short memories: “within a kilometre, everyone is back to whizzing, flying 
changing lanes, no signalling”, he said (Chris, f2).  Caroline (f7) also expressed similar 
sentiments when she was asked about the risks associated with driving: 
   
It’s the behaviour of other people – because even if I did something and it 
caused an accident – I’d say right, it’s my own fault – I did this or I did that.  But 
if somebody else causes it – that would bother me substantially more because 
then it’s like: “this has happened to me because you’re a gobshite” – and then 
that’s just a whole other ball-game.  (Caroline, f7) 
 
It is interesting to note the driving imperative in commuters’ reflections on their 
commuting practices.  For many commuters, the concept of not driving at all or the idea 
of life without the car does not come into discussion.  That imperative, at least in part, 
comes down to a culture of the car and the faith commuters express in its dubious 
capacity for escape and flexibility, as well as associations with the car’s ability to 
provide “the good life” (Urry, 2005, p. 26).  This culture is a powerful actor; an 
important part of the context of commuting that constitutes how freedom in 
automobility is lived in practice.   
 
In addition, for political theorists concerned with the maximisation of the liberty of the 
individual, the ethical negotiations of commuters might be considered as expressing a 
freedom that “consists in controlling one’s behaviour by one’s unforced choice while 
having knowledge of relevant circumstance” (Gewirth, 1990, p. 216).  But it can be seen 
that the choices of commuters are not unforced at all.  They are enabled and constrained 
not only by the requirement for responsible action across social contexts, but also by the 
types of social action (Dant, 2005) the culture of the car and the networks of 
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automobility in their ubiquity facilitate and impede.  Freedom, as commuters live it, is a 
product of choices that exist within the context of automobility’s “particular form of 
social and material life”, its routines of false necessity that make it “nearly 
imperceptible as a social fact” (Rajan 2006 pp. 114/117).  This reminds us of Miller’s 
(2001, p. 3) point “that we think our world through a sense of the self in which driving, 
roads, and traffic are simply integral to who we are and what we presume to do each 
day”.  The car’s ubiquity and the economically moral actor together reinforce each other 
and are important dimensions of the constitution of automobility and its freedoms.  
 
Given a research focus on car-commuting, it could be argued that a finding emphasising 
the importance of the economic and work is unsurprising.  However, the connection 
between commuting, the economically moral responsibilized subject and the ethics of 
good citizenship is by no means a given (Ouellette and Hay, 2008, p. 471) so that it 
appears in this context is, therefore, illustrative of the permeation of such discourses.  
As already explored, commuting is usually backgrounded and is rarely portrayed as a 
source of contestation; it is emblematic of collective thought that is taken for granted 
and not usually open to question (Dean, 1999, p. 16; Moran 2005, p. 28).  It is 
commuting’s unexamined particularity that allows it to serve as an effective technology 
producing neoliberal mentalities and moralities in automobility.  Its very un-
remarkableness is actually remarkable; its unexamined particularity is what places it at 
the heart, if such a thing existed, of the government of (and by) automobility.   
 
Limits of the responsibilized subject: deflection and the interpretation of road 
safety messages 
 
So far it has been explored how the binary of freedom and constraint plays out in the 
practice of automobility, including how the exigencies of work, morality, and the 
ubiquity of automobility act in the constitution of freedom in the system.  But how 
strategy interventions in the dispositif of road safety are actually managed by 
commuters has not yet been discussed.  It has already been explored how commuters’ 
practices are contrived to make individual responsibility for risk minimisation “a feature 
of the choices that are made by individuals, households and communities as consumers, 
clients and uses of services” (Rose, 1999, p. 159).  Yet a conditioning agent in the 
meshing of mediated discourses of road safety and that of commuters is deflection, but 
it operates in different ways to how deflection of authority is mediated in the material 
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that has already been explored.  The articulation of policy strategy through the 
mediatisation of the Donegal accident urges drivers towards responsibilization and 
deflects responsibility away from state and national actors.  But commuters can also 
deflect blame away from themselves and towards the “system” and especially towards 
other road users, making safety more a matter of the personal provisions of others rather 
than themselves.  This mode of deflection was a feature Maxwell (2001) also found in 
his study of Cambridge commuters, but the particularity of its operation is different in 
the Irish research context and deflection is not a feature of every commuter’s experience 
of their driving practices.   
 
In discussion of road behaviour for example, my commuters cite instances of ways in 
which others act in an “incorrect” or “unsafe” manner but go on to describe their 
responses to these actions in ways that can also be considered questionable in terms of 
the rules of the road and road safety strategies of responsibilization.  While quite 
humorous, this indicates the negotiated interpretation and lived nature of the 
responsibilization espoused in media articulation of policy strategies.  Thus the limits of 
the responsibilized subject, and how heterogeneous strategies operate to limit the 
media’s symbolic and ritual power to constitute that subject (Couldry, 2003; Lemke, 
2002), can begin to be seen.   
 
Caitriona pointed out that people should generally keep left while on the motorway, 
unless overtaking, so should never “hog” the middle lane.  However, her remedy for 
dealing with middle-lane hogs is overtaking on the left12: 
                                                          
12 S.I. No. 294/1964 - Road Traffic General Bye-Laws (Irish Statute Book 1964) states 
that: 
(3) A driver shall overtake on the right and shall not move in towards the left until 
it is safe to do so. 
(4) Notwithstanding paragraph (3) of this bye-law, a driver may overtake on the 
left— 
(a) where the driver of the vehicle about to be overtaken has signalled his 
intention to turn to the right and the driver of the overtaking vehicle intends, after 
having overtaken, to go straight ahead or to turn to the left, 
(b) where the driver of the overtaking vehicle intends, after having overtaken, to 
turn left at a road junction and has signalled this intention, 
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Well I lived in the UK for 19 years.  So I learned how to use the motorway – 
three lanes right?  Irish people tend to sit…in the middle lane…instead of being 
on the  inside lane.  They don’t seem to get that.  So I’m on the inside and I pass 
them on the inside doing the speed limit – I don’t speed –  and they’re sitting 
there doing like 90 (Km/h).  (Caitriona, f3) 
Here, Caitriona foregrounds speed as a bigger offence compared to “undertaking” (“I 
pass them on the inside doing the speed limit”).  Caitriona’s actions are a negotiation of 
road safety messages that foreground the problematic subject position of the speeding 
driver.  This frame is often the target of disciplinary measures (and it is said that “Speed 
Kills” [Keohane, Kuhling, and Horgan, 2002, p. 50]) that have little to say about the 
consequences resulting from commuters’ heeding of speed-limits in-lieu of other rules 
of the road.  In her actions, Caitriona is governing her vigilance on the road but in 
transgressive ways.  The likelihood of detection of punishable behaviours related to 
undertaking seems much less than speeding, whether or not she sees her actions related 
to overtaking on the left as questionable (she clearly doesn’t).   
 
In a similar fashion, Anne recalled a road safety ad related to drink-driving in which a 
speeder loses control of his car, hits a kerb and violently over-turns several times, 
crashing through a wall and killing a child.  As a result of this ad, her mother now 
drives in the middle of the road. As she explained: 
 
She’s actually driving out at the white line and I’m telling her – don’t be out!  
It’s because the kerb made the car flip (in the ad) – for her now she won’t align 
the car  over at the left – and I keep telling her it’s more dangerous to be over at 
the white line if someone comes.  (Anne, f8) 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(c) in slow-moving traffic, when vehicles in the traffic lane on the driver's right 
are moving more slowly than the overtaking vehicle. 
(4)(c) is the important statutory instrument for interpreting Caitriona’s actions as 
questionable.  The Garda National Traffic Bureau (2015) clarify that overtaking on the 
left is only acceptable in the context of traffic congestion in this case, which does not 
apply to the scenario Caitriona describes. 
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A recent road safety advertisement about texting and driving, in which someone 
walking while texting continually bumps into other people was also cited by Michelle 
(f4).  The ad points out that it is difficult to walk and text, never mind drive and text at 
the same time, but Michelle had a slightly different take on this.  She noted that it was 
more about personal accountability compared to other ads about crashing: 
 
It goes to show you the impact you have on other people.  Whereas the crash ads 
you always assume that’s somebody else who crashed into me…Because there’s 
only him – he’s the only one…So you just assume well that’s…his 
accountability.  He’s  bumping in to other people who are minding their own 
business and he’s the one not  focused, the one not paying attention.   
(Michelle, f4) 
 
This ad resonates with Michelle because it disallows the possibility of passing-off 
responsibility for road safety to others.  This shows commuters can see 
responsibilization as desirable and proper and thus they do not always wish to deflect 
responsibility to others.  David (f4) goes on to mention another road safety ad in which 
the perpetrator and the victim turn out to be the same person, which has a similar 
personal responsibility message-effect for him.  Further examples of negotiated readings 
of safety messages included the topic of the proper use of roundabouts and yellow box 
junctions, in which commuters also translated the meaning of the ads into their own 
“lifeworld” of driving13 (Husserl, 1970).   
 
A number of points are suggested by these exchanges.  Anne, Michelle, and Caitriona’s 
comments highlight the way texts are decoded within frameworks of meaning that 
include the reinterpretation and renegotiation of existing practices of driving (Hall, 
1980).   The silence of road safety strategies around such negotiated meanings can be 
read by commuters as tacit authorization of such actions.  Road safety ads which 
emphasise personal responsibility can be interpreted by some commuters as being about 
                                                          
13 Discussion of ads in Michelle’s group emerged out of conversations around bad 
habits, such as the use of mobile phones while driving.  During that discussion, 
commuters did not view the ad about texting and driving mentioned above during the 
session.  I did refer to it as the recent ad about texting and driving but did not describe it 
in any detail, nor show it.  My brief reference was enough to prompt knowledgeable 
discussion by all participants about this ad and on road safety ads in general, however.   
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the culpability of others.  This is because the narrative of the ad is set up in viewer’s 
minds as involving people that these viewers don’t identify with – typically young men 
and women, rather than middle-aged women such as Michelle (f4).  Commuters’ 
interpretation of road safety advertising involves the rationalisation of adverts’ 
messages in light of their renegotiation of their own (driving) practices.  While they 
were very familiar with the genre of road safety ads, commuters’ interpretation were 
varied and messy, signalling that a dimension of the responsibilized subject is that the 
material management of responsibilization involves elements of interpretation that can 
change or subvert the goals of the strategy in practice.  
 
These points have implications.  While commuters enact responsibilities that constitute 
their liberty and the conditions for this are created by governance through freedom 
(Dean, 1999, p. 72), this is not to say that commuter actions can be free from 
unintended consequences.  This is the case even when their intention was to transpose 
responsibilization strategies directly into action.  Given commuters’ interpretation and 
responsibilized management of road safety messages, the suggestion is that there are 
plenty of opportunities for policy strategies to exempt the “selves” they are trying to 
responsibilize from the messages they espouse.  This is not so much about the failure of 
strategy per se, but rather exemplifies how rationalities are “part of a reality 
characterised by the permanent ‘failure’ of programs” (Lemke, 2002, p. 9).  As already 
suggested, the “difference between the envisioned aims of a program and its actual 
effects does not refer to the purity of the program and impurity of reality, but to the 
different and heterogeneous realities and strategies” (Lemke, 2002, p. 9).    
 
This underlines the ultimate unknowability of the results of shaping the self into the 
manageable forms that governmentality and responsibilization suggest (Rabinow and 
Rose, 2003, p. xx).  What is shown here is how the responsibilization strategies such as 
those articulated through the mediated policy context of the Donegal accident, while 
influential, do not simply determine commuters’ practices.  As with the other 
dimensions that have been identified, these strategies are part of the networks of actors 
that constitute the freedom the car provides in practice in automobility.  Commuters’ 
self-government is often an attempt to manage the reality of the ultimate unknowability 
or unpredictability of others actions.  This is in accordance with Dean’s (1999, p. 13) 
account of governmentality.  Commuters’ negotiations do not represent the wholesale 
rejection of road safety strategies, with consequential actions that are unrecognisable 
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with respect to mainstream discourses extant in the mediated policy context of the 
Donegal accident, for example.  Commuter conduct instead “plays” with the meaning of 
strategies, but the political effect of their deviation from the suggested 
responsibilization seems weak.  
 
Conclusion   
 
Through the examination of the mediated policy context of the Donegal accident, the 
lived reality of positive and negative liberty as immanent to the production of freedom 
has been investigated.  That freedom in governmentality is actually produced in very 
specific ways through forms of government stretching from political government to 
technologies of the self (Lemke, 2002) has been explored.  This constitutes a radical 
reconceptualization of the binary of freedom versus constraint commonly articulated in 
popular cultural and the academic representations of the car explored in this chapter, 
because it systematically links freedom to (self) government, rather than 
conceptualising freedom as being in opposition to government. 
By analysing the common sense construction of individual responsibility as an ultimate 
expression of road safety in neoliberal governmentality, one of the most important ways 
in which the production of freedom is discursively attempted in the dispositif of road 
safety has been explored.  To sustain the fiction of the responsibilized self also requires 
the distancing of this subject from the institutions of state government, however.  And it 
has been shown how this is attempted through the detachment of expert authority from 
the state and the fabrication of a competitive market for road safety, in which the 
remaining role of state actors centres on the creation of “context” and “awareness”.  
Meanwhile, in the equation of morality with economic analysis, the ethic of neoliberal 
citizenship delineated more of the ways in which subjects are obliged to be free (Rose 
1999, p. 87; Rose; O’Malley, and Valverde, 2006, p. 91).  It was also pointed out how 
this obligation exists under the threat of discipline, emphasising both the continuum of 
government in processes of governmentality and the acknowledged limitations of 
strategies of responsibilization by themselves.  Such limitations are explicitly 
recognised in the Road Safety Strategy (RSA, 2007, p. 56), as already noted, when it 
states total compliance with policy objectives is not an achievable goal.   
 
In this chapter the ways in which commuters variably “buy into” the problematic idea of 
the freedom of the car and conceive of their own liberty in terms of a complex binary of 
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freedom and constraint has also been explored.  Their practices of freedom show how 
apparently free choices are immediately constrained by responsibilities regarding work, 
study, and family, as well as by the types of social action automobility makes 
conceivable, facilitates, and disrupts.  This means commuters’ freedom as they practice 
it is a product of negotiations between different forms of “government” including their 
self-regulation and responsibilization, as well as the threat of discipline. 
  
Commuters underline how technologies of the self constitute the dispositif of road 
safety in practice in messy ways that also signal the limits of specific responsibilization 
strategies, in relation to their ability to create the outcomes they envision.  In Brian’s 
(f2) reflection on the accident in which he hit a cyclist, he shows tacit awareness of such 
limits, in that he realises that no matter how he behaves, unknowable events may occur 
anyway.  In these contexts, probabilistic and entrepreneurial techniques of risk 
management are engaged in through the maximisation of vigilance, as suggested in 
mediated discourses, and by pondering the effects of such incidents on motor insurance 
premiums, for example, rather than on concern for the welfare of others (Rose, 
O’Malley, and Valverde, 2006, p. 95).  The fear of road traffic accidents becomes 
articulated economically, in a way that characterises the constitution of the neoliberal 
subject both in the dispositif of road safety and in the practices of the networks of 
automobility.   
 
Commuters express anxieties that flow from the atomisation and individuation of 
society that neoliberalism necessitates.  So an outcome of the economic thinking 
articulated by Brian (f2) and Brendan (f6), for example, is social anxiety and alienation 
expressed in the fear of being unable to manage others.  Responsibilization strategies 
only go so far in helping us protect ourselves, not only when their interpretation and 
practice can differ from person to person, but also when consequences cannot be 
managed or measured in their totality.  But there was little sense from commuters that 
there could be further roles for political actors, for example, in trying to alter the 
apparently immutable dangers of a responsibilized world, or that the neoliberal 
economic subject channelled by these commuters is a contingent one.  What commuter 
reflections on driving lack then is a reflexive or self-conscious sense of the way that this 
assemblage of freedom has been constituted or how the car’s integration into our sense 
of self and what we do each day is conditional (Miller, 2001).  Commuters’ reflections 
on their driving practices show their experiences of freedom as it is lived as an 
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instrument of government, involving a myriad of actors beyond our “selves”.  But it is a 
freedom expressed as a never-ending struggle between an autonomous subject and an, 
albeit complex, binary of freedom and constraint.  In this sense, strategies of 
responsibilization seem to work well to embed neoliberal rationalities that valorise a 
self-determination in which “the consequences of actions are borne by the subject 
alone”, as Lemke (2002, p. 10) suggests.  This shows how market logic works to 
depoliticise individual autonomy (Maddison, 2013, p. 106).   
 
So far, though, the exploration of the range of actors implicated in the constitution of 
the dispositif of road safety and the system of automobility has only scratched the 
surface of these networks.  A sense of the complex networks of materiality and sociality 
that constitute assemblages of car-drivers (Dant, 2005; Merriman, 2005, p. 158) as free 
has quickly emerged, however.  These actors include popular cultural and academic 
references to the car, articulations of strategies of road safety, and the exigencies of 
work and commuting that have been explored here.  But these are not the only 
constituting entities.  The ways that the automobile facilitates relationships for 
commuters has already been touched upon, and this draws attention to how the car can 
be used to express what are often emotional needs.  At the same time, the mediated 
policy context of the Donegal accident also routinely deploys emotional forms of 
mediation in attempting to account for the negative consequences of the car’s 
circulation.  These emotional facets of automobility cannot be ignored.  Therefore 
identifying the role of some of these affective actors is the next task in the exploration 
of the relationships between the mediation of the dispositif of road safety and the 
everyday practices of drivers.  
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Chapter 3: Networks of emotions and affects 
 
 
Introduction   
 
In the previous chapter’s analysis of the attempted construction of the citizen governed 
through their freedom, the striking articulation of emotional and affective modes of 
communication was an issue that remained in the background.  However, this aspect of 
the dispositif of road safety needs to be foregrounded for cars and driving carry 
meaningful affective resonance.  Indeed, Sheller (2005, p. 221) argues that automobility 
“is implicated in a deep context of affective and embodied relations between people, 
machines and spaces of mobility and dwelling, in which emotions and the senses play a 
key part”.  Given their significance, the role of these emotional and affective modes of 
communication to the constitution of the social order cannot simply be dismissed.  In 
keeping with the concerns of my research and the framework of governmentality, the 
question to explore is the work that emotions and affects do within the dispositif of road 
safety and the practices of commuters.  In this chapter, I analyse the emotional and 
affective components of the mediated policy context of the Donegal accident and 
commuters’ reflections on their commuting practices.  I explore how “feelings” function 
to generate or attempt to generate specific effects within texts and in social meaning 
structures (Ahmed, 2004b, p. 19) in the networks of automobility in Ireland.   
 
Emotion, or affect, is difficult to analyse and define.  For Terada (2001, p. 4) emotional 
and affective modes together comprise feeling, encompassing both the former as “at 
least minimally interpretive…psychological states” and the latter as its “physiological 
aspect”.  Massumi (2002) considers affect to be bodily and autonomic in character, 
while emotion is the semantic and semiotic recognition of affect.  Therefore emotion 
becomes socio-linguistic or discursive.  However, Gorton (2007, p. 334) notes that “the 
nature and degree of difference between emotion and affect” form a contested terrain.  
Ngai (2005, p. 27) for example argues that emotion and affect in psychoanalysis 
differentiate first from third person feeling “and, by extension, feeling that is contained 
by an identity from feeling that is not”.  Ngai (2005) uses the terms interchangeably, 
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presumably as a form of critique of a psychoanalytic definition that relies on 
differentiation between subjects and objects (Gorton, 2007).  Gorton (2007, p. 334) 
notes that feminist authors variously emphasise emotions or affects but “this rarely 
means only one or the other is explored”.  Instead, what is underlined by these authors 
is the importance placed “on the way in which feeling is negotiated in the public sphere 
and experienced through the body” (Gorton, 2007, p. 334).   
 
In this chapter the emphasis on feelings as emotions and/or affects is retained.  I will not 
engage with definitional debates but instead will use ideas from Ahmed (2004 a, b) to 
explore the work being done in the circulation of feelings.  The circulation of feelings is 
explored in a way that includes the media, but does not assume the centrality of 
mediated forms to social constitution.  This is in keeping with the approach of this 
thesis that emphasises the complexity of the constitution of automobility and the car-
driver subject and how “drivers and vehicles perform in, and are constituted through, 
complex networks of sociality and materiality” (Merriman, 2005, p. 158).  Ahmed 
(2004b, p. 6) uses the term “impression”, for example, as a way of avoiding making 
distinctions between sensation (affect) and emotion, because they are not “‘experienced’ 
as distinct realms of human ‘experience’”.  She introduces the analysis of “affective 
economies, where feelings do not reside in subjects or objects, but are produced as 
effects of circulation…(that)…allows us to think about the ‘sociality’ of emotion” 
(Ahmed, 2004b, p. 8).  In highlighting sociality, attention is drawn to the question of the 
function of emotional or affective discourses in the networks of automobility and as a 
result, the chapter explores the different ways in which feelings go towards the 
constitution and sustenance of a social order of neoliberalism.   
 
In order to properly examine this question, the place of rationality in policy contexts of 
automobility in Ireland first needs to be considered.  An initial impression from the 
mediated policy context of the Donegal accident is that feelings play little part in the 
dispositif of road safety as policy debates and actors valorise the formally rational or 
rational choice models in their output (Sheller, 2005).  However these debates and 
actors are well attuned to deploying emotional appeal when it is in their interests to do 
so.  In fact, the mediated policy context of the Donegal accident is enmeshed in multiple 
rationalities that surface as circumstances require, despite the instrumental and formally 
logical discourses of road safety utilised in the construction of solutions to the 
antagonisms of automobility (Maxwell, 2001; Sheller, 2005; Bohm, et al., 2006).  
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Consequently, the chapter begins with further exploration of this ostensibly rationalist 
context, specifically the RSA’s policy response to the accident that killed eight in 
Donegal (RSA, 2011).  It explores the framework of multiple rationalities and briefly 
considers how the coverage attempts to construct an affective public in which feelings 
are implicated in the constitution of political consensus (Moorti, 2002, p. 150; Berlant, 
2005, p. 47). 
 
Next, mainstream media contexts in relation to the accident are examined as complex 
sites for the deployment of multiple rationalities which operate as an “affective 
economy” to reinforce existing status-quo power and social relations (Ahmed, 2004a, p. 
121).  This discussion differs from the analysis in the previous chapter in that my focus 
has narrowed to specific dimensions of the discourses of responsibilization; that is, the 
role of feelings in the framework of multiple rationalities.  This part of the chapter 
includes exploration of how these discourses work to connect emotions to passivity in 
relation to meaningful social or political activity (Spelman, 1992; Jaggar, 1992; Ahmed, 
2004 a, b).   
 
However, the connection between these realms of mediation and the emotional worlds 
that people create with their cars has been heretofore unremarked upon.  As regards “the 
lived experience of dwelling with cars in all its complexity, ambiguity and 
contradiction” (Sheller, 2005, p. 222), commuter reflections on their driving become 
very much implicated in the formulation of multiple rationalities that constitute complex 
assemblages of car-drivers, the dispositif of road safety, and the networks of 
automobility.  These are explored in the second half of the chapter.  Commuter-citizens 
are found constructing their own networks of multiple rationalities (logics and 
meanings) around automobility in Ireland that adhere and disjoin by varying degrees to 
some of the concerns of the mediated policy context (Ahmed, 2004a).  By utilizing 
Ahmed’s (2004 a, b) theory of emotional economies, the articulation of feelings can be 
theorized seamlessly across both media representation and commuter experiences of 
their driving practices with respect to how they function to constitute the networks of 
automobility in Ireland.   
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The public sphere and multiple rationalities  
 
While, as Maxwell (2001) notes, affective modes of communication are enmeshed in 
the multiple rationalities of automobility, discourses about car use are dominated by a 
limited number of issues that legitimate car ownership and provide technical and 
economic solutions to the problems the car creates.  As has already been discussed, 
these issues are aggregated by Bohm, et al. (2006) into the antagonisms of carnage, 
congestion, environmental catastrophe, and oil dependence.  Sheller (2005, p. 222) 
argues that the “individualistic ‘rational choice’ model” in transportation policy debates 
is “so influential as to be taken for granted”.  Moran (2005, p. 72) notes that rational 
choice theory assumes “that positive collective goals can be achieved through the 
pursuit of individual self-interest”.  This links the rational choice model to the 
responsibilization strategies explored in the previous chapter, where “rational, technical 
and economically guided systems of enumeration and assessment…mirror, enhance and 
extend neoliberal arrangements and sensibilities” (Walsh, 2010, p. 861).  Indeed, 
rational choices and rationality remain a dominant framework within mediated policy 
contexts of automobility through which courses of action are proposed for citizens 
about, for example, road safety (MacGregor, 2009; McAndrews, 2013).   
 
One way to problematize the place of rationalities in mediated representation is in 
relation to Habermas’ (1989) public sphere (see also Habermas, Lennox, and Lennox, 
1974), a concept for which Media Studies has had an enduring fascination (Lunt and 
Livingstone, 2103, p. 87).  For Habermas, the ideal of the public sphere of rational 
critical debate is “a realm of our social life in which something approaching public 
opinion can be formed” and where access is guaranteed to all citizens (Habermas, 
Lennox, and Lennox, 1974, p. 49).  The public sphere’s historical emergence is co-
extensive with the rise of liberal modes of governance (Beeson and Firth, 1998, p. 2), as 
well as the market economy, in which the territorial rule of a sovereign who settled 
claims “by parcelling out lordly rights” was no longer possible (Habermas, 1989, p. 28).  
Nation states – such as France, The United Kingdom and America – also emerged 
during this time with their administrative apparatus, bureaucracy, and standing armies, 
constituting a new “public authority” (Habermas, 1974, p. 51).  This new type of 
authority “consolidated into a concrete opposition for those who were merely subject to 
it” (Habermas, 1974, p. 51).  The bourgeois public sphere “became a forum in 
which…people…readied themselves to compel public authority to legitimate itself 
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before public opinion” (Habermas, 1989, pp. 25-6).  The medium of this confrontation 
was peculiar and without precedent: “people’s public use of their reason” (Habermas, 
1989, p. 27).  This sphere of rational critical public debate and deliberation14 manifested 
in what were previously officially-regulated newspapers, becoming the nascent forms of 
what is called “the media” today.  It was in these media that “private individuals 
assembled into a public body...debated that public authority on the general rules of 
social intercourse in their fundamentally privatised yet publically relevant sphere of 
labor and commodity exchange” (Habermas, 1974, p. 52). 
 
The subsequent rise of constitutional liberalism guaranteed society as a sphere of private 
autonomy in which public authority became restricted to few functions (Habermas, 
1974, pp. 52-53).  Liberal constitutions copper-fastened the existence of a public sphere 
“to transmit the needs of bourgeois society to the state” and to transform political 
authority into a legitimate authority in which the “general interest” became the measure 
of rationality, predicated on the needs of capitalism (Habermas, 1974, p. 53).  Released 
from the constraints of their convictions regarding the promotion of public opinion and 
freedom, newspapers were free “to take advantage of the earning possibilities of a 
commercial undertaking”: The public sphere “was transformed by the influx of private 
interests, which received special prominence in the mass media” (Habermas, 1974, p. 
53). 
 
For Habermas (1989) the ideal of the rational-critical public sphere is undermined in a 
contemporary context where the media (as the actually existing public sphere) merely 
provide a distraction from political action, rather than avenues for deliberative debate.  
Indeed, by the second half of the twentieth century the media’s political role had been 
debased by the interweaving influence of both state and commercial actors:   
 
This leads to a kind of “refeudalization” of the public sphere. Large 
organizations strive for political compromises with the state and with each other, 
excluding the public sphere whenever possible.  But at the same time the large 
organizations must assure themselves of at least plebiscitary support from the 
mass of the population through an apparent display of openness.  (Habermas, 
1974, p. 54) 
 
                                                          
14 Deliberation is defined as “decision making by discussion among free and equal 
citizens” (Elster, 1998, p. 1). 
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In Habermas’ view, the ideal of a rational critical public sphere is possible, but it 
remained only a theoretical possibility in the context of his suspicion of established 
institutions and power structures.   
 
Of the many critiques levelled at the concept of the public sphere, it is feminist criticism 
that is the most relevant for my discussion of emotional and affective modes of 
communication15.  This is because feminist critiques draw attention to the inseparability 
of rational and affective forms of communication and to the formation of multiple 
public spheres rather than a single monolithic one, criticisms that Habermas himself 
acknowledges.  Fraser (1990, p. 60; see also 1992) argues that “[The public sphere] was 
the arena, the training ground and eventually the power base of a stratum of bourgeois 
men who were coming to see themselves as a ‘universal class’ and preparing to assert 
their fitness to govern”.  Fraser (1992), as well as other feminist writers such as 
Benhabib (1992) and Flax (1992), are also dubious about Habermas’s original 
conceptualisation of the ideal of purely rational communication from which feeling has 
been expunged (Barker, Hulme, and Iversen, 1991, p. 16).  For Fraser (1992) the 
question is whether a public sphere should be modified to include those excluded from 
it or whether instead it should be reconceptualised in terms of conflicts between public 
spheres which are dominant or subordinate (Barker, Hulme, and Iversen, 1991, pp. 17-
18). Benhabib (1992, pp. 89-90) argues that the particular construction of the public 
sphere “served to confine women and typically female spheres of activity like 
housework; reproduction; nurture and care for the young sick and elderly to the private 
domain”.  In the “shadowy interior of the household” such notions were treated “as 
natural and immutable aspects of human relations” (Benhabib, 1992, p. 90).   
 
                                                          
15 Other critiques of Habermas’ theorisation emphasise weaknesses in his account of 
history and the assumed alignment of the public sphere with the idea of the state in 
societies that are becoming increasingly complex, such as in the context of globalised 
media markets, convergence of media industries and technologies, and the 
fragmentation of mass-media audiences brought about in part by digitisation and the 
internet: “media, polity and culture are no longer neatly aligned (if they ever had been) 
with the nation state” (Lunt and Livingstone, 2013, p. 89).   
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For Flax (1992) the bourgeois public sphere and its ideal of reason was irredeemably an 
instrument of domination for women.  Rational autonomy, she argues, is structured by a 
gender hierarchy in which reason can only be achieved by breaking away from a 
feminised domestic sphere (Barker, Hulme, and Iversen, 1991, p. 17).  In this, she 
denies that pure rationality is possible:  
 
the inner world is heterogeneous and conflictual; reason cannot be split off 
entirely from desire…modernisation is predicated upon a masculine subjectivity 
which defends against repressed aspects of the psyche by locating them in 
women and then by distancing itself from them.  No expansion of multiplication 
of the public sphere could undo the prime exclusion which constitutes it: it is 
limited to a particular form of rational discourse.  (Barker, Hulme, and Iversen, 
1991, pp. 17-18) 
 
Routing through these strands of debate, Moorti (2002, p. 150) posits that there are 
“multiple, overlapping, and competing public spheres, counter-public spheres (that) 
account for the processes through which individuals participate in society”.  These 
include affective public spheres where “discussion of issues pertaining to the body and 
emotions become central to democratic community formation” (Moorti, 2002, p. 150).  
Thus, emotions and affects – rather than being expunged from rational deliberation – 
can actually be critical to the constitution of public spheres.  Dahlberg (2005, p. 115) 
argues however that even though the idea of the rational-critical public sphere cannot 
exclude affective modes of communication, it might suppress them “by devaluing 
them” in the interests of the powerful.   
 
As noted, Habermas’ (1984; 1987) own thinking continually evolved to address these 
and other critiques faced by public sphere theorisation.  For example, Habermas (1984) 
recognised the dispersed and plural nature of public spheres that can materialise 
whenever forms of communication take place, which acknowledges the complexity of 
liberal society.  He embraces the diversity of identity and thus the legitimacy of multiple 
ways of deliberating while retaining the special significance of the political, because 
“only politics has the capacity to draw threads of common understanding out of the 
diversity of worldviews and values” (Lunt and Livingstone, 2013, p. 92).  Habermas 
(1987) also acknowledges the inseparability of (ideally) rational-critical modes of 
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communication from aesthetic-affective ones16 and he rethinks his previous scepticism 
towards institutions, accepting Foucault’s account of governmentality as a better way of 
conceptualising power.  
 
Multiple rationalities and the mediated policy context of the Donegal 
accident 
 
What it is most important to take from these frameworks is that to talk of rationality in 
connection with the public sphere is to acknowledge multiple rationalities.  As put 
succinctly by Dahlberg (2005, p. 115), “the unconscious-bodily-affective aspects of 
communication cannot be removed to reveal purely rational processes and true 
meaning”.  That multiple rationalities co-exist in multiple expressions of public spheres 
can also be acknowledged.  In fact, the inseparability of rationalities is clear in the 
mediated policy context of the Donegal accident.  
 
A year after the crash, Noel Brett, then Chief Executive of the RSA, introduced its 
annual report (RSA, 2011, p. 3; figure 5).  His statement provides a neat, if artificial, 
conclusion to the circulation of accounts of the worst accident ever and how these both 
mediate policy and are mediated by it.  Brett states:  
 
Ireland recorded the lowest number of deaths on our roads since records began 
in 1959…A significant achievement, yet 212 people died needlessly on our 
roads…deaths that simply did not need to happen.  The summer of 2010 will 
also be remembered for the series of crashes that involved young people. During 
one fateful weekend in the middle of July, ten lives were lost on Irish roads; 
eight alone in a single horrific incident in Donegal.  It was the worst road 
accident in the history of the state.  Tragically, two months later, four teenagers 
aged between 15 and 19 years old were killed in a car crash. (RSA, 2011, p. 3) 
                                                          
16 In his theory of communicative action, for example, Habermas (1984) splits Weber’s 
earlier concept of formal rationality (“logical, rule-based, codified” and involving 
“quantitative calculation” [Chilundo and Aanestad, 2004, p. 5]) into instrumental and 
strategic rationality.  Instrumental rationality is “performed according to technical rules 
and…is judged in terms of the effectiveness of intervention in a physical world”; this is 
related to strategic rationality, that is, how “actors achieve their ends by influencing 
others” (Chilundo and Aanestad, 2004, p. 5).  But as Chilundo and Aanestad (2004, p. 
6) note, rationally oriented actions can produce non-rational or detrimental effects; for 
Weber too, rationality included the non-rational or irrational as well as the rational. 
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There is palpable frustration here, that in what was the best year ever for fatalities on 
Irish roads, the worst traffic accident ever could still happen.  Brett immediately 
prefaces the rational policy actions that are ostensibly designed to combat specific 
incidents such as these in which young drivers are involved: “Young drivers are 
vulnerable road users due to their inexperience.  That’s why, in September 2010, the 
RSA announced its plans to enhance the way in which drivers are trained, tested and 
licenced in Ireland” (RSA, 2011, p. 3).  These policy actions included mandatory initial 
basic training for motorcyclists and essential driver training for new drivers; the 
lowering of the drink drive limit for new drivers, an increase in penalty points for 
specified offences for new drivers, and the introduction of restrictions for drivers in the 
first two years of their full driving licence (RSA, 2011, p. 3).   
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Figure 5: Page 3 of The RSA’s Annual Report 2010. 
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Brett creates the impression the policy actions he outlines are occurring because of the 
Donegal accident, as well as others that occurred in in 2010.  He does this by 
connecting the 10 deaths that one “fateful” weekend to “vulnerable” young drivers and 
creating an equation between these road deaths, young drivers, and the proposed actions 
(“That’s why…”, he says  [RSA, 2011, p. 3 emphasis added]).  Brett’s words articulate 
how a mythic, causal relationship between the goals of policy and its proposed actions 
is mobilised in media representation.  The impression created is that fatalities will fall 
because of the efficacious governmental actions the RSA will now take and the 
penalties imposed on citizens as a result.   Here, responses to road safety issues are 
encompassed within the rationality of policy activity.  It is through quantifiable, 
instrumental, bulleted, actions that road safety will be achieved.  But many of Brett’s 
actions were actually already contained within the Road Safety Strategy, so are not 
derived from a response to incidents such as the Donegal accident at all.  For example, 
the strategy states: “SPECIFIC TARGET: 100% of all new provisional licence holders 
in the motorcycle category should undertake the compulsory basic training by the end of 
2008 and that this is maintained thereafter” (RSA, 2007, p. 46).  Brett acknowledges 
this, admitting that all of the actions he now proposed were “long overdue” and that the 
implementation of remaining initiatives where a date was not cited was now a “top 
priority” for the authority (RSA, 2011, p. 3).  He does not point out their specific 
inclusion in the Road Safety Strategy (RSA, 2007) however.  
 
In revealing ineffectiveness for not carrying the actions proposed earlier, Brett allows 
the reader to see through the myth of policy rationality that he has just elaborated.  
Barthes (2000, p. 130) argued that an example such as this: 
 
conspicuously shows that myth essentially aims at causing an immediate 
impression – it does not matter if one is later allowed to see through the myth, its 
action is assumed to be stronger than the rational explanations which may later 
belie it. 
 
In other words, the impression that the proposed actions will prevent accidents such as 
the one in Donegal still stands, despite their rather tenuous relation to the accident itself 
(e.g. motorbikes were not involved in the crash), the unexplored question of whether 
there is any evidential basis to support the assumption of their effectiveness, and the 
RSA’s self-stated inaction on them in the past.  
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The mobilization of the myth of policy rationality is a key media ritual by which policy 
enters the public realm.  Its instrumentally rational form echoes that of the entire 2007–
2012 strategy, which rationalises 126 separate measures, actions, or instruments that 
together will “create” road safety (RSA, 2007, p. 70).  However, it is obvious that 
emotional language is simultaneously deployed within this ostensibly rationalist policy 
context, illustrating the framework of multiple rationalities.  In the first passage by Brett 
quoted above, a few emotive words (“fateful”, “tragically”, “horrific”) signal the 
deployment of affective rationalities.  The use of the word “horror” and the evocation of 
tragedy are obviously emotive.  The positioning of a weekend as “fateful” suggests 
inevitability – that the crashes could not have been prevented or were preordained by a 
higher agency or supernatural authority.  These lexical choices combine with a strategy 
of de-agentalization, in which events are “represented as brought about in ways that are 
impermeable to human agency – through natural forces, unconscious processes and so 
on” (Van Leeuwen, 2009, pp. 156-7).  Examples of this de-agentalization include: 
“Ireland recorded”; “The summer of 2010 will be remembered”; “one fateful weekend”.  
A sense of responsibility for the accidents’ occurrence is obfuscated or conjured away 
by these rhetorical moves (Fowler 1991, p. 80; Richardson, 2007, p. 54), both from the 
accidents victims and national actors such as Brett.  However, Brett’s policy response 
comprises education and enforcement actions rather than, for example, 
engineering/infrastructure changes to help prevent accidents like this in future, 
underlining the continuing responsibilization framework explored in the previous 
chapter.    
 
These few lines and phrases illustrate the work of affective rationalities.  Their 
deployment reinforces the incoherence of the instrumentally rational actions set out by 
Brett to prevent accidents like these in the future, for example.  After all, if events are 
constructed as outside the realms of human agency, then instrumental measures would 
have no effect in preventing their subsequent occurrence.  Brett’s implicit frustration – a 
feeling or emotion – becomes ironically generative of the instrumentally rational policy 
actions he proposes.  This illustrates how affective or emotional rationalities are actually 
tangled up in what are ostensibly rationalist discourses (Sheller, 2005) and demonstrates 
how multiple rationalities are simultaneously mobilized in mediated communication 
within the dispositif of road safety. 
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The types of rhetorical moves deployed by Brett are echoed in coverage of the Donegal 
accident on the day the crash was covered in The Irish Times.  For example, the article 
from page 3 of The Irish Times on 13th July 2010 (“RSA says families shattered in ‘split 
second’” [Kelly, 2010]) centres on Brett and the Minister for Transport, and its thematic 
structure alternates between the strategic deployment of parallel affective rationalities 
(articulated in lexical choices such as “shattered”, “tragedy”, “condolence”) and much 
more instrumental discourses centring on vague advice and actions the public might 
take in light of the accident.  In this article, Brett is paraphrased as saying that the road 
safety message was not lost on young people and that, while 455 young men had died in 
car crashes between 1998 and 2009, this represented a 34% reduction over the period.  
This comment is actually ambiguous in meaning.  It is unclear as to which comparative 
period is Brett referring.  It could be the 12 years up to 1998 or the reduction over the 
years from 1998 to 2009 for example.  If the latter figure, 455 could not represent that 
drop, as it is the number of fatalities, rather than the reduction in fatalities.   
 
What is important is not so much the ambiguity of Brett’s words but the underlining of 
how the strategic deployment of instrumental, quantifiable, and temporal rationalities 
seen in the introduction to the RSA’s annual review (RSA, 2011, p. 3) was reported in a 
similarly incoherent and mythical manner in the media coverage surrounding the 
Donegal accident itself.  The same emphasis on the quantifiable and the instrumentally 
rational is visible in the introduction in Brett’s lexical choices when he speaks of policy-
related matters and action (“2010”, “20mg/mol”, “212”, “tackling the causal factors is 
paying dividends” [RSA, 2011, p. 3]).  This contrasts with the affective rationalities 
deployed in relation to the car in the description of the accident.  In other words, 
multiple rationalities are strategically deployed and circulate among policy documents 
and newspaper articles around road safety issues and the Donegal crash in very similar 
ways (Kelly, 2010) and are integral to the mobilisation of the myth of the RSA’s 
efficiency.  This simultaneous and apparently paradoxical deployment of feeling and 
rationality is part of the same media ritual by which policy enters the public realm.   
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The work of emotion:  an affective public? 
 
The mediated policy context of the Donegal accident indicates that feelings are 
mobilised in a way that attempts to constitute a public sphere in which emotion and 
affect are key components (Moorti, 2002).  Berlant (2005) traces this idea in a US 
context where the orchestration of public feeling becomes the core practice of 
democracy and the way in which the political is contextualised in media representations 
(Berlant, 2005, p. 47).  For Berlant (2005), expressions of “public feelings” aim “to 
recruit the public to see political attachments as an amalgam of reflexive opinion and 
visceral or ‘gut’ feeling”.  This sentiment finds something of a parallel in Brett’s 
statement and the above coverage from the Donegal accident, especially as Berlant 
(2005, pp. 47-48) notes her argument is not particular to the US.  
 
As her point of departure, Berlant (2005) detects a structuring binary in the articulation 
of mediated political discourse in which emotional language, as opposed to reason, 
becomes attached to claims about justice, truth and morality.  For the purposes of her 
analysis, Berlant (2005, p. 47) constructs this opposition between emotion and reason, 
but its articulation actually traces “the folding of thought into feeling modes” of 
expression or the inseparability of multiple rationalities in practice.  Berlant (2005, p. 
47) notes that the orchestration of public feeling is not about the decline of society or 
democracy per se: “Feelings are not the opposite of thought: each is an embodied 
rhetorical register associated with specific practices, times, and spaces of 
appropriateness”.  In this, she points to multiple public spheres and to the contextual 
specificity of the appropriateness of expressions of feeling.  Keohane, Kuhling, and 
Horgan (2002, p. 57 citing Geertz, 1973) had already elaborated similar ideas, noting 
that: “there are multiple forms of rationality, which, from the point of view of actors, are 
valid and meaningful within the historically situated web of social significance in which 
they are suspended, and which they themselves have woven”.   
 
Berlant (2005) describes how political discourses have attempted to construct an 
affective public.  What her theorisation does is articulate the potential significance of an 
affective public to the constitution of actually existing complex social formations.  
Ahmed (2004 a, b) complements and extends this analysis of the multiple rationalities 
of the public sphere, because she gives us the tools to theorise affective modes of 
communication across media representation and the lived experience that Berlant (2005) 
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does not investigate17.  This is required if the media is to be problematized as just one 
set of the multiple networks of actors involved in the sustenance of social authority.  It 
is by considering affective modes of communication in the mediated policy context of 
the Donegal accident together with their deployment in the reflections of commuters 
that allows us to explore the work that these modes of communication do in constituting 
the dispositif of road safety and the networks of automobility as they are lived in 
Ireland.  
 
The circulation of feelings and “sticky bodies” 
 
Ahmed (2004b, p. 3) traces the ways in which different feelings can circulate and stick 
to the same signs, objects, and people and how the same feelings can be associated with 
different figures and materials depending on the context.  Ahmed (2004 a, b) first argues 
that emotion has typically been viewed as beneath reason: “To be emotional is to have 
one’s judgement affected: it is to be reactive rather than active, dependent rather than 
autonomous” (Ahmed, 2004b, p. 3).  A connection between emotion and passivity is 
made, as Ahmed (2004b, p. 3) notes, from how the Latin root of the words passive and 
passion both connect to the word suffering.  She argues that “to be passive is to be 
enacted upon, as a negation that is already felt in suffering”.  A fear of passivity is 
connected to a fear of emotionality “in which weakness is defined in terms of a 
tendency to be shaped by others” (Ahmed, 2004b, p. 3).  Here, it can be seen how 
passivity and passion connect emotion to a lack of agency: how to be emotional is to 
relinquish autonomy.  Next, Ahmed (2004b, p. 3) argues that a simple binary between 
emotion and reason is displaced into an emotional hierarchy, where not only reason, but 
also the ability to display appropriate emotions, as well as to control them is valorised 
                                                          
17 Public sphere theorisation and research has directly explored how audiences interpret 
the content of the media but this seems encapsulated within a framework of media 
reception studies.  For example, Lunt and Livingstone (2013, p. 90) point to how their 
1994 work about audience reception revealed “moments of genuine public access, 
deliberation and engagement among audiences”.  This shows how the development of 
public sphere theory around multiple public spheres allowed writers like Moorti (2002, 
p. 150) to consider ways in which day-time talk shows make an affective-public sphere 
possible, for example. 
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(Elias, 1978).  Ahmed (2004b, p. 3) notes that emotions can even be considered better 
than reason:  “If good emotions are cultivated, and are worked on and towards, then 
they remain defined against uncultivated or unruly emotions, which frustrate the 
formation of the competent self”.  As a result, Ahmed (2004b, p. 4) argues, “it is not 
difficult to see how emotions are bound up with the securing of social hierarchy” and 
thus as an effect of power on subject formation.   
 
Ahmed (2004a, p. 117) challenges the assumption that emotions are a private matter, 
residing in the self or moving out towards others from within.  Instead, she suggests that 
“emotions circulate between bodies and signs… (to)…create the very effect of the 
surfaces or boundaries of bodies and worlds” (Ahmed, 2004a, pp. 117-118/124).  For 
Ahmed (2004a, p. 119) emotions do things: rather than being only psychological they 
“work by sticking figures together (adherence), a sticking that creates the very effect of 
a collective (coherence)”.  As such, “emotions become a form of capital: affect does not 
reside positively in the sign or commodity, but is produced only as an effect of its 
circulation” (Ahmed 2004a, p. 120).   She says:  “Some signs…increase in affective 
value as an effect of the movement between signs: the more they circulate, the more 
affective they become, and the more they appear to ‘contain’ affect” (Ahmed, 2004a, p. 
120). 
 
For Ahmed (2004a, pp. 120-121) passion is accumulated over time.  The subject 
becomes a nodal point rather than an origin or destination and affective value 
accumulates there to shape the surface of “bodies and worlds”.  This accumulation 
happens in various temporally proximate media representations for example, where 
sticky words and language are repeatedly attached to people, objects, or concepts, 
creating associations and alignments between these categories and emotional feelings as 
effects of their repetition (Ahmed, 2004b, p. 12).  Ahmed (2004b, p. 12) shows how 
words such as “flood and swamped” stick to the category of the asylum seeker in 
mainstream media reports, creating associations between that category and loss of 
control.  This shows how media representations are key sites for establishing chains of 
associations and generating affective intensities.  The effect of these chains of 
associations, according to Ahmed (2004b, p. 12), is to mobilize fear, in this case around 
asylum seekers.  Ahmed (2004a, p. 124) argues such alignments “work through the 
movement between figures”.  She notes that such movement becomes stuck in the 
attachment of signs to bodies (or objects), albeit only temporarily or provisionally 
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(Ahmed 2004a, p. 127).  Stickiness (containment) and movement depend on associative 
histories that have already been created.  While many different signs or emotions can 
stick to bodies and objects and are accreted over time and through repetition, they can 
vary depending on the context (Ahmed, 2004a, p. 127).   
 
By characterising emotion as only residing provisionally in bodies (or indeed objects), 
Ahmed’s (2004a, p. 127) conceptualization problematizes the paradoxical discourses of 
desires and sign-values that are said to inhere to, reside in, or be embodied by the car; 
by the human subject’s feeling for the car, or in affective relationships enabled by the 
car.  It does this by showing how the car can be attached provisionally to a variety of 
such emotional signs, for example independence, speed, comfort, innovation, and 
leisure or pleasure, but also carnage, fear, congestion, or environmental harm depending 
on the context (Sachs, 1984; Sheller, 2005; Urry, 2005; Bohm, et al., 2006).  As various 
cultural studies of the signification of vehicles and driving suggest (Hebdige, 1979; 
Barthes, 2000; Miller, 2001; Garvey, 2001; Gilroy, 2001 for example), emotions 
“stickily” attach to the automobile both in mediated representations and in practices, 
gaining or losing salience as the car moves among and between aspects of these 
discourses.   
 
According to Ahmed (2004b, p. 22), studies of the emotional aspects of cultural 
objects/practices should “think more about what the materials [assembled for research] 
are ‘doing’; how they work through emotions to generate effects” 18.  For the purposes 
                                                          
18 Studies have also been done in relation to fear advertising, mass media campaigns on 
public health issues in general, and road traffic accidents in particular (for example 
Wilde, 1993; Wallack and DeJong, 1995; Donovan, Jalleh, and Henley, 1999; 
Laflamme and Didreichson, 2000; O’Neill, 2001; Tay, 2001; Grayling, Hallam, and 
Graham, 2002; Girasek and Gielen, 2003; Breen, 2004; Elder, et al., 2004; Room, 2004; 
Schlundt, Warren, and Miller, 2004; Roberts, 2005; Roberts, Wentz, and Edwards, 
2006;  Lewis, Watson, and Tay, 2007, and Woodcock and Aldred, 2008).  These 
variously attempt to problematize the real purpose of such campaigns or whether they 
can alter behaviour; or call for advocacy in relation to the issues involved, for example.  
Some of these studies can be categorised as externalities or psychological research and 
as such they tend not to be concerned with connecting macro effects of cars to more 
personal relationships between cars and car users (Miller, 2001, p. 22).  Ahmed’s theory 
could be applied to the work emotions do in these contexts, connecting personal 
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of my study, this means adapting the theory to explore the connections and 
disconnections around the articulation of feeling both in media representations and 
driving practices.  Not all of these connections are mediated, but some are, and with 
Ahmed’s (2004 a, b) theory they can be considered as part of the same collectivity that 
emerges from the networks of feeling in automobility in Ireland.   
 
Applying this theory to the mediated policy context of the Donegal accident, the 
emotional words Brett (RSA, 2011, p. 3) and other actors use in the extracts already 
quoted (“shattered”, “condolence”, “fateful”, “horrific”, “tragically”, “vulnerable”) can 
be said to create the impression of and intensify the feelings and pain that result from 
the crash (Ahmed, 2004a, p. 124).  These emotional words create a reality – the accident 
as a horror and also as a state of affairs that cannot now be changed.  This ontology can 
then be captured and ordered differently by the application of more instrumental actions 
from the “busy and fruitful” RSA.  So the reality constructed in these documents 
extends beyond rational responses to the accident to incorporate emotion and this binds 
Brett’s bureaucratic and instrumental logics in human feelings.  A chain of affective 
intensity is set-up by these emotional words that sticks these terms to the concept of the 
road traffic accident involving the car (Ahmed, 2004 a, b).  These terms and ones like 
them become natural components of discourse formations associated with road traffic 
accidents in wider mainstream media contexts.   
 
There are many instances of such “stickiness”, in which the work of emotion (as an 
implement of power) is to attempt to secure social hierarchy in the dispositif of road 
safety.  For example, in The Irish Times article (“Latest crash brings back painful 
memories” [Duncan, 2010; figure 4]) a large picture shows the twisted shell of a 
Volkswagen, recognition of which is reduced to a badge on the wheel hub.  This car is 
horribly mangled and the wheel’s prominence in terms of the composition of the article 
suggests a grim irony.  It is a go-faster alloy addendum for which someone paid extra, 
signalling an ultimately non-existent capacity for superior control or speed and by 
extension an enhanced freedom.  But that meaning is recontextualised here and becomes 
ironic.  Now the wheel reinforces the desperate, emotional horror of the crash. The 
intertextual associations between the picture and the surrounding headlines secure these 
                                                                                                                                                                          
relationships expressed through and with the car to the emotional effects associated with 
road traffic accidents and campaigns about their prevention, for example.  
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provisional connections.  Words such as “painful”, “shattered”, “victims” as well as 
“sympathies” stick to the car in this context, continuing the “process of intensification” 
that aligns this article’s impressions of road traffic accidents with those feelings 
expressed in policy (Ahmed, 2004a, p. 121).   
 
This is not an old car, some cheap banger, or escaped NCT failure.  Instead it is the 
consumer product of a rational response to modern driving and commuting needs and 
desires.  Neither should it be a death trap, scoring the maximum 5 stars on 
EURONCAP’s new car rating system (EURONCAP, 2015c).  The accident confounds 
the success of the instrumentally rational approach that the Road Safety Strategy 
ostensibly embodies, as well as the car’s functional expression of rational consumer 
needs.  But the wheel, the car, and its representation in a destroyed state illustrate the 
multiplicity of rationalities that actually swirl around this picture and those that 
provisionally “stick” to the car in the context of this accident.  This sticking of figures 
together – parts of the crashed car, accident victims, words that express feeling – creates 
the effect of a collective, a unified emotional response to the accident as expressed 
through these mediated representations and these figures (Ahmed, 2004a, p. 120).  The 
repetition of these types of images and expressions of feeling cohere with other 
expressions that are familiar from reports of other car accidents over time.  They 
accumulate and intensify through the media the affective values that shape what the sign 
or commodity (the car or the road traffic accident for example) mean in this context and 
the surfaces of bodies and worlds that emerge from these circulations (Ahmed, 2004a, 
p. 121).  Affective resonance also accumulates from these representations onto those the 
accident’s victims leave behind, and onto the meaning of the place of the accident, as 
segments of the chains of association established and intensified through media 
coverage such as this.  This illustrates the particularity of affective expression in the 
mediated policy context of the Donegal accident and the work that such expression does 
in meaning-making in this instance.  
 
Mediated rituals of emotion and affect  
 
Other narratives from the mediated policy context of the Donegal accident rely even 
more overtly on affective logics to produce particular ideological and discursive effects.  
In these instances, affective rationalities are not deployed in the consideration and 
formulation of actions for citizens that are designed to mitigate events like the Donegal 
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accident in the future.  Instead they are deployed in a ritualistic fashion to connect state 
actors to the reported words of local people directly affected by the aftermath of 
incidents like these and to community representatives, for example, reinforcing the 
deflection of authority from the state and the security of the social hierarchy (2004b, p. 
4). 
 
After two paragraphs of description in the article on the front page (Duncan and 
Jackson, 2010), a spokesperson from the NRA first asserts his experience in relation to 
these types of accidents before temporarily adopting the more personal and affective 
language associated with newspaper accounts of ordinary local people: “I have never 
come across such a multiple road fatality scene and I am finding it very difficult to take 
in”.  Here, the spokesman identifies with the community by adopting the emotional 
rationalities that are attributed to them in this context.  Following several further 
paragraphs of description, a local priest comments on the scenes of “immense and 
intense grief” at the hospital in Buncrana:  “There were about 60 relatives at the hospital 
last night...it was terrible to witness”.  Individual citizens are portrayed as “visibly 
shaken as they grappled with the news” of the crash.  In an article on page 3, friends and 
relatives “with tear stained faces follow in cars behind in a cortege” and a local person’s 
eyes water as she describes the crash’s impact and the nervousness of the community 
(Duncan, 2010).  Another individual describes how nobody from the village had wanted 
to go to work the next day:  “It just seems to affect people a lot.  You’d nearly think you 
are one of the family; it’s that kind of feeling.  Everybody’s the same. I’m just 
devastated”.  Yet another says “you don’t know how to take it”.  In these extracts, there 
is the sense of the overwhelming intensity of feeling that stops people in their tracks.  
The accident is rendered outside of language or knowledge, thereby placing it in the 
realm of the affective and the embodied response. 
 
Here, local citizens’ incomprehensibility shows them to be beyond or beneath the 
formally rational.  Their representation shows how to be emotional is to relinquish 
autonomy and be shaped by others as Ahmed (2004b, p. 3) describes.  Local citizens’ 
words find empathetic resonance in the quoted comments of official actors, community 
representatives, and the Taoiseach.  For example, the Taoiseach says that “his thoughts 
and prayers are with the relatives of the deceased” (Duncan and Jackson, 2010).  His 
sentiments are repeated in a quote on page 3.  The mayor of Buncrana characterises the 
effect of the accident as “mind-numbing devastation” (Duncan, 2010).  But unlike local 
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community members, the mayor goes on to articulate the extent of this devastation in a 
more generalizable fashion: 
 
You’ve three parishes affected…and there won’t be anyone in the Inishowen 
Peninsula who won’t know the victims – that’s the extent of the devastation.  
Because of the spread of the families it would be nearly impossible not to know 
somebody. (Duncan, 2010) 
 
A local priest is given space to explain how the days after the crash “would be hugely 
difficult for everyone, including local clergy”: 
 
We have had multiple accidents in which more than a few people have died and 
it brings back memories for them.  That’s really one of the tragedies, that it’s 
reinvoking the memories for all those people who lost their sons and daughters 
all in the same age group.  (Duncan, 2010) 
 
A different priest adds, “It’s a really cruel blow to this particular community”, before 
agreeing with his colleague that girlfriends and family members of those lost in other 
previous tragedies would also be affected by it: “Young people must realise how fragile 
life is and be careful and cautious and play by the rules all the time”, he said.  
 
In these extracts, local and official representatives actively state implications, provide 
context and background for events, and reinforce the myth of the rationality of policy 
activity.  They present a more certain modality (i.e. commitment to the claims they are 
making [Richardson, 2007, p. 59]) and specificity in their statements of the effect of the 
accident.  On the other hand, friends, relatives, and individual members of the local 
community are uncertain, passive, affected, emotional, feminised, and inward-looking.  
What is shown is the repeated attachment and intensification of passivity connected to 
ordinary community members’ displays of emotion (Ahmed, 2004b, p. 3).  But this is 
actually the displacement of the binary between reason and emotion into a hierarchy 
between emotions (Ahmed, 2004b, p. 3).  Feelings in these reports are not simply 
devalued as Dahlberg (2005) suggests, they are actually valued when they represent the 
ability of a particular type of actor to express the “correct” emotions under the “correct” 
circumstances.  In this context, the expression of appropriate feelings becomes better 
than reason (Ahmed, 2004b, p. 3).  These are not “unruly emotions” (Ahmed, 2004b, p. 
3) that might, for example, “rage against the dying of the light” of the accident’s 
victims, seeking retribution against authorities or perpetrators.  In fact ordinary 
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community members, local representatives, and national actors are represented as 
expressing very similar feelings.  Only national actors and local representatives 
maintain the capacity to evoke generalised perspectives that are not accorded to 
ordinary local citizens, however.  And importantly, only national actors are accorded the 
authority to go beyond these feelings and enunciate instrumental rationality in relation 
to solutions or appropriate policy responses to the accident, in a way that ordinary 
community members, and local representatives who merely reinforce the consensus, are 
not.  Ordinary local citizens can only suffer and they are acted upon by official actors.  
The representation of feelings coupled with the discursive denial of instrumental 
rationality represents the relinquishment of ordinary individual citizens’ autonomy 
(Ahmed, 2004b, p. 3).  In this instance though, that emotionality and relinquished 
autonomy (passivity) is valorised as appropriate to the circumstances.  The types of 
organisation and formalisation of behaviours explored in these articles work to encode 
and naturalise categories of thought in relation to different groups of actors and they 
represent a common media ritual (Couldry, 2008b, p. 168). 
 
Another important aspect of this ritual organisation and formalisation of appropriate 
behaviours for different groups of actors is the mystification of place – of Inishowen 
and Buncrana – in the media coverage.  The attribution of mystical characteristics 
secures the sense of the accident occurring somewhere else, continuing the ideological 
work of passivizing local citizens, and locating different agencies in particular local and 
national actors.  The main article on page 3 begins with a reference to the weather:  
 
As the rain clouds rolled across the rugged Inishowen Peninsula yesterday, 
locals were struggling to come to terms with the fact that eight men had died in a 
crash the previous night near the rocky out-crop known locally as the King and 
Queen of the Mintiaghs. (Duncan, 2010) 
 
By sandwiching the emotions of the community between references to the weather and 
a parochial reference to a townland near to where the accident occurred, the writer 
creates the absurd impression that “the elements” have aligned themselves with the 
emotions of local people.  This magical and mystical rhetoric signals human-interest 
content and intent rather than serious analysis and illustrates the particular way in which 
feeling is deployed in the article.  The rolling clouds of rain and the rockiness of the 
outcrop are unconnected to the accident.  That road conditions and the weather were 
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immaterial has already been pointed out (Duncan and Jackson, 2010).  These references 
literally and figuratively mystify the area in which the crash occurred by creating a 
chain of affective associations (“rain clouds rolled”, “rugged”, “rocky-outcrop”, “local”, 
“King and Queen of the Mintiaghs”) that circulate between these bodies and signs and 
stick to the discursive representation of Inishowen and its people (Ahmed, 2004a, p. 
117).  The mystical language associated with Inishowen reifies its residents as “an 
incredibly tight-knit community” (Duncan, 2010) therefore distinct from the alienations 
of contemporary urban life and it “others” both the place of Inishowen and its citizens.  
The sense of fate being involved in the accident or its aftermath, in terms of the 
alignment of the elements to the emotions of the local citizens of Inishowen, connects 
these emotions to a lack of control of these events or, in other words, to passivity 
(Ahmed, 2004b, p. 12).  This construction reinforces how only national actors are 
allowed to be associated with the articulation of the rationality of policy activity in this 
context, yet as already seen this does not mean they take responsibility for policy 
failures of the dispositif of road safety.   
 
Inishowen and its residents are discursively constructed as separate from national 
newspaper journalists and their readers, who become part of an “administrative 
minority” (Williams, 1988, p. 226 cited in Moran, 2005, p. 17).  The general flow of 
late modernity is interrupted within the constructed space and time of Inishowen which, 
reassuringly for the proportionally urban (74%) and middle class (82% ABC1) The Irish 
Times readers, creates the impression that the location of the accident is “elsewhere” or 
“outside” (The Irish Times, 2015b).  Indeed mystical rhetoric frames this article and is 
active in the last paragraph, where local MEP Pat “the Cope” Gallagher is given the last 
word, quoted as saying the crash had cast “a dark cloud” over the area of Inishowen 
again (Duncan, 2010).   
 
In this article “sticky words” work to retrench existing authority (Ahmed, 2004a, p. 
122).   They distance both the author and the reader from the events of the crash by 
encapsulating the accident inside a discrete, mystical frame.  Within this frame, 
affective logics can be given free rein.  A local describes the town’s atmosphere and the 
strangeness of events: “cars are stopped on the road [with people] chatting to 
neighbours”.  She goes on: “Even if you meet a car driving down, the car might be a 
half-mile away from you but they’re pulling in.  Everyone’s so nervous” (Duncan, 
2010).  The priests’ and politicians’ “thoughts and prayers” speak of this transcendence 
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of normal phenomena, as does the magical rhetoric of the weather paralleling the mood 
of the people.  In newspaper accounts Inishowen is a place apart and the crash creates a 
time beyond usual experience within that space that underlines its separation.  The 
journalist seems to be reporting from a foreign country, rather than within her own 
shores.  It may actually be Inishowen, but it sounds and feels more like Narnia than 
Donegal.  This implies not only that The Irish Times has authority to “correctly” frame 
the opinions and feelings of this community, but is also able, through the alignment of 
the weather with the mood of the locals, to confer agency upon and decode the 
motivations of Mother Nature herself. 
 
The othering of the location for the “worst accident in Irish history” reinforces the 
hierarchy of rationalities prevalent in this mediated policy context of the Donegal 
accident.  Experts or official actors are granted the capability to evoke multiple 
rationalities of feeling and instrumentality as required, and along with local 
representatives make framing generalisations of effects of the accident on the 
community.  In empathising with and adopting the emotional language associated with 
those affected by the crash, official actors’ comments can be considered strategies of 
condescension in Bourdieu’s (1991, p. 68) terms, in which the powerful adopt the 
language of affected groups in order to ostensibly negate the inherent inequality 
between them, but nevertheless they leave the social order intact while apparently 
transcending it.  Ordinary local citizens’ capacity “to be shaped by others” (Ahmed, 
2004b, p. 3) or to be responsibilized by official and institutional policy contexts is 
reinforced.  A displaced hierarchy of emotions (Ahmed, 2004 a, b) validates the 
“correct” emotional rationalities that call for reflective and traditional rituals (such as 
the preparation of funerals) which are corralled as passive in the context of political 
action and associated with a retrenchment to family and a closing-off rather than 
opening-up to the world-at-large.  In these ways, feelings are put to work in the cause of 
the security of the social hierarchy (Ahmed, 2004b, p. 4).   
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Multiple rationalities and the work of emotion in commuter reflections 
on their driving practices 
 
While the above analysis has illustrated the variety of “sticky words” and feelings that 
circulate and adhere to the car in relation to the mediated policy context of the Donegal 
accident (Ahmed, 2004 a, b), it has told us nothing about how these feelings circulate in 
relation to the “heterogeneous strategies” of the practices of automobility in which the 
dispositif of road safety is lived in practice (Lemke, 2002, p. 9).  As part of the political 
rationality of neoliberal governmentality (Beeson and Firth, 1998), the attempted 
orchestration of public feeling and the multiple rationalities of mediation must be 
considered in light of the operation of strategies of the self that may mesh with or 
operate without reference to the mediated discourses to varying degrees.  As argued, the 
public sphere’s encapsulation within the media and mediated deliberation requires 
extension or expansion in order to apply it to a scenario in which the social order is 
sustained by multiple networks of actors of which the media comprises merely one set.  
This is not to say media is not important, but rather it is to explore the extent to which it 
is important without assuming it is central, by employing Ahmed’s (2004 a, b) 
theorisation in the analysis. 
 
While one might immediately consider the affected local population as the locus of 
governmental action, the discursive framing of Inishowen as “other” makes it clear that 
the cautionary tale of the Donegal accident has lessons that are to apply to “all” road 
users.  As stated in one of The Irish Times articles: 
 
The Road Safety Authority has urged all drivers to take responsibility for their 
actions following the multiple fatality in Donegal…Minister for Transport Noel 
Dempsey urged road users to “redouble their efforts” to improve road safety... 
“Today we are reminded that we can never, ever become complacent about road 
safety”.  (Kelly, 2010) 
 
The quotidian commuters of automobility best represent this ostensible universality.  
Commuting’s “collective commitment” to rationality coexists uneasily and collides with 
the multiple rationalities of the Irish experience of modernisation and modernity 
(Keohane, Kuhling, and Horgan, 2002, pp. 46).  What is now discussed is the “mind-
share” of feelings-based rationalities in the experiences of commuters.  This is an 
exploration of the circumstances in which commuters valorise similar or different 
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hierarchies of emotions and reason as articulated in the mediated policy context of the 
Donegal accident, and the “sticky words” that they attach to the car, as well as the forms 
of sociality that emerge from commuters’ own frameworks of multiple rationalities 
(Ahmed, 2004a, pp. 122/128).  
 
Focus group participants were prompted to describe their commute at the start of 
sessions and almost all explained how the most efficacious way of achieving the end of 
commuting to and from work had been rationalised.  Don travels from a south Dublin 
suburb to rural County Kildare and back, a round trip of some 120 kilometres each 
working day:  “There’s no public transport where I’m going.  Unless I drive to Heuston 
station which takes an hour, take the train which only goes twice a day…there’s no 
trains, so” (Don, f1).  Brid, Don’s wife, agreed:  “It’s the quickest – unfortunately” 
(Brid, f1).  Brid went on to explain that, as she visits people during her working day, she 
needs the car.  Pauline summarises the types of rationalities articulated by these 
commuters in this part of discussion: “So it’s easy, quick and convenient” (Pauline, f1).  
Brid’s choice of the word “unfortunately” alludes to knowledge that car use is 
something to feel guilty about, but she is unable to rationalise an alternative, making the 
car the inevitable choice for her circumstances (Watson, 1995, p. 82; Maxwell, 2001).  
Beth (f2) echoed similar reasoning, but noted that she did sometimes take public 
transport.  She explained that the possibility of a lift to the DART determined her 
decision to drive.  Brian (f2) noted that he nearly always drove to work despite moves 
by his company to better facilitate those using the train:  “There’s actually a bus that 
picks you up that meets the train and brings you to practically to your desk!” he said.  
Geraldine and Chris (f2), a couple, rationalised their own use of the car for commuting, 
stating that it made sense as they were always heading against the “crazy” traffic.  
Geraldine also explained that she had no choice but to take the car to work given her 
public transport options, while Chris noted that Geraldine probably wouldn’t have taken 
the job that she was offered in Naas if she didn’t have the car.  The unbidden 
justification of the car as the most efficient choice of commuter transport above others 
becomes a consistent theme of discussion for these commuters.   
 
After describing his 40 minute commute, Gary (f3) stated that the proximity of 
Newbridge to Maynooth University was a major factor in his choice of college course.  
Dermot (f5), from Athlone, also said that Maynooth’s location was “probably the main 
factor” in his choice of college.  These rationalities illustrate the practical importance of 
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commuting distances and times for decision making in relation to significant life 
choices that are far more important than the mundane details of the daily commute.  
What is being highlighted here is how the car shapes “the form and content of social 
action” (Dant, 2005, p. 61).  In Gary (f3) and Dermot’s (f5) cases, social actions and 
outcomes would inevitably have differed had the car not afforded the bridging of the 
spatial and temporal gap between these particular jobs or colleges and the location of 
their homes.  Kevin (f6), who travels from Edenderry Co. Offaly to Dublin city centre, 
noted it would take “two and a half hours door-to-door” on the bus, so he takes the car.  
Una (f6) defended her own commuting choices the same way, while Margaret (f6) 
similarly explained that she alternates between two different modes of transport and a 
number of routes for her journey into work.  In these and other extracts, chains of 
association are set up by commuters (“an hour”, “twice”, “quickest”, “later”, “half-
seven”, “20 minutes”, “five o’clock”, “19 years”, “heading”, “choosing”, “factors”, 
“closer”) that stick to the car in the context of commuting, creating the impression of a 
community of rational commuters, foregrounding and valorising instrumental 
rationalities over affective ones.   
 
But these conversations are also phatic in nature, performing social cohesion rather than 
providing meaningful information.  According to Young (2002, p. 60), phatic gestures 
such as greetings “do not offer information or further arguments directly by giving 
reasons or criticisms”.  Although the introductions here do also convey information, the 
commonality of description and narrative ordering acknowledges a shared circumstance 
in which participants find themselves both as commuters and participants in the focus 
group.  Young (2002, p. 59) notes that, “gestures of greeting function to acknowledge 
relations of discursive equality and mutual respect among the parties to discussion, as 
well as to establish trust and forge connection based on the previous relationships 
among the parties”.  Where there are no previous relationships among participants, such 
introductions function to create shared awareness of an already existing connection in 
commuting.  As greetings, they can be considered imbued with feeling, underlining the 
framework of multiple rationalities as being as much a part of commuters’ 
understandings of their driving as in mediated representations about the Donegal 
accident.   
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While not necessarily “calm and dispassionate” (Young, 2002, p. 65) the language use 
of commuters in my focus groups initially valorises rational and quantitative, 
calculating actions over affective ones.  As such, it represents active strategizing that 
discursively aligns with the instrumental rationalities that surround government policy 
actions associated with the Donegal accident, but not accorded individual citizens of the 
local community in that case.  Commuters valorise and share their rational choices and 
self-interested decision making abilities with other participants, even when deploying 
humour.  However, the deployment of humour and the affective nature of these 
statements as forms of greeting shows that even when instrumental actions are 
foregrounded multiple rationalities are at work.  Affective rationalities are not 
associated here with passivity or suffering as they are in the mediated policy context of 
the Donegal accident (Ahmed 2004 a, b) and in fact reinforce commuters’ 
instrumentality.  
 
By their nature, phatic discussions come at the start of focus groups sessions.  It is a 
feature of focus group discussion that these conversations can presage subsequent 
deeper and more obviously affective topics of concern.  Like the others, Michelle begins 
by constructing the narrative of her own commute: 
 
I used to come down the M50 – off the M3 at Blanchardstown and come in the 
back roads through Clonee to here.  But in the winter it got really rough and I 
did a big skid on ice one day on <a country> lane and I thought that’s it – I’m 
not doing that again. [Laughs].  So I actually come the full motorway in now.  
So while you’re probably travelling the same distance, you’re paying the toll 
bridge to come in.  But it’s an easier commute because you’re doing it on 
motorway – so at least you don’t have to worry about the conditions of the back 
roads on wet mornings and that kind of stuff…And I know there’s probably 
wear and tear on the car from doing back roads, plus sometimes it’s nice not to 
be on busy traffic all the time.  It’s kind of country coming … Clonee into 
here…so I changed because that makes it easier. (Michelle, f4)  
 
Michelle quickly goes from simple description to describe more deeply held feelings.  
While she brushes off her skid with a nervous laugh, the incident is serious enough to 
permanently change her commuting habits.  She balances the elements in coming to her 
decision to use the motorway and rationalises that economics and traffic congestion are 
outweighed by her own safety concerns.   
 
142 
 
Her consideration of safety issues in such a way marks a departure from the rationalities 
that have been shown deployed in the mediated policy context of the Donegal accident.  
In RSA policy texts and mainstream mediation there is the sense of the effort expended 
among a large range of actors to prevent crashes, as well as how this is constructed in 
relation to strategies of responsibilization for citizens about road safety.  But in 
everyday practice these initiatives circulate with considerations about the cost of a toll 
bridge, vague concerns for wear-and-tear on a car, and how one feels about scenery 
along a route for example, all of which together have a role in shaping the actual 
practices of commuting and thus how the dispositif of road safety is lived.  Michelle 
articulates multiple rationalities in coming to her decision, at times valorising the 
neoliberal ethic identified in Chapter 2, by articulating concerns for her own safety in 
economic terms.  Once again however, the deployment of feeling is an active 
component of the narrative of the commute.  In her descriptions of her practices, 
Michelle does not assume the passivity ascribed to ordinary citizens that is an important 
feature of the mediated deployment of affect that has already been explored.  
 
Michelle’s nervous laugh seems to underline how prosaic commuting choices have the 
potential to intensify or mitigate potentially life-altering or catastrophic consequences.  
Such decisions are predicated on a variety of logics and rationalities, many of which 
gain scant purchase in the media representations explored already.  Michelle’s story is 
emblematic of how fear about crashing, that the reporting of the Donegal accident 
works to intensify, also manifests because of personal experience and becomes 
rationalised in individual action which must take other considerations into account.  
Like Dermot (f5) and Gary (f3), whose commuting decisions have potentially huge 
effects on the particularity of both their day-to-day lives and their career paths, Michelle 
finds an accommodation with the car and rationalises her life around the antagonisms 
and benefits it forces us to accept as part of day-to-day existence.  A variety of feelings, 
sometimes contradictory ones, are simultaneously apparent in Michelle’s account.  Her 
story underlines the range of actors and emotions involved in producing “stickiness” in 
relation to the practices of commuting or the assemblage of car-drivers and describes 
the dispositif of road safety and the networks of automobility as they are lived in 
practice.   
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As noted, commuters – who were not asked to justify their use of the car – often did so 
anyway, usually based on the premise that there was something unusual or unique about 
their particular commute that, regrettably, required the use of the car.  Don (f1), for 
instance, has no public transport choice so he must use the car.  Brid (f1) needs the car 
during the day and it’s the quickest choice for her.  Beth (f2) justifies her use of the car 
because it gets her into work early, while for Brian (f2), the car is just “very handy”.  
Geraldine (f2) could not take the job offered her without the car.  Other expressions of 
this defensiveness come from Brian and Graham: “Well you could cycle I suppose – 
there’s always a way right?  Nothing is impossible” (f4).  For Kevin and Una, (f6), the 
alternative bus journey is too long (Kevin: “the lifestyle benefit outweighed the cost 
benefit”; Una: “So it would actually take me longer than if I was driving, on a normal 
day.  Plus the inclement weather doesn’t entice you up the hill” [f6]).  For Brid as for 
Brian and others, it seems unacceptable or unfashionable to suggest the car as an 
attractive or positive proposition.  For Brid, this results in a somewhat tied-up-in-knots 
situation as she tries to justify her own use of the car: “Well if I cycled to work, I’d 
probably feel like I’d have a shower or something” (Brid f1).  When asked why she 
didn’t feel the same need to shower when she used to cycle to work while she lived in 
Holland however, her husband jumped to her defence: “It’s flat, it’s flat!” he said.  The 
unbidden nature of the justifications commuters proffer serves to underline the 
dominance of the car and how automobility subordinates other mobilities (Urry, 2005, 
p. 26).  Alternative modes of transport are rationalised out of contention through both 
instrumental and affective logics, making the car the inevitable or natural choice for 
commuters.  Indeed, a seemingly well-rehearsed apologia for car use is implicit in some 
group member’s words, an acknowledgement that it must be problematic somehow, 
something requiring a justifiable defence against our sometimes slightly shame-faced 
use of it.   
 
Maxwell (2001, p. 205) notes that: “The way in which participants ‘make sense’ of car 
use in the face of…social and environmental consequences of their individual and 
collective action is deeply intertwined with a desire to reduce anxiety and guilt”.  The 
assumptions underlying such feelings of guilt explicitly surface in various studies.  For 
example, Denis and Urry (2009) discuss the future of the automobile where “by 
necessity the present car system will have been replaced”.  In Car Cultures, Miller 
(2001, p. 9) argues that debates about the ethics and futures of the car “are so vocal and 
disseminated so widely in the media, they become the backdrop to the reflexivity of the 
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drivers themselves”.  For Miller (2001, p. 9), Maxwell’s commuters spent “at least as 
much time trying to reconcile themselves to the critical discourse on the car and the 
guilt they are expected to feel from their use of the car as they are to driving the car”.  
This attempted reconciliation seems also behind commuters’ apologia in the current 
research, but the situation here is perhaps more complex here than Maxwell (2001) and 
Miller (2001) allow for.  While guilt about car use is present it is filtered through 
commuter needs, requirements, and desires that the car facilitates and shapes, which 
have a much deeper resonance for these commuters compared to environmental or any 
potentially negative social consequences around car use.  In light of the exigencies of 
work and commuting by car, while commuters feel the need to attempt the 
reconciliation of their car use with its philosophical dubiousness (Rajan, 2006), their 
articulation of such concerns in terms of guilt sometimes seems more a reflection of 
what they think they ought to think, rather than how they actually think.   
 
Meeting affective needs  
 
The breadth of affective logics deployed by commuters connected to the car underlines 
the particularities of the circumstances in which these rationalities are employed in the 
mediated representations already explored.  Indeed, commuters’ need to rationally 
justify the car is backgrounded in the following section, as they elaborate how the car 
becomes an active agent in the creation of affective intensities in their everyday lives.  
This data offers an even richer picture of the complexity of multiple rationalities that 
Keohane, Kuhling, and Horgan (2002) argue is characteristic of social action.   
 
After outlining her rationale for driving, Fiona then goes on to foreground affective 
rationalities in explaining her choice of the car over other forms of transport: 
I hop in the car with Barry three times a week.  It would take me twenty minutes 
to get there on the train but I actually go in the car which takes 35 minutes…it’s 
more fun just sitting in the car.  And we get the chance to catch up, which is 
really nice.         (Fiona, f1) 
 
Some of Beth’s (f2) reasoning for commuting by car displayed similar traits: “It’s 
peaceful, I listen to Morning Ireland and there’s no kids.  There’s no one shouting at 
me.  It’s just – I love it.  It’s like chill out time”.  Explaining that her commute was the 
only time she could relax without children in the car, Michelle (f4) argued that her long 
journey made her a better mother: “[when] you leave here you are so stuck in [work] 
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mode.  But by the time you get home you’re ready to get excited about – ‘look what 
I’ve been finger painting’ …So it’s a nice time …because when you arrive home you’re 
in a different mind-set”, she said. 
 
Evelyn (f5) articulates the affective facets of her journey: “I enjoy the warmth when it’s 
cold! … I know it’s a long journey – but…I like the chance to think…And sometimes I 
eat my breakfast on the way in”.  Geraldine expressed a love for driving and stated she 
was unable to imagine her life without a car.  Kevin also expressed a generalised 
enjoyment of commuting by car, while Declan (f6) noted that his own satisfaction 
varied by time of year.  Una (f6) agreed:  “It’s heaven driving to work during the 
summer”, she said.  Lisa also expressed an affinity for driving.  For her, driving was an 
expression of autonomy, and like Tony and Caroline, she stated she did not like public 
transport at all.  Tony found driving a privilege because he did not always get the 
chance to drive.  Anne (f8) noted that she did not like driving at first, but experience 
subsequently changed her mind – not least because of the scenery she encounters on her 
way to college: “I drive the back roads so I quite like my commute – I go through 
Strawberry Beds”, she said. 
 
These types of rationalisations position the car as meeting affective needs and make a 
virtue out of the inflexible aspects of working lives of which commuting is an integral 
aspect.  The words used by commuters create associations of feeling between the car 
and commuting (Ahmed, 2004 a, b): “fun”, “catch up”, “peaceful”, “chill-out”, “lucky”, 
“free time”,  “freak you out”, “finger painting”, “nice”, “different mind-set”, “warmth”, 
“chance to think”.  These “accumulations of affective value” contrast sharply with those 
attaching to the car in relation to the emotional horror of the Donegal accident in ways 
that underline the contextual specificity of feelings that stick to the car (Ahmed, 2004a, 
p. 121).  Commuting and automobility are attached to heightened affective states, and 
while many of these are pleasurable, it has been shown how this is often not the case at 
all.   
Commuters’ rationalisations for driving further represent a society that emerges from 
the forms of social action automobility necessitates and shapes (Dant, 2005).  Fiona 
explains how, in her area, residents had been crying-out for a local shuttle bus to the 
train station, but didn’t use the service once it was provided.  Here, she provides an 
allegory for the emotional power of automobility: 
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The shuttle was stopped after about 6 months...And every time I hopped on that 
bus the driver was giving out about the mammies coming out to collect their 
student children in the train station. And people liked their little car experience 
and for years had been doing this and continued even when there was a shuttle.  
(Fiona, f1) 
 
Fiona concluded that children getting off the train didn’t want to wait ten minutes for 
the shuttle-bus when they were used to being collected by their parents.  But inchoate 
social anxieties (Cohen 2002, p. xxv) surfaced when the group articulated how this 
could reflect safety and security concerns parents felt about leaving their children alone 
waiting for the bus: 
 
Barry: Oh yeah, a bit of that. 
 
 Fiona: Not hugely because it’s a very safe area. I wouldn’t have thought… 
 
 Barry: Ah no Fiona – The odd…the back of your mind, ah no, you’ve… I’d say.  
 
 Fiona: Maybe? Late at night? 
 
Barry: Yes. Later on – the dark…Dark morning, dark evening and people like, 
you know, parents like collecting their kids as well, believe it or not! 
 
 Facilitator: For safety? 
 
 Barry: Even just to personalise collection.  You know, something nice about it 
 yeah. (Barry and Fiona, f1) 
 
Separately, Graham touched on how his family deal with related social anxieties and 
fears. Noting that their media usage in the car had changed now that his young children 
could understand the news, he explained:   
 
<My son> is telling me that somebody was murdered or somebody was shot.  So 
we started turning off the radio.  So because the two of them are in (the 
car)...usually we’re driving down the road …spotting their friends – so the car 
has become…nearly like a place of fun, it’s like you know I spy or it’s like – “I 
see my friends”.  (Graham, f4) 
 
The sense here is that, in the society which emerges from life organised around it, the 
car has the potential to both aggravate as well as alleviate social anxieties, to create 
positive and negative associations of feelings in complex ways, often simultaneously.  
This is not only because media reports may generally be heard by all passengers – 
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potentially reinforcing such anxieties for a captive audience.  It is also, as Maxwell 
(2001) notes, an outflow of the spatial dispersion the car enables that necessitates a car 
journey to get to the train station.  The multiplicity of such journeys contributes to the 
creeping alienation, isolation and lack of social cohesion that reinforces the fear for 
personal safety that is a common feature of daily life and is mirrored in the experiences 
of these commuters.  But as well as creating these problems the car provides their 
solution, in that it offers an affectively rich, “safe” space by separating our vulnerable 
selves from a world perceived to be dangerous or inhospitable, and creating what feels 
like a mobile privatised space in which one can travel without the “danger” of 
interaction with strangers (Henderson, 2008).   
 
Auto-mobile therapy and relationships enabled by the car 
 
Relationships enabled and maintained by the car are some of the most important 
affective dimensions of the automobile for the commuters in my study.  The expression 
of these relationships illustrates the needs met by cars that underline why people can’t 
simply reject them on account of their antagonisms.  Commuters here foreground 
multiple affective rationalities that again contrast with the media’s deployment and 
construction of such rationalities in response to car crashes.   
 
An example of this is the way in which the car becomes associated with the expression 
of personal feelings, a sometimes cathartic environment where people can discuss 
anxieties or concerns in perceived privacy.  As Gerard (f5) notes: “all of the iconic 
conversations I’ve had in my life have been in cars”.  Caroline (f7) illustrated how the 
car can be a therapeutic space: “If I wanted to talk to somebody – I'd take them off in 
the car.  Get out into a different atmosphere.  It’s hard to explain it but…when you hear 
in my family “let’s go for a spin” – something’s going down”.  Tony agreed with this 
sentiment, while Susan (f8) said she thought that late night driving was particularly 
good for philosophical conversations:  “It’s the lights and it’s really dark there’s no one 
around and it’s that kind of magical hour in the evening when minds turn to higher 
things”.  Colm said he would have different conversations in the car compared to home, 
while Claire (f9) noted: “If there was something annoying you – you might say it then – 
because, well, they can’t go anywhere!  And because – it comes to an end – you know?”  
Sara (F9) noted that her car was the first among her friends’ to become a mobile 
confessional environment: 
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It’s a good area for DMCs– deep and meaningful conversations.  My 
friend…wouldn’t say anything to anyone about anything she’s going through.  
[But] because I was the first one of my friends to drive and I’ve been driving 
them for years, in the 15 minutes from home she’d only start throwing little 
nuggets at you and then… you spend an hour at the gate of the house – In the car 
in the dark!  And she’d be telling you her life story and then when she leaves the 
car, for her that’s it.   
 
Affective value sticks to and intensifies around the car here, carving it out as a 
therapeutic space.  This space is constituted by words and phrases that circulate between 
bodies and signs, creating the effect of a temporal and spatial boundary between the car 
and the outside world (Ahmed, 2004a, p. 117):  “different atmosphere”, “really dark”, 
“magical”, “deep and meaningful”, “when she leaves the car that’s it”, for example.  
The use of the car as an aid to the expression and maintenance of relationships in this 
way illustrates the forms of shared social action and experiences that emerge from and 
are shaped by feelings about car use and that are enabled by it.  The use of mystical 
allusions creates separation in this context just as it did in The Irish Times construction 
of Inishowen as a place apart (Duncan, 2010), although it is a different kind of 
separation.  It is different because separation in this case can be actively sought to 
provide a space of sanctuary for commuters, rather than being imposed from outside to 
demarcate the otherness or difference of a place.   
 
Maxwell (2001, p. 215) argues car journeys can constitute (enjoyable) shared social 
experiences in themselves and that individual meanings of the car do “not adequately 
represent the social relations in which car use is embedded”.  As already noted, 
Maxwell (2001, p. 215) says that “[c]ar use can often be an expression of help, care or 
love” when journeys are taken with family members.  Such expressions occur when 
escorting children to activities, visiting to elderly relatives, and when elderly people 
themselves used cars in a way that sustained otherwise unsustainable social networks, 
for example (Maxwell, 2001, pp. 215-216).  These expressions include the enjoyment of 
the act of driving itself (Maxwell, 2001, p. 216).  While my commuters associate the car 
with enhancing relationships, as a therapeutic space, and the expression of concern and 
affection for others, they take these facets for granted and had not reflected on them 
before.   
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Michelle (f4), for example, notes that she used her car to connect with relatives who 
didn’t live in her immediate area and explained that her own car in particular – a 
“people carrier” with a raised entry point – had become essential for her mother, who 
suffers from reduced mobility.  Graham (f4) explains that for him the car was also 
essential for visiting parents and that without it he wouldn’t see them half as often as he 
does.  Graham often brought his elderly aunts and uncles to weddings or football 
matches too, because they were physically incapable of taking public transport: “It’s a 
very simple thing to drive them some place.  They know you don’t mind driving, they 
know you’ll like it and you’ll do it right...It’s something you can give people – It’s time 
– but beyond that it’s a nice thing to be able to do, you know?”, he says.  Tony (f7), who 
had only recently begun driving, explains that he sometimes drove his mother to work, 
picked up shopping for the family, and collected his brother from school.  He 
occasionally brings his parents into town on nights-out and says he enjoys chats with 
them on the way in: 
 
[Driving the car] makes me feel more grown up anyway – more mature.  They 
gave me a sense of responsibility – you can drive the car now – like they 
wouldn’t pass that to my little brother or sister.  So I definitely feel like I'm up 
the pecking order in the family. 
 
Colm (f8), who has also not been driving long, brings his father to the pub too, while 
Claire (f9), who also brings her parents to their leisure activities noted: “It makes you 
feel good about yourself that you’re needed to bring them”.  In Tony’s family, the car 
and the right to drive has become a rite of passage conferring the status of “grown-up” 
on the children.  For Tony, Colm, and Claire the car provides status through the sign 
value of “family” (Urry, 2005, p. 24) that sticks to the car through repeatedly intensified 
associations of feeling – parental love, emotional growth, and trust (Ahmed, 2004 a, b).  
Such emotional milestones also embed the car in the lives of the next generation of its 
users and illustrate ways in which automobility is continually reproduced (Urry, 2005).  
 
Evelyn (f5), Gerard (f5), Declan (f6), Una (f6), Colm (f8), Susan (f8) and Sara (f9) 
further explored how relationships with children and friends were also enabled by the 
car.  But the car enables works of charity too, as Graham (f4) noted: 
  
It’s very interesting how cars can bring you together…my mother works for the 
Irish Cancer Society where…sponsors or partners – [pick up patients] who don’t 
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have a car and bring them to hospital.  They get their cancer treatment and bring 
them home.  So it’s two things – you have a car so you have a means to bring 
the person … to hospital and then you have someone to talk to and without a car 
she couldn’t do that.   
 
Michelle:  And it’s kind of supportive because you know the person coming for 
you cares enough to get out there and do it. 
 
Graham: Exactly because they’re not paying for it, they’re not getting anything 
for it.  It’s interesting – I never thought about cars like that before but there you 
go.  
 
It can be seen in these exchanges that the car is providing the facility – particularly in 
the sense of ease – in which meaningful manifestations of feelings, indeed love and 
care, are intensified and can better circulate around different relationships.  These 
facilitations (e.g. “you don’t mind driving”; “it’s a nice thing”; “it’s a simple task”; “for 
want of a better relationship”; “I had the car to make my son’s life easier”) are 
associations that do work sticking figures together (e.g. different people; the car; 
feelings) (Ahmed, 2004a, p. 119).  As noted, it is novel for commuters to contemplate 
their car in this particular way and these rationalities are not foregrounded or even 
acknowledged in the media representation about the Donegal accident that has been 
examined, despite them featuring in academic studies (Maxwell, 2001; Miller, 2001; 
Urry, 2005 for example).    
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the work of emotions and affects in the constitution of the 
dispositif of road safety and networks of neoliberal automobility, from both their 
mediated articulations and how they are lived.  Habermas’s (1989; Habermas, Lennox, 
and Lennox, 1974) concept of the public sphere, and in particular various feminist 
critiques, helped articulate how affective rationalities are inseparable from rational 
deliberation.  The mediated policy context of the Donegal accident was shown to be 
enmeshed in multiple rationalities, despite the ubiquity of the rational choice model in 
the formulations of solutions to the problems the car creates (Sheller, 2005).  This 
analysis is extended by Ahmed’s (2004 a, b) theorisation that enabled us to explore the 
work of emotion between both media representations and lived experience.  The 
extension of public sphere theory was necessary because the mediated orchestration of 
public opinion needs to be considered in a context where the social order is sustained by 
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myriad networks of actors.  The ritualised and repeated deployment of “sticky words” to 
bodies associated with the car (e.g. local, official actors, the media, commuters) has 
been examined, in which affective value is accumulated, shaping the surface of bodies 
and worlds in media reports of the Donegal accident, policy around road safety, as well 
as the practices of commuting (Ahmed, 2004a, p. 121).  The deployment of feelings has 
been found to be characterised by complexity and contradiction.  
 
The mediated policy context of the Donegal accident articulates and valorises an 
instrumental policy rationality, while at the same time contradicting that instrumentality 
with its mobilisation through the intensification of feeling.  This mediated context 
others and passivizes the place and local people of Inishowen where the accident 
occurred.  Media rituals such as this create or reflect both the myth of policy rationality 
and a sense of collective belonging around ritual conventions associated with those 
most affected by the crash, while at the same time excluding these citizens from fully 
autonomous citizenship.  A hierarchy of emotions becomes apparent where, for 
example, rationalities associated with traditional rituals such as funerals are assigned to 
local citizens and only certain officially sanctioned actors are allowed to deploy both 
affective and instrumental rationalities to construct general framings about the accident 
and propose solutions to the problems that tragic events like this cause. 
 
Commuters’ descriptions of their journeys can mirror the instrumental logics associated 
with official actors, but their actual behaviours are also shaped by a range of factors that 
manifest as a complex framework of multiple rationalities.  Commuters share and 
valorise their rational choices and self-interested decision-making abilities when 
initially describing their commuting journeys within this framework.  But commuters’ 
active deployment of feelings differs from the passive associations attributed to citizens 
of Inishowen and reflects differential hierarchies of emotions and sticky words that can 
simultaneously attach to the car and circulate around it (Ahmed, 2004a, pp. 122/128).  
This was shown in the case of Michelle (f4), for example, who at turns valorises the 
neoliberal ethic, but she also shows how affective rationalities can have as much say in 
the practices that result.  Commuters’ use of mystical allusions that turn the car into a 
slightly mysterious therapeutic space also correlates with language usage that marks 
Inishowen out as other.  Again, the difference is that in media representation about the 
Donegal accident this creates the effect of passivity that inheres to ordinary local 
citizens, while in commuter reflections on their driving practices, as in the 
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representation of official actors, affective language is articulated to mobilize 
instrumental rationality. 
 
The car becomes implicated in social formation in quite a profound way.  Consideration 
of how the car shapes decision making – regarding choice of university for example 
(Dermot, f5; Gary, f3) – underlines this, showing that choices are made in light of range 
of factors that entangle multiple rationalities.  Automobility’s power to shape social 
action is also highlighted by the way in which commuters feel guilt about car use yet 
still rationalise other forms of transport out of contention for their commuting needs.  It 
is reinforced by the way in which the car solves problems it itself creates and how it can 
both magnify and mitigate resulting social anxieties in complex ways that involve 
multiple rationalities.  Different contexts of fear or pleasure that stick to the car also 
overlap, highlighting the range of contradictory feelings that are simultaneously 
involved in the constitution of automobility.  In this chapter, how the car has seeped into 
rituals of coming of age, shared expressions of love, and the performance of affective 
relationships with loved ones has also been explored.  This has demonstrated how cars 
are “deeply embedded in ways of life, networks of friendship and sociality, and moral 
commitments to family and care for others” (Sheller, 2005, p. 236).  
 
All these insights together challenge media-centric assumptions about what the car and 
policy to do with cars means to people because they highlight the networks of actors 
and rationalities involved in the constitution of the dispositif of road safety and system 
of automobility as it is lived.  Commuting becomes emblematic of the skilled 
negotiations of competing, multiple rationalities and responsibilities that are both 
facilitated and made compulsory by the car (Urry, 2005).  The clash of discursive and 
practical social actions that emerge from the rationalities explored in this chapter form 
the final structuring theme that emerges from the research data: the exploration of the 
networks of resistance that Foucault (1976) defined as “counter-conducts”.  
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Chapter 4: Networks of resistance  
 
Introduction   
 
I can well imagine societies in which the control of the conduct of others is so 
well regulated in advance that, in a sense, the game is already over. (Foucault, 
1984b, p. 300) 
 
The fierce spatio-temporalities of contemporary daily life – driven by 
technologies that emphasize speed and rapid reductions in the frictions of 
distance and of turnover times – preclude times to imagine or construct 
alternatives other than those forced unthinkingly upon us as we rush to perform 
our respective professional roles in the name of technological progress and 
endless capital accumulation. (Harvey, 2001, p. 201) 
 
Our discussions so far outline a vision of driving extant in mediated policy contexts of 
road safety and another one in the conceptions and actions of drivers, and these appear 
to be in tension.  This chapter explores this tension by conceptualising it as a particular 
type of resistance.  Matereke (2013, p. 41) outlines what Foucault (1978a, p. 268) called 
“counter-conducts”, defined as “struggle[s] against the processes implemented for 
conducting others” in governmentality.  This is the form of resistance explored in this 
chapter.    
 
Weir, O’Malley, and Shearing (1997, p. 510) define a programmers’ vision of 
government – “the discourses and programmes of rule” – as the centre of analysis in 
most governmentality literature.  However, they argue that “many programmes exist 
only in the process of messy implementation” (Weir, O’Malley, and Shearing, 1997, p. 
512).  The discourses and programmes of rule are thus not “formed by programmers 
alone, nor… in relations of context with the subjects of rule”, but instead are 
“multivocal and decentred” (Weir, O’Malley, and Shearing, 1997, p. 505).  This chapter 
delineates two intersecting and often contradictory programmers’ visions.  The first – 
the programmers’ vision for automobility – is represented by specific policies and 
discourses of automobility that will be explored in the context of the launch of a 
network of speed cameras as part of the constitution of the dispositif of road safety in 
the first section of this chapter.  The second – the programmers’ vision for neoliberal 
society – refers to the “phenomenon” in which the concepts and exigencies of 
neoliberalism permeate debates about automobility (Gilbert, 2013).  This is also 
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discussed through analysis of mediation about the speed cameras’ launch, as well as 
through commuter experiences of commuting and other aspects of automobility.  This 
chapter analyses the complex ways in which resistances manifest in the discourses and 
practices of driving.  In effect, it explores the contradictions and disagreements that 
result within and between the two programmers’ visions outlined.  These negotiations 
and self-management strategies co-exist with normative and aligned behaviours and 
together constitute automobility, making-up its reality in practice (McKee, 2009, p. 
474).   
 
Resistance was and remains a disputed and ambiguous notion in governmentality 
literature. Weir, O’Malley, and Shearing (1997, p. 510) argue that resistance, if it is 
considered at all, is typically seen only as an obstacle to rule and never discussed as an 
alternative governance, nor given “the constitutive role” that Foucault made available 
for it.  However, Burchell (1996, p. 20) notes that “the introduction of techniques of the 
self…seems to imply a loosening of the connection between subjectification and 
subjection”.  Flint (2002, p. 621) asserts that governing “is often characterised by 
contradictions, complexities and inconsistencies, a gulf between policy rhetoric, 
implementation and practices and the fact that outcomes are often partial, uneven and 
unpredictable”.  McKee (2009, p. 474) argues that subjection is actually a project 
“inherently characterised by conflict, contestation and instability”; but while 
foregrounding the analysis of resistant behaviours, subjection is still suggested as the 
outcome.  Each of these arguments demonstrates the contentiousness of notions of 
resistance.  Nevertheless, McKee (2009, p. 476) argues that “a key role for political 
contestation, an analysis of the effects of particular governmental ambitions, and the 
development of a critical stance are all quite feasible” within governmentality.  A key 
here is to clarify the definition of resistance, to see beyond “a binarism of resistance and 
domination” (Matereke, 2013, p. 39).  This means viewing it not simply as “liberation 
from an oppressor”, but rather as “an invention of alternatives to current governing 
practices” (McKee, 2009, p. 471).  In this sense, resistance may be considered as not 
merely political but also ubiquitous.  As Foucault (1984c, p. 167) argues, if there was no 
resistance, there would be no power relations.   
 
For Foucault (1982, p. 221), to govern means to “structure the possible field of action 
for others”, where according to Matereke (2013, p. 38), “subjects (the governed) still 
remain with the ability to initiate and secure possible modes of action in response to 
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their government”.   As such, automobility can be viewed as consisting of “sites of 
complex processes of domination, resistance and also appropriation that allow for the 
constitution of power relations” (Matereke, 2013, p. 40).  These power relations are 
constituted “with effects of resistance and counter-investments”, meaning that “one type 
of stable subjugation, given once and for all” never prevails (Foucault, 1976, p. 97 cited 
in Matereke, 2013, p. 40).  Indeed, Matereke (2013, p. 41) outlines Foucault’s (1976) 
concept of counter-conducts in order to account for how power relations are constituted.  
According to Cadman (2010, p. 540) counter-conducts are “wholly immanent and 
necessary to the formation and development of governmentality”.  They are immanent 
because the critique of liberal government is an intrinsic part of its existence – 
encapsulated in the question “[d]o we govern too much?” – and also part of liberal 
government’s ongoing activity as events of “innovation, change or disruption”.  
Counter-conducts in this context arise “not simply through an internal rationality 
emanating from governments but through the constitution of, and action between, 
governors and governed” (Cadman, 2010, p. 548).  As already suggested by Weir, 
O’Malley, and Shearing (1997, p. 510), resistances include conflicts between competing 
strategies for government.  But counter-conducts are not contained within programmes 
of rule and their discourses and include the resistant actions of the practitioners of 
automobility themselves.   
 
In counter-conduct resistance can be shown not simply as revolt or dissidence, but as 
struggles within governmentality – in terms of the activity of conducting others, how 
one conducts oneself, and how one lets oneself be conducted (Foucault, 1978a, pp. 257-
258) – which push or potentially reshape the boundaries of conduct.  In this conception, 
“resistance becomes a form of critique by which an individual renegotiates the limits of 
the self” (Matereke, 2013, p. 41).  As such, counter-conducts are not actions that 
necessarily set out to undermine “the system”, create anarchy or overthrow regimes, 
although sometimes they could conceivably achieve this.  Rather, in this research 
context, counter-conducts may be viewed as among the necessary agencies that are 
expressed by subjects in order to better accommodate themselves within the system of 
neoliberal automobility.  Counter-conducts make sense of the contexts in which 
resistance manifests in this project.   
 
This chapter first briefly explores the operation of the network of speed cameras within 
the dispositif of road safety as a disciplinary form of power.  This discussion locates the 
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actuality of the cameras as actors in the context of their representation and frames 
discussion of mainstream media representations and user-generated content about the 
cameras’ launch.  The chapter then examines the launch of the camera network in the 
context of mainstream media rituals surrounding their introduction as well as mediated 
articulations of resistance to them.  Specifically, mainstream print media (The Irish 
Times; Irish Independent) and user-generated content (boards.ie) about the camera’s 
launch are investigated.  These representations are picked because they portray a 
controversial issue related to road safety, in which the counter-conducts of automobility 
may manifest.   
 
Print media reports related to the launch of the cameras and coverage of camera-burning 
incidents are examples of how neoliberal ideals manifest in the media, and how a 
dominant media consensus is ritually prefigured in mainstream mediation of the 
cameras.  The analysis in this chapter highlights that mainstream representation of the 
cameras bolsters the neoliberal governance strategies and subjects mobilised by the 
operation of the cameras as a disciplinary power.  Yet internet forum discussion 
underlines the actual complexity of issues around the cameras’ launch that are denied by 
the media consensus.  Including the “casual” discourse of user-generated content found 
on internet forums enriches the understanding of how the dispositif of road safety is 
constituted by contestation and counter-conduct (Weir, O’Malley, and Shearing, 1997).  
My exploration suggests how politicised and contentious the debate about the cameras 
could have been if the issues raised by drivers were engaged with by organs such as The 
Irish Times.  What is illustrated in these sections are the ways in which the mainstream 
media goes about constructing its own centrality for itself (Couldry, 2003), how the 
potentially mythical nature of this centrality plays-out in the user-generated content of 
internet forums, as well as how the disciplinary power of the cameras is an important 
actor in the constitution of the dispositif of road safety.   
 
Online forums’ dynamics of acceptance, accommodation, and rejection variously 
connect to the particular ways in which people counter and incorporate the 
programmer’s visions for automobility and neoliberal society into their lived practice.  
Indeed, the second half of the chapter goes on to explore the “work” in which counter-
conducts appear as, in effect, alternative practices or accommodations of the 
suggestions of governance.  By examining discourses and practices of commuters which 
both incorporate and challenge programmers’ visions of government, a better sense of 
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the complexity of the power relations constitutive of commuting and automobility can 
be ascertained.  When the programmers’ views are changed or accommodated this can 
constitute counter-conduct, but the reality is complex and the extent to which counter-
conduct can align with an over-arching neoliberal sensibility is explored.   
 
Counter-conducts and the launch of a network of speed cameras  
 
The rollout of a network of speed cameras is a primary plank of the enforcement 
component of the Road Safety Strategy, shoring-up its education strand in which the 
message of personal responsibility in relation to road safety is disseminated through the 
media (RSA, 2007; see also Chapter 2).  The importance and technological complexity 
of the network of cameras to the dispositif of road safety can be seen in how strongly 
they figure in the “priority actions” of the Road Safety Strategy, helping enforce the first 
listed “key behaviour” to be changed –  inappropriate speeding (RSA, 2007, p. 25): 
 
The Safety Camera Network is a significant addition to the existing enforcement 
programme.  Mobile and fixed cameras will be used across the road network.  
The locations will be based on analysis by the Gardaí of speed-related collisions, 
which will allow optimal deployment of the safety cameras and hours of 
operation to achieve the compliance rates…Implementing a successful Safety 
Camera Network requires an integrated technology system that links the camera 
output to the vehicle and licence databases and to the courts administration 
system.  The operation of the Safety Camera Network will be supported by a 
high profile and continuous public awareness campaign to ensure drivers are 
aware of the role of safety cameras in enhancing their safety.  (RSA, 2007, p. 
29) 
 
The cameras are also referenced in the introduction to the Annual Report 2010 (RSA, 
2011) in which the Donegal accident is highlighted (RSA, 2011).  They are positioned 
as “one of the most significant developments in road safety since the introduction of 
Mandatory Alcohol Testing” (RSA, 2011, p. 3).  Their rollout is part of a strategy that 
seeks to prevent accidents like the one in Donegal in the future, and their disciplinary 
power can be traced as an important constitutive actor of the dispositif of road safety. 
 
Indeed, though subjects are supposed to negotiate strategies of governmental 
responsibilization through the effective management of the choices they make 
(Ouellette and Hay, 2008), the goals of such strategic interventions can also be enabled 
by the threat of sanction.  The penalty points the cameras generate leverage the 
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neoliberal assumption of “competitive, acquisitive and uniquely self-interested 
behaviour which is the central fact of human social life” (Gilbert, 2013, p. 9) albeit in a 
somewhat perverse manner.  They create a kind of contrary league-table in which poor 
performance (that is breaking the speed limit at a camera location) results in the 
“awarding” of penalty points that culminate in the loss of a driving licence when a set 
target is “achieved” (twelve points).  As the site of government intervention, individuals 
“compete” to ensure they do not fall foul of the cameras and ultimately lose their 
driving licences.  For any car commuter, the loss of a licence has the potential to 
severely affect the ability to work and thus to consume, denying “the main consolation 
for participation in neoliberal culture: access to a wide range of consumer goods” 
(Gilbert, 2013, p. 13).   
 
But good performance in relation to avoiding the cameras is rewarded with nothing at 
all – except the ability to continue to live lives as complex negotiations of 
programmers’ visions.  Penalty points make the highly demanding task of feeding ones 
children “and keeping them out of relative poverty” potentially more difficult because 
they can damage the ability to perform this task in a car-dependent society (Gilbert, 
2013, p. 14).  The disciplinary power of the cameras shows how neoliberal ideology can 
interpellate “subjects as consumers, while simultaneously legitimating a political 
programme which actively undermines the capacity of citizens to consume” (Gilbert, 
2013, p. 18).  This power is predicated on and reproduces the assumption that 
“inherent” competitive individualism ensures acquiescence with the system.  But 
acquiescence is not secured, because as the RSA’s own figures show, 479,651 fully 
licenced drivers had penalty points active on their driving licences from all offences 
types as at April 2014 (RSA, 2015b) 19. 
 
The cameras’ interventions “materially instantiate” neoliberal ideology and 
institutionalise “ritual forms of behaviour in which [subjects] are obliged or persuaded 
to engage” (Gilbert, 2013, p. 12).  Their disciplinary power helps construct the 
subjectivity that is necessary to the operation of the competitive, individualistic regime 
of commuting (inculcating it as the required, as well as desired, action [Stewart, 2001, 
pp. 18-19]).  The sort of behaviours they promote lead to an “internalization of 
                                                          
19 This was the latest available data.  The RSA website notes that “points are wiped 
from a drivers licence after three years” (RSA, 2015b).  
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standards” which is used by subjects to self-regulate conduct “inculcating virtues such 
as prudence and self-control” (Barnett, 2010, p. 286).  Vigilance – specifically of excess 
speed in this context – can mitigate the threat of the loss of freedom the cameras 
potentially represent.  But while speed cameras help enforce the imperative for 
responsibilization encountered in relation to the Donegal accident, they do not simply 
create the outcomes projected by policy.  Governance is never complete or total as the 
agency to choose the ways in which behaviours and counter-conducts are self-managed 
is always retained.  Assemblages of cars and drivers, the dispositif of road safety, and 
networks of automobility are shaped by the threat of discipline.  But as will now be 
explored, they are also shaped by other actors including consensus formation by 
mainstream media, resistant and normative discourses of user-generated internet forum 
content about the cameras, and the counter and aligned practices of the users of the 
system.  
 
Mainstream media and consensus formation around speed cameras 
 
Although now barely remaining in public consciousness, the launch of a network of 
speed or “safety” cameras in Ireland in 2010 was accompanied by significant resistance, 
including a spate of camera burnings in the months following the start of their 
operation.  However, print media coverage of these events and the launch itself depict 
resistance around the cameras as pre-settled and defused and illustrate how neoliberal 
ideals manifest in the media coverage. An article entitled “No clear pattern to burning of 
speed vans” appeared in The Irish Times on April 16th 2011 (Lally and McAleer, 2011).  
It was published on page 3 of the Weekend Review section of the paper, positioned 
below a much larger article concerning the fate of Ireland’s golf clubs in light of 
economic recession (figure 6).  In the “speed vans” article, the journalists detail three 
instances of camera van burnings that had occurred over the previous six months in 
Counties Louth, Wicklow, and Donegal.  The article reports progress towards solving 
each incident, with the Gardai hoping for an “imminent development” in the Wicklow 
case, while there was hope that a detailed description of the vehicle used in the Donegal 
incident would help solve that crime.  The Louth event was proving to be more difficult 
to resolve.  The article speculates about the involvement of the “republican movement” 
in the burnings, before detailing extra security provisions that were being considered to 
defend the vans against attack.  However, the Gardai were reluctant to reinforce security 
on the vans “feeling that a fleet of heavily fortified vans could alienate the public”.  
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Conor Faughnan of the AA then sets-out the broad level of support for the vans’ 
introduction, as well as detailing the issues that “annoy the public” in relation to their 
deployment.  The vans are operated on behalf of the Gardai by GoSafe, a private entity 
that won the tendering process to provide this network of mobile speed cameras.  The 
Garda Commissioner of the time is quoted as saying GoSafe’s work was “vital” and that 
the attacks were wrong.  Faughnan is given last word in the article, describing the 
burnings as “pure thuggery”. 
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Figure 6: The Irish Times, Weekend Review, Page 3, 16th April, 2011. 
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The article describes GoSafe as “a consortium that has been asked to try to save lives on 
our roads”.  The description of the contracting process in which GoSafe won the multi-
million euro right to carry out this complex technological and logistical operation as 
merely being “asked to try to save lives on our roads” (Lally and McAleer, 2011, 
emphasis added) seems an excessively reductive, simplistic, and casual assertion to 
make.  This is because the awarding of the contract represents the culmination of years-
long processes of expert group pronouncements, legislative change, context setting by 
the media and government and the completion of a complicated procurement process.   
The personalisation of institutional actors created in the phraseology of GoSafe simply 
being “asked” masks a political and economic process by making it appear as personal 
service, and obfuscates the agency of the state and other institutional actors such as the 
RSA involved in governance infrastructure.  In particular, the hiring of private 
contractors for policing purposes demonstrates the diffusion of governance through 
market mechanisms.  Harvey (2005, p. 2) notes that a role of the state in neoliberal 
theory is to create markets, but intervention into them once created “must be kept to a 
bare minimum”.  However, one must also consider how neoliberal ideals do not imply 
reduced state action in practice.  Neoliberalism actually advocates deliberate 
intervention in order to cultivate entrepreneurial behaviours that are assumed to be 
humanity’s natural state in the absence of intervention by government (Gilbert, 2013, p. 
9).  As such, intervention is not about simply transferring state functions to the market, 
thus reducing the state’s role in the process, but rather reordering these functions around 
the principles of the free market which does not necessarily imply minimal intervention 
at all.   
 
Indeed, the RSA’s (2007) targets in relation to reducing road deaths were actually 
achieved three years early and without the help of the cameras.  This underlines that 
imperatives other than the need to save lives were at work in the gestation of the 
network.  While the complex processes implicit in the awarding of the operation of the 
safety camera network to GoSafe suggest the kind of market interventions that state and 
institutional actors are actually involved with in neoliberal practice, this is denied by the 
assertion that the consortium have simply been “asked to try to save lives” (Lally and 
McAleer, 2011).  This denial mirrors the deflection of state responsibility exemplified 
by the discourses of responsibilization that make social maintenance a matter of 
personal provisions (Lemke, 2002, p. 12).  Thus the discursive minimisation of state 
intervention occurs repeatedly in the dispositif of road safety and is an important way in 
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which neoliberal theory manifests in mainstream mediation.  The state’s role is 
diminished here by the reduction of governance to an interpersonal relationship but this 
strategy is belied in practice by the “all sorts of state intervention” that actually go on 
(Barnett, 2010, p. 285).  
 
Indeed, the increased complexity of interactions between state actors and corporate 
entities that is necessitated by the setting-up of the camera network is reinforced in an 
Irish Times report from the 13th of November 2010, written just before their launch.  
Headlined “Privatised speed check vans go live on Monday” (Carroll, 2010), the report 
outlines the rollout of the camera network, which was expected to become fully 
operational by the following February, as well as some of the mechanics of its set-up 
and operation.  It also emphasises the business facets of the camera network and its five 
year, €65m contract, which had been signed the previous November by the Garda 
Commissioner, the then Minister for Justice (Dermot Ahern), and representatives of the 
GoSafe consortium.  The cameras were to provide 6,000 hours of checks every month, 
spread over 600 locations across the state, the report explains.  The location and 
operation of the cameras were to be centred on places and times where crashes took 
place in the past.  The article goes on to state that the GoSafe network bolsters the 
Gardai’s own assemblage of “400 hand-held speeding devices and more than 100 
automatic number plate recognition cameras which are installed in Garda cars for 
checks that capture 200,000 speeding motorists annually”.  Those caught speeding by 
the GoSafe cameras would receive penalty points, to be administered by the Gardai.  
The report states that 11 million cars would be monitored annually by the cameras, 
before explaining how GoSafe would be paid for their services.  It ends with some 
background information on the number of crashes in which speed was cited as the main 
factor, varying from 15 – 54 per cent, depending on the type of crash involved.  The 
article is the main story on page 5 of the Irish Times that day (figure 7) and is positioned 
beside a picture of a family whose previously conjoined twins “had captured the 
nation’s hearts” (The Irish Times, 2010).  Another article on the page concerns power 
cuts caused by a recent storm, while a final smaller article reports comments from the 
Turkish ambassador to Ireland about the slaughter at Gallipoli during the First World 
War.  All of the articles take up one half of page 5 in total.  The other half of the page 
consists of an interesting intertextual counterpoint: a large advertisement for the Land 
Rover Freelander, depicted, as has already been argued is characteristic of car 
164 
 
advertising, on an empty mountainous route.  Small print on the advertisement cautions 
“Drive responsibly on and off-road”. 
 
The deletion of the actors in the preferred reading of the Carroll (2010) article’s 
headline and sub-headline (it is the vans themselves that “go live”; crash-risk sites are 
“scanned by cameras in marked vehicles”) echoes throughout the piece (Richardson, 
2007, p.  55).  The cameras’ operators are named as “the GoSafe consortium”, or “the 
consortium”, or are referred to as “a consortium” led by a vague and almost 
preternatural entity “the Spectra Group” whose interests and activities seem to fade into 
the ether.  The use of “the consortium” as a phrase reinforces this sense of mystery, 
giving little indication of who or what GoSafe consists (Carroll, 2010).  The 
consortium’s strategic intent is denied by its designation as the mere operators of 
cameras, as the management of the network is the responsibility of the Garda (“The 
consortium…will be directed by the Garda and overseen by gardai at the Garda Office 
for Safety Camera Management”).  Despite being the operators of the cameras, 
GoSafe’s agency is transferred to the cameras themselves.  It is the cameras that 
execute: they “check”, “enforce”, “operate”, “provide”, “monitor”, and “perform”.  
These metonymic strategies, as Reisigl and Wodak (2001, p. 58) argue, “enable the 
speakers (or writers) to conjure away responsible, involved, or affected actors (whether 
victims or perpetrators) or to keep them in the semantic background”.  These strategies 
further the theme of deflection of state agency, even while the article constitutes a 
description of the extent and nature of the interventions the state and institutional actors 
have been involved in (and will continue to be involved in) in relation to the camera’s 
administration and management. 
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Figure 7: The Irish Times, Page 5, 13th November, 2010. 
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Although it is pointed out this is the first time law enforcement has been entrusted to a 
private body, this is not dwelt upon and is rather constructed as a state-of-affairs: as 
“outsourcing”.  This is a useful nominalisation that, again, obscures the state’s agency 
in constructing, managing and deciding upon this process.  The lack of comment in the 
article about this articulates a view of the privatisation of law enforcement as a natural 
progression.  Such privatisation of public or communal assets is one of the basic 
elements of neoliberal policy (Gilbert, 2013, p. 11), where a “sector” – in this case 
policing – is partially transferred to the private sphere.  A market system has been 
imposed to support this privatisation and the ground-rules for market competition must 
properly be observed within it (Harvey, 2005, p. 65).  In relation to the launch of the 
cameras, neoliberal predications can be argued to overpower the imperative to save 
lives and they explain the desire to implement the network even though targeted 
reductions in road deaths were achieved without the cameras’ assistance.  
 
The backgrounding of the consortium’s strategic necessity to act in its own competitive 
interests and those of its shareholders is bolstered in the article by two denials, the first 
of which is about the payment of commissions:  “The consortium is being paid a flat fee 
for the service.  There is no provision for commissions or bonuses related to how many 
motorists are caught speeding” (Carroll, 2010).  The passive transformations of the 
verbs “pay” into “being paid” and the nominalisation of  “provide” into “provision” 
work to obfuscate the attribution of whom is being paid and by whom (Fowler, 1991, 
pp. 78-80; Richardson, 2007, p. 50).  It is the state who uses public funds to pay the 
private entity to provide the service but attention is drawn instead to the denial of 
additional bonus payments as the problematic issue of concern.  The effect is to 
authorise the former as a status quo and to highlight that the unacceptability of the latter 
was already dealt with in the contracting process.   
 
The second denial, attributed to a Garda spokesman, states “the cameras were not a 
revenue gathering exercise but a means to improving [sic] safety on the roads”.  Here, 
problematic considerations of the marketization of public resources or policing are 
defused by again shifting the provisioning of the speed cameras away from issues of 
revenue generation and the influence of private interests and towards the issue of road 
safety alone.  Although writing in the context of racism, Van Dijk (1992, p. 92) notes 
that acts of denial such as these examples are generally “part of a strategy of defence, 
presupposing explicit or implicit accusations” (emphasis in original).  The modality of 
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the writer of the article (Fowler, 1991, p. 85) towards the desirability of the way in 
which the cameras were provisioned may be indicated in how the first denial is 
presented as a separate paragraph, without any explicit attribution to a source being 
provided.  Fowler (1991, p. 85) regards modality “as ‘comment’ or ‘attitude’, obviously 
by definition ascribable to the source of the text, and explicit or implicit in the linguistic 
stance taken by the speak/writer”.  The denial stands on its own as a declaration without 
a sense that the privatisation of law enforcement may be subjective and therefore 
contingent and not absolutely necessary.   
 
As such, both the Garda spokesman and the newspaper become implicated in the same 
strategy of defence of neoliberalism, safeguarding debate about the introduction of the 
speed cameras from its problematic implications and counter-consensual viewpoints.  
This exemplifies how the consensus is built: it is ritually deflected by prefiguring 
counter-conducts that are then presented as already settled and thus requiring no further 
debate.  It makes The Irish Times an important actor in the construction of a dominant 
social consensus about the introduction of the cameras within the dispositif of road 
safety.  This consensus includes organs of the state and intermediaries; the Gardai, the 
Department of Justice, as well as the GoSafe consortium.  It is a consensus for which 
The Irish Times apparently speaks on behalf of “everyone”. 
   
The Irish Times and other mainstream actors also conjure up memories of a dark past of 
terrorist “folk devils” (Cohen, 2002), mobilising Irish history to rationalize a common 
sense narrative around the introduction of the cameras.  As noted, the Lally and 
McAleer (2011) article states the Gardai were exploring the possibility that “the 
republican movement” were involved in camera-van burnings.  The quoted source says 
that, “because the vans effectively act as CCTV some people involved in smuggling and 
other crimes linked to republicans wouldn’t want them there”.  In making the 
connection to republican smugglers, other potential counter-conducts around the issue 
of the safety cameras are discursively attached to subversive or illegal activities.  They 
become grouped with already “off message” viewpoints expressed on the internet: the 
article begins with “If you go online you might conclude from internet discussion 
boards that a string of arson attacks on speed camera vans over the past six months is 
the logical result of motorists’ anger about punitive fines and misplaced speed limits”.  
The grounding of the consensus in this common sense narrative (Harvey, 2005, p. 39) – 
that only criminals or subversives could not want the camera network – is simply 
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reinforced by the writers’ use of the collective term “our roads” for the places where 
GoSafe have been asked to save lives.  Editorialising comments like this indicate “our” 
behaviour as it is supposed or ought to be (Harvey, 2001, p. 16).  Motorist anger about 
the cameras thus becomes categorised together with the actions of republican dissidents 
and criminals as the “unauthorised” expression of resistance around the cameras. 
 
Indeed, another Irish Times article, concerning the camera van burning incident in Co. 
Louth, had already created the impression of this common sense consensus (O’Brien 
and Lally, 2010).  Headlined “Attack on new speed survey vehicle condemned by Garda 
Commissioner”, the report was published on the 27th of November 2010, within two 
weeks of the vans going “live”.  The article details the timeline of events surrounding 
the incident and includes comments by the Garda Commissioner condemning the attack.  
At this stage, the Gardai were unsure of the direction the investigation would take, but 
were examining CCTV footage and appealing to the public for information.  The article 
appeared on page 6 of The Irish Times that day, beneath a large picture of the scene 
headed “Arson attack: GoSafe van destroyed in blaze” (figure 8).  Other articles on the 
page include a report on a work-to-rule at Aer Lingus, plans for a redevelopment of the 
RTE campus, and a piece on an appeal by An Taisce against planning approval for a 
casino.  Beside the picture of the destroyed van, another report headlines the continued 
threat posed by republican paramilitaries in Northern Ireland (Moriarty, 2010).  Both 
the Moriarty (2010) and the O’Brien and Lally (2010) articles are very strongly 
intertextually linked through the presence of neoliberal themes in each and through the 
surfacing of common actors in both20.  For example, the Chief Constable of the PSNI is 
quoted in the Moriarty (2010) article as saying – in connection with the issue of human 
rights – that there was a need to move from “the age of regulation to the age of 
responsibility”, a key neoliberal tenet.  In the same article, the Chief Constable pays 
tribute to the Garda Commissioner, referring to “his unprompted comment that an attack 
on the PSNI was an attack on the Garda Siochana”.  The proximity of these two articles 
to each other – an element of the staging of the reports – also creates a visual connection 
between the two (Deacon, et al., 2007).   
 
                                                          
20 Deacon, et al. (2007, p. 182) note that news reports are “not separate and independent 
from other texts and discourses, but…interrelated with that which surrounds it and that 
which assigns it a contributory function in a more general ensemble”. 
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The point is that the link to paramilitary involvement in camera burnings is 
foreshadowed in the intertextual connections between both of these articles, although 
the explicit connection would only later be made.  The link is underlined in the O’Brien 
and Lally (2010) article’s headline that deploys the language of condemnation ritually 
attached to terrorist acts especially during The Troubles, and the Commissioner’s 
comments that the burning of the speed van was “an outrageous and reckless act which 
could have had grave and tragic consequences”.  The Commissioner goes on to conflate 
GoSafe’s work with that of the Gardai: “GoSafe van personnel are out on our roads day 
and night working with An Garda Siochana to reduce speed related collisions and stop 
the needless loss of lives on our roads”, he notes.  “It is important work directed at 
ensuring that fewer families and communities here have to endure the pain and suffering 
which follows collisions and deaths on our roads”.  Language use by the Commissioner 
is affectively laden, “sticking” the concepts of fear and care to the camera network and 
aligning the speed vans with protection from negative affects like these (Ahmed, 2004 
a, b).  Accordingly, connectivity to Ireland’s folk devil past is part of the armoury of 
consensus building, marking-off of ideologically safe counter-conduct around the 
cameras.  
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Figure 8: The Irish Times, Page 6, 27th November, 2010. 
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The creation of the effect in which social antagonisms towards the cameras seem 
already diffused also involves the detailing of authorised deviation from consensus.  
This is achieved through the medium of AA spokesperson Conor Faughnan.  The image 
of the AA, predicated on its history as a member’s club that assisted broken-down 
motorists (Freedman, 2010) persists despite the fact that it is a commercial entity owned 
by Acromas Holdings (Acromas, 2015).  Faughnan’s role is to step into the discursive 
vacuum created by the marginalisation of dissent constructed by grouping motorists 
with smugglers and criminals.  He acts as a safety-valve and a counter-balance to the 
non-credible situation that would be produced by one-sided discussion of the burning of 
safety cameras without any opposing view-points at all.  Such one-sided discussion 
would not have created the required “myth of objectivity” (Davies, 2009, p. 112) that 
allows some discursive space for ideologically safe counter-conduct which does not 
disturb the imperatives of neoliberalism, and it bolsters the inherent claim that The Irish 
Times speaks for society.   
 
Indeed, Faughnan’s pronouncements in the Lally and McAleer (2011) article conflate 
the interests of motorists with those of “the public”, before the authorised counter-
conducts he describes are funnelled into “safe ideological harbours” (Storey, 1998).  
Involved in what he calls “the debates about the introduction of the cameras” (Lally and 
McAleer, 2011), the AA’s spokesperson sets out the circumference of socially-
acceptable counter-conduct.  Exclusively authorised are specific debates about the 
location of the cameras, the inconsistent speeds which seem to trigger them, and the 
perception that they are primarily for the purposes of revenue generation.  However, 
Faughnan immediately distances the AA from this third point, reiterating the “fact”, as 
the Gardai and The Irish Times themselves had done already, that “the contract is for 
hours worked and bears no relationship to how many fines are issued”.  According to 
Faughnan, there had been arguments for the cameras to be self-financing, but the AA 
was against this.  This does implicitly confirm that the cameras can be used for revenue 
generation, however.  The debate on the self-financing issue, Faughnan underlines, was 
secured not on the basis of the life-saving potential of the cameras, but on the basis of 
the economic cost of fatalities:  
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The argument that clinched it was the work done by Peter Bacon on the 
economic cost of a road death.  He estimated that it cost the economy about €3 
million, while each speed fine netted about €80 to the state…If a speed camera 
prevents one death happening, its economic benefit is greater than 37,500 
speeding fines, so the Government savings are made through saving lives, not 
speeding fines.  (Lally and McAleer, 2011) 
 
Read (2009, p. 28) argues that in neoliberalism “[e]verything for which human beings 
attempt to realize their ends, from marriage, to crime, to expenditures on children, can 
be understood ‘economically’ according to a particular calculation of cost for benefit”.  
It appears here that death should be understood in this way too.  Faughnan’s words 
exemplify the “active encouragement of competitive and entrepreneurial modes of 
relation across the public and commercial sectors” (Gilbert, 2013, p. 12), because they 
articulate death in terms of cost-benefit and its effect on the bottom line of government 
spending, a key index of Ireland’s “competitiveness” with respect to trade and business.  
This points to a consensus in which programmes’ veracity (and legitimacy) are checked 
for their logic against neoliberal criteria.   
 
That expert authority in advanced liberalism becomes detached “from the apparatus of 
political rule” and relocated into “a market governed by the rationalities of competition, 
accountability and consumer demand” has already been explored in this thesis (Rose, 
1993, p. 285).  And while it has just been shown how the rationalities of the market 
have again been imposed in relation to the cost-benefits of speed cameras, as part of the 
Policy Advisory Panel to the RSA (RSA, 2007, p. 93) Faughnan also exemplifies how 
authority of expertise has become detached from the state.  He represents the motorist in 
expert form; the motorist whose views are further conflated as the views of the public, 
but actually emanate from the commercial entity that is the AA.  Faughnan joins the 
pantheon of expertise surrounding the Road Safety Strategy that includes individuals 
such as Gay Byrne, Noel Brett, and Noel Dempsey, who are authorised to articulate 
rational solutions to road safety issues.  In such mainstream reporting, Faughnan is 
ritualistically wheeled-out as the voice of the homogenous and reasonable motorist and 
his job is to construct a very particular type of authorised counter-conduct around the 
introduction of the cameras.  In this process, objections are choreographed into 
acceptable issues (the safe ideological harbours of Storey [1998]) that take the existence 
of the cameras and the normative context of automobility for granted.  Faughnan creates 
the appearance of robust debate and negotiation for consent on these issues and suggests 
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easily managed counter-conducts that citizens can debate – for example in relation to 
the positioning of the Garda cameras vans.   
 
In this section, it has been shown that neoliberal governance strategies about the 
management of resistance or counter-conduct involves the articulation of a pre-figured 
consensus in which state and corporate agency, for example, is denied.  The problematic 
issue of the privatisation of law enforcement is constructed as a status quo and 
potentially contentious issues about the use of public funds are deflected.  Debate about 
the introduction of the cameras is safeguarded from viewpoints that run counter to a 
neoliberal consensus which encompasses state actors, intermediaries such as the RSA, 
as well as GoSafe, and “the public”.  The consensus is reinforced by the setting-out of a 
common-sense narrative in which authorised counter-conducts are delineated.  But these 
never threaten the existence of the camera network itself and actual resistance to their 
introduction becomes conflated with the acts of criminals and ultimately dissident 
republicans.  Delineating the consensus that the camera network is necessary expands 
the analysis of how neoliberal ideals manifest in the mainstream media.  This consensus 
is not so much about saving lives, but instead represents the description of a new market 
in which entrepreneurial behaviours can be cultivated; one where what were previously 
government agencies can be managed in new neoliberal ways (Slater and Tonkiss, 
2001; Barnett, 2010; Gilbert, 2013).  
 
Disrupting the consensus 
 
Lally and McAleer (2011) go beyond straight reportage to editorialise about how online 
constructions of van-burning stories differ to The Irish Times’ own – or to the 
mainstream consensus that The Irish Times is implicated in constructing in the above 
analysis.  Sometimes the consensus is not quite so easily delineated, however.  For 
example, a thread on the motoring forum of boards.ie entitled “Gaybo does it again.  Is 
there no stopping this dinosaur windbag?” (boards.ie, 2011b) discusses reasons for the 
decline in road traffic accident deaths.  It links to an Irish Independent article reporting 
Gay Byrne’s comments as Chairperson of the Road Safety Authority that reductions in 
the number of Traffic Corps Garda meant that “the general view is that overall 
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enforcement is down and the bad behaviour is starting to return” (Kelpie, 2011)21.  In 
the article, which appeared on page 4 of the Irish Independent published on the 29th of 
December, 2011 (figure 9), an assistant Garda Commissioner disagrees with Byrne’s 
view, saying that his assessment was crude and that the Gardai had investigated 
“smarter” methods of enforcing Road Traffic legislation: “Yes, resources are reducing”, 
the Commissioner says, “but over the last couple of years we’ve looked at smarter ways 
of doing our business on the roads”.  He subsequently adds that Byrne’s comments 
didn’t “do credit to the great work that is done, not just by An Garda Siochana but by all 
of the agencies involved in making our roads safer”.  The article goes on to detail the 
events surrounding the deaths of seven people in separate road traffic accidents that 
week.  Byrne’s failing is that he hasn’t quite grasped the ground rules of market 
competition in neoliberalism, in which initiatives such as the speed cameras can 
“increase efficiency and productivity, improve quality, and reduce costs…through 
reduction of the tax burden” (Harvey, 2005, p. 65).  His resistance is checked by the 
Commissioner against neoliberal criteria and his logic is found wanting.  A major plank 
of the “smarter” methods the Commissioner refers to is the introduction of the speed 
enforcement cameras.   Such smarter policing methods in turn facilitate cost reductions 
in policing, particularly in the area of the numbers required for traffic enforcement22. 
                                                          
21 Byrne’s comments were originally made in the previous days Irish Independent in a 
column written by Byrne himself which was headlined “Fewer gardai on roads means 
more dead bodies” (Byrne, 2011). 
 
22 This analysis also highlights how market imperatives for the cameras’ introduction 
already explored in The Irish Times coverage around their launch is not restricted to The 
Irish Times itself.  
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Figure 9: Irish Independent, Page 4, 29th December, 2011 
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Byrne’s comments, when viewed in terms of counter-conduct, illustrate how 
“subjection” is characterised by “conflict, contestation and instability” (McKee, 2009, p. 
474) and how counter-conducts can be constitutive of the dispositif of road safety.  
Rather than simply toeing the official line, Byrne actually contests the actions of other 
official actors and goes on to suggest the general consequences that will result from the 
cutting back of Garda resources.  Of course, Byrne’s role as the then Chairman of the 
RSA affirms the legitimacy he has to contest the plans of other public bodies involved 
in road safety where he perceives it to impact on the effectiveness of the RSA.  
However, his authority in that role is contingent upon the presumption that his symbolic 
capital as the once most prominent broadcaster in Ireland readily converts into currency 
in the entirely different area of road safety.  Further, the credibility or authority of 
Byrne’s comments is predicated upon the myth of a centre to society for which, as a 
media figure, he can speak (Couldry, 2003; 2012).  Byrne’s celebrity authorises him to 
represent and know the mind of the general public (“the general view is…”, he says), 
but this is a myth constructed and endorsed by the RSA and ritually reiterated in 
mainstream media representations.   
 
In these contexts, official actors such as Byrne and the assistant Garda Commissioner 
compete to speak for the “true” centre of society, pointing to how the constitution of the 
networks of automobility is never straightforward.  Gilbert (2013, p. 7) notes that the 
diversity and complexity of the broad family of neoliberal ideas leads some to argue it 
to be incoherent notion.  The contradictions between Byrne and the Garda 
Commissioner mean there is no “absolute uniformity of a pure doctrine” in their 
statements (Gilbert 2013, p. 8), but they can be considered together in terms of the 
messiness of realpolitik (McKee, 2009).  This exemplifies how governing is 
characterised by the “contradictions, complexities and inconsistencies” that Flint (2002, 
p. 621) argued (also see Foucault 1972, p. 134).  What binds Byrne’s and the 
Commissioner’s sentiments together in neoliberalism is that while the latter embraces 
the rationalisations the cameras enable for policing, the former is merely debating the 
efficacy of imposing these cut-backs on the Garda Traffic Corps rather than somewhere 
else.  Acceptance that cutbacks are necessary or a given is presupposed in both cases 
(“The country is bankrupt”, as Byrne notes [Kelpie, 2011]).   
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While the consensus about the cameras is never threatened by Byrne’s intervention, it 
can be undermined by user-generated content on internet forums that disregards the 
mainstream media construction of certain views around the introduction of the networks 
as unacceptable, for example.  As already argued, including casual statements such as 
comments on internet fora assists the ability to analyse the role of counter-conduct and 
how programmers’ visions are negotiated by agency.  Indeed, a close examination of 
another thread on boards.ie entitled “Another speed camera van burned!!” (boards.ie, 
2011a; figure 10) shows the apparent consensus about the cameras to be undermined by 
opinions and issues that have no echo in mainstream media representation.  The thread 
includes the views of posters who think the perpetrators of van burning are “scumbags” 
that should be imprisoned (boards.ie, 2011a).  Other contributors to the same thread 
view the burning of vans as the logical extension of the rolling out of safety cameras 
(one poster asks: “what did you expect?”) and sympathise with the motivations of the 
perpetrators: “Whoever done it should be given a medal!”.  Many qualify their positions 
as being against the vans, but also against the motives of the perpetrators.  Some admit 
to speeding or other illegality:  “I speed regularly, in conditions and on roads that I think 
are safe to go faster than the speed limit in.  I'm not a fan of the vans. I haven't been 
caught yet, and hope not to be. But Jeebus – burning a vehicle that you know has a 
person inside?”   
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Figure 10: boards.ie, Motors forum:  “Another speed camera van burned!!”, 9th April, 
2011. 
 
A number of posters profess knowledge of GoSafe, sympathise with those who work for 
the company or try to distance the camera operators from a belief in their work, or in 
other ways empathise with the workers’ plight: “i know the drivers and they wud be 
happy to get out and walk away and leave them to it, the crap wages there on they cudnt 
care less about a van”.  As the thread develops, some posters offer opinions on the 
“real” role of the cameras; that is, the belief that they are there to generate revenue 
rather than improve safety:  “these things are just another money grabbing exercise by 
our disgrace of a government.  Anyone who thinks they’re for safety is living on planet 
jedward”. 
 
Others add that it would be better if the vans were operated by the Gardai:  “I doubt 
people would be inclined to burn them [in that case]”.  On the forum, the debate 
broadens out to include the merits and demerits of privatised enforcement and the 
discussion loops around to questions of recession and austerity, containing intertextual 
references to those discourses:  
179 
 
with all thats happened in the last few years, with the banks and people losing 
their jobs and maybe their homes. and families losing their children to 
emigration, and business closing down everywhere, well, i think its one thing 
too much to accept private companies policing our roads. 
 
What is seen in this thread is connectivity being established between interventions such 
as speed cameras and wider discourses of economy and society that are generally absent 
in the mainstream media representations explored above, although this does feature in 
Byrne’s criticism of the cut-backs to the Garda Traffic Corps.  These wider discourses 
underpin an opposition that quickly develop between those who articulate 
responsibilization discourses – arguing that fines generated by the cameras are 
avoidable if one doesn’t speed – and those who consider the privatisation of the cameras 
as ideologically questionable.  This opposition is visible in the following extracts, each 
taken from different individual posters, where those who are suspicious of the cameras 
create wider connections between the cameras and public/private entity actions that 
penalise ordinary citizens for the boom-time behaviours of powerful business and 
government entities:  
 
The speed vans are just another symbol of what's rotten in the governance of this 
country.  
 
…these things are just another money grabbing exercise by our disgrace of a 
government.  
 
I'm paying to bail out the banks as well…There is no way those camera vans 
should be allowed to engage in blatant profiteering at the expense of the already 
over taxed motorist.  
 
Sure isn't there signs up on roads where the vans are? If a person gets caught its 
their own fault, fools.  
 
If you dont like the USC maybe move. 
If you dont like water charges maybe take control of the situation yourself to cut 
down costs (water butts etc.) 
If you dont like getting fined for speeding then dont speed. 
All the options are in your hands and under your control so no point giving out 
about it really...just get on with life and be happy.  
 
This final comment suggests absolute acceptance of the individualised neoliberal 
responsibilization discourses and conceptions of human self-hood.  However, the poster 
does not express “a resigned compliance” with neoliberal programmes nor explicitly 
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reject its ideology, as Gilbert (2013, p. 13) suggests is the most common relation to 
neoliberalism.  In fact neoliberalism is embraced by this poster, who takes consolation 
that the adverse consequences of neoliberalism are natural and “what life is really like” 
(Gilbert, 2013, p. 15).    
 
Taken together, however, this analysis of online discussion shows a wider conception of 
the implications in the safety camera debate than allowed for in the mainstream media 
framing.  Compared to The Irish Times coverage, much more credence is given to 
viewpoints which illustrate Keohane, Kuhling, and Horgan’s (2002, p. 49) observation 
that, in Ireland, “a general feature of postcolonial cultural legacy can be the state’s 
inability to enforce the law due to an evasive and subversive attitude to rules and 
regulations and to the law in general”.   
 
There is much greater acceptance online of a reality that the cameras are primarily 
revenue generators, whatever the truth of that argument.  There is also debate about the 
implications of privatised enforcement that is not seen in mainstream media 
representation.  This attachment to wider discourses of the recession does not inhere to 
the mainstream mediation around the launch of the cameras either.  Of course, there is 
always a problem in highlighting the positions of a narrow minority of people on 
internet fora, who may post their viewpoints vociferously because of the relative 
anonymity of the internet.  Nevertheless, the ease with which angles on the speed 
camera debate not covered in the mainstream media emerge on these sites is indicative 
of the greater complexity of counter-conducts (and even aligned practices) within the 
road safety dispositif compared to the suggestions of mainstream representation.   
 
Despite Gay Byrne’s disrupting comments in the Irish Independent, a social consensus 
is still constructed by mainstream media around the issue of safety cameras.  In The 
Irish Times, competing viewpoints are simplified and an equivalence is drawn between 
being against the cameras and the destruction of the vans.  Nevertheless, this analysis 
has shown how official actors such as Byrne go on to be implicated in counter-conducts 
beyond that initially allowed for in the assumed consensus constructed by The Irish 
Times.  Analysis of online debate reinforces the impression that the pre-settlement of 
resistance around speed cameras is a mainstream-media created myth that works to 
inhibit discussion of nuanced opinions and counter-conducts about the legitimacy of the 
cameras.  Together what has been shown so far is how mediated articulations of 
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consensus and counter-conduct illustrate the programmers’ visions for automobility and 
neoliberalism as they are actually discursively represented.  But the lived reality – how 
consensus and counter-conduct emerge and circulate as part of commuter practice – has 
yet to be explored.  
 
 
Aligned practices, counter-conducts and the commute 
 
To properly explore “the extent to which…political ambitions have been realised in 
practice” (McKee, 2009, p. 473), the material practices that also constitute the context 
in which strategies and discourses about speed cameras circulate must also be 
considered.  Among the challenges, limitations, and critiques of governmentality 
research is that it tends to draw on mediation or textual representations only (McKee, 
2009).  Although material practices were incorporated into Foucault’s conceptualisation 
of discourses, much post-Foucauldian research, including works by Dean (1995) and 
Rose (1999), falls into this category.  But there is a difference between the mediated 
strategies of rule and their actual implementation or operation (McKee, 2009, p. 473) 
and, as has already been seen in the other chapters of primary research, the results of 
strategies of governance cannot simply be read off or assumed from their textual 
representations alone.  Foucault “was concerned with the inherent ability of the subject 
to think and act otherwise” (McKee, 2009, p. 474) and it is only by getting closer to 
practices, as has been the case in the other chapters of primary research, that this 
concern can begin to be addressed.   
 
The practices explored in this section relate to reflections on activities and rituals 
commuters observe in the space of the car on their way to or from work and home.  This 
is an additional way of thinking about the conduct of conduct in automobility and its 
relationship to governance.  My focus group’s experiences illustrate how the agencies of 
driving become absorbed in what is required and afforded by the space of and time 
spent in commuting.  They encompass events and activities that occur inside the car and 
focus attention on the ways in which the car affords, shapes, or conditions the 
performance or production of particular activities.  These activities can frequently be 
viewed as normative behaviours.  But as normative behaviours they are not always 
practices aligned with the programmers’ visions for automobility such as those of the 
dispositif of road safety promulgated through the mainstream media, so they can often 
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simultaneously constitute counter-conducts.  Conversations with commuters in the 
previous two chapters already implicitly illustrate what people “do” in the their cars 
while commuting and exemplify how people negotiate specific strategies of road safety 
and responsibilization, as well as how they rationalise the inevitability and the benefits 
of car commuting for their own ends.  Some of these rationalisations speak of implicit 
counter-conducts around the uses that are made of the car in practice.  Perhaps because 
of being ordinary and unremarkable (Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Moran, 2005), the commute 
produces a tendency towards the performance of other practices within the car space to 
fill the time.  However, many of these activities can be recast as forms of work and it is 
these work-related practices and counter-conducts that are concentrated on in this 
section.   
 
For Laurier (2005), driving on the motorway is not enough “to fully occupy the locus of 
accountable activity that is an intelligible and reflective actor” (2005, p. 263).  Laurier, 
et al., 2008, p. 26) note that: “There are all manner of social phenomena occurring 
during the journey that are worthy of the attention of those interested in how mobile life 
happens while in motion”.  Moran (2005, p. 60) argues that: “The unremarked, repeated 
acts of commuting do not encourage us to reflect on their relationship to wider factors 
such as public policy, planning, investment and corporate culture – their location, in 
other words, within workspace”.  Considering Laurier’s (2005; Laurier, et al., 2008) and 
Moran’s (2005) words helps us explore the ways in which the activities undertaken in 
the car underscore and facilitate the needs of “workspace”.  As identified by Laurier 
(2005, p. 263), commuters, whether employees or students, work “while driving to get 
their work done”.   There are different ways in which the activities carried out while 
commuting by car can be considered as work:  travelling to and from jobs or performing 
actual job-related tasks in the car through the use of mediating technologies such as 
mobile phones can be considered forms of work.  Some activities carried out in the car, 
including the psychological processing of the working day, can enable more efficient or 
effective work in other locations (e.g. the home or office) or enable leisure and family 
life and thus underscore the ability to sustain productivity.  The ways in which some of 
these commuting practices, and counter-conducts associated with them, reproduce the 
exigencies of workspace in contemporary neoliberal society are now explored.  These 
activities represent antagonistic interrelationships or accommodations between the 
strategies of the programmers of automobility and the programmers of neoliberal 
economy and society.  
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Working in the car 
 
Commuters in my focus groups often use the car as an adjunct to their work or study 
space.  For some this involves work phone calls (Barry, f1; Graham, f4; Kevin, f6) 
where the car becomes the “extension of the office” (Graham, f4; also Fiona and Barry, 
f1).  For Graham (f4) this is particularly important on the way home at the end of the 
day when he can talk to colleagues in the US whose working day is only beginning.  
Emer (f3), a student, notes the car is “my capsule, my office – my mobile office…I have 
all my books all stacked up”.  Emer reveals that she has also started to tape her lectures 
and that she used time in the car to listen to them: “Some of them are quite heavy stuff 
and you need to listen to them a few times to get a grasp of it, you know?…So that fills 
that hour completely” (Emer, f3).  Emer also uses flash cards to test her knowledge of 
subjects as she commutes.  For Barry and Fiona (f1) working in the car means less time 
needs to be spent in the office: 
 
Fiona: So you would probably spend longer in the office if you had to make all 
those calls.  Whereas the commute on the way home is “work” really. 
 
Barry: Actually that’s a very good point. I would rarely –  or I try to avoid 
taking a phone call in the office because it just kills time.  When I’m in the car 
I’ll ring them back.  Over the years,it’s a clever thing to do. (Fiona and Barry, 
f2) 
 
The car better facilitates the work day compared to public transport for Beth (f2) 
because it means she doesn’t have to bring additional clothing – such as a coat or 
runners – that would be required for commuting on the Dart in bad weather: 
 
It’s also wardrobe related...And I also carry a laptop with me a lot of the time.  
So it’s a whole kind of palaver basically.  Then you’d have to change out of the 
wet clothes when you get to work…You have to change your shoes…you have 
to change your tights – it’s an issue.  (Beth, f2) 
 
While for Caroline (f7) the car also supplements her normal study space as a student, 
other students found it too uncomfortable for this purpose (Tony, f7) or felt they didn’t 
spend enough time commuting to make it feasible: “I’m not one of those people that 
lives….in the car” (Therese, f8).  On the whole though, commuters try to use their 
commuting time as productively as possible (it’s so boring…I have to make it work 
[Emer, f4]).  For many, this involves the planning of activities for the day or after the 
commute is over (“I would plan things: ‘Oh yeah when I get home I can do that’” (Don, 
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f1).  Beth (f2) noted: “[It’s] a chance to plan the day ahead – and a chance to focus on 
work after home stuff – so all the way in, dedicated work stuff – planning…I like it as a 
good way to start the day”.  For Fiona, once the kids were dropped off, the remaining 
commute time could be used to relax – and plan “I would have an hour of a commute to 
work.  It was so relaxing in my own space with just me there.  And I could think-out the 
whole day, plan work plan everything.  It was probably the only quietness that I had” 
(Fiona, f1).  Working from the car facilitated not only the work day, but also its 
perceived ending, as well as enabling leisure time activities after the work day is over.  
As Barry (f1) notes:  “I ring Fiona and see what the line-up is for the evening”.   
 
For Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 320), driving a car is an experience “that becomes 
entwined…in everyday practice such that it becomes ordinary and the re-orientation of 
the body to the rest of the world ceases to be remarkable in itself” and a sense of that is 
evident in commuters’ understandings of their driving practices that have already been 
explored.  It is only when unpacked, when the black-box of commuting is opened, that 
surprisingly complex and sometimes intricate forms of banal and ordinary behaviour 
and self-management come into view.  Commuter practices can be considered ordinary 
in the sense of ranking lower in a hierarchy of concerns, because they are normally not 
reflected upon, but they are also ordinary in the sense of “correct or standard, shared by 
everyone”, even though they are performed individually (Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Moran, 
2005, p. 17).  Once attuned to the requirements and the possibilities of the commute, 
many of these practices that the car enables become routinized for commuters, as 
Merleau-Ponty (1962) argues, but over time they effectively also become compulsory 
for them too (Urry, 2005).  Commuting by car is therefore strongly suggestive of 
Foucault’s (1984c, p. 169) argument that sometimes: 
 
What characterizes power is the fact that it is a strategic relation which has been 
stabilized through institutions.  So the mobility in power relations is limited, and 
there are strongholds that are very, very difficult to suppress because they have 
been institutionalized and are now very pervasive in courts, codes and so on.  
All this means that strategic relations of people are made rigid.  
 
This is not to suggest that such contestation is impossible, but there is a general lack of 
resistance to the requirement to commute per se from research participants.  What is 
actually seen in the data is how counter-conduct manifests to constitute commuting by 
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countering other (neoliberal) interventions into automobility – such as strategies within 
the dispositif of road safety – where these are perceived to threaten practices involving 
cars that more directly reproduce the programmers’ vision for neoliberal sociality.  It is 
within this normative yet complex context that counter-conducts manifest.  Counter-
conducts tend to reinforce, rather than undermine, the actual requirement to commute by 
car to work, at the expense of the requirement to commute by car safely.  It is in this 
sense that they are “counter”.  In this, the complex operation of human agency on the 
ways in which programmes (and the programmers’ visions) are implemented is 
glimpsed (McKee, 2009, p. 474).   
 
For example, commuters struggle to accommodate what is required of them when the 
pressures of work and their private lives are combined within the context of what 
neoliberalism and automobility makes necessary and desirable (Stewart, 2001; pp. 18-
19).  Whether their commuting journeys were long (equivalent to a day a week Fiona, 
f1; Kevin, f6; Emer, f3) or short, commuting made commuters pushed for time, 
corresponding with Bauman’s (1998 cited in Keohane, Kuhling, and Horgan, 2002, p 
.50) analysis of globalisation effects where  “first world” commuters are constantly 
busy.  These time constraints produce combinations of actions – such as eating, actual 
work, and planning while driving – that are carried out in the car space but are not 
necessarily easily accommodated by it.  For Keohane, Kuhling, and Horgan (2002, p. 
50), the driving culture of commuting’s “commitment to a very particular economy of 
time” results in people being “nudged” out of the way on the road by faster moving 
traffic.  Further manifestations of this time-compression phenomenon resulted in 
commuters drinking their mug of tea or coffee while driving (Emer, f3; Caroline, f7), 
“stuffing their face” in the car (Tony, f7), or maximising the extra time that emerged 
when the requirement to leave home early to avoid the traffic paradoxically resulted in 
extra time at one’s destination (“I get in early and I have a flask” [Emer, f3]).   
 
Commuters also capitalise on the opportunistic time-segments that could emerge from 
the infrastructural management of traffic flows within any given journey.  As Therese 
(f8) notes: “at the traffic lights, if I know I’m going to be stopped for a couple of 
minutes I probably take a sup of coffee or something like that ”.  Laurier (2005, p. 266) 
says that in situations like these “mobile workers…make assessments as to…whether 
they have to stick to driving alone”.  Again, these types of activities have “not been 
designed to go together” in the car, yet workers “managed to artfully combine them” 
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(Laurier, 2005, p. 262).  That this is learned behaviour is also indicated by commuters 
whose conceptualisation of driving and commuting differs from the reality that emerged 
once the use of a car became commonplace for them: 
 
When I got my car I was like “nobody is eating in my car ever” and now I’m 
regularly found going between locations, trying to grab a sandwich or something 
as I sit at the side of the road in the hard shoulder or a McDonald’s drive-
through or whatever – because I’m so far out as well. (Susan, f8) 
 
These activities and behaviours, while helping enable programmers’ visions for a 
neoliberal society, can very clearly be considered as counter-conduct in terms of the 
programmers’ vision for automobility and the dispositif of road safety: a cursory 
internet search reveals instances where activities such as eating while driving are 
construed as “counter” to media-centric discourses of road safety.  Local news reports 
detail drivers being fined for eating and drinking (non-alcoholic) beverages at the wheel 
(Leinster Leader, 2008; Wexford People, 2012).  A survey from AA Motor Insurance 
covered in thejournal.ie reports a spokesman as saying “you certainly shouldn’t be 
fumbling with the cup while you are on the move.  A simple incident like the lid coming 
off and coffee spilling could become disastrous” (Wade, 2011).  Other behaviours cited 
in the same survey as “distracting” include reading while driving, changing clothes, and 
brushing hair (Wade, 2011).   
 
In another example, a handbook on safe driving for work cautions (in capital letters) 
“Never eat and drive at the same time” (Health and Safety Authority, An Garda 
Siochana, and RSA, 2012, p. 27).  Liberty Insurance (2014) advises drivers to “Eat 
before your journey or pull over to a safe place before snacking”.  The Rules of the Road 
(RSA, 2013), does not list eating while driving as a separate, specific offence.  
However, “careless driving” is an offence, punishable by mandatory court appearance, 
penalty points and a court fine upon conviction.  This catch-all transgression was added 
to the penalty points system in 2004, when it was reported that “doing virtually anything 
inside your car, except driving it, could cost unwary drivers five precious points” (Reid, 
2004).  As such, it can be seen that sometimes commuter work can yield multi-faceted 
and counter-productive activities in relation to specific aspects of governmentality.  
Automobility requires “intense flexibility” (Urry, 2005, p. 28) and the efficient 
maximisation of time and space for successful living, but the programmes and processes 
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that guide conduct in specific spheres sometimes conflict with neoliberalism’s overall 
exigencies, forcing us to negotiate ad hoc pathways.   
 
This situation represents, in part, how neoliberal power relations are maintained in the 
face of the contingent choice-making of its subjects.  And it also underlines how 
resistance as counter-conduct constitutes automobility in the face of media-centric 
assumptions about the media’s power to effect strategies of governance (Couldry 2003; 
2012).  Here, a sense of the “gulf between policy rhetoric, implementation and 
practices” and why “outcomes are often partial, uneven, and unpredictable” is 
understood, and the contingency (rather than effectiveness) of some power relations in 
automobility can be seen (Flint, 2002, p. 621).  Together, what aligned and counter 
practices describe is how automobility is comprised of “sites of complex processes of 
domination, resistance and also appropriation” that constitute power relations which are 
never fully settled (Foucault, 1976; Matereke, 2013, p. 38).  The flexible, multi-tasking 
worker has many options with what to do with their time in the car but such choice 
creates a kind of tyranny (c.f. Schwartz, 2006, p. 7).  As Urry (2005, p. 28) puts it, 
automobility: 
 
forces people to juggle fragments of time so as to deal with the temporal and 
spatial constraints that it itself generates.  Automobility is a Frankenstein-created 
monster, extending the individual into realms of freedom and flexibility whereby 
inhabiting the car can be positively viewed and energetically campaigned and 
fought for, but also constraining car “users” to live their lives in spatially 
stretched and time-compressed ways.  The car is the literal “iron cage” of 
modernity, motorized, moving and domestic.   
 
The struggle for work and leisure time 
 
Though it is easy to imagine how stressful the commute can become given the 
negotiations it necessities and the complexity it represents, it can also be seen how 
many commuters in fact use their space and time commuting to relax and recuperate 
from the stresses of home and work life.  This manifests in an array of comments that 
show remarkable agreement across the sessions.  These include: “you just want your 
own space” (Barry, f1); “space to myself sometimes” (Fiona, f1); “People like their 
space in the car” (Don, f1); “it’s my space” (Beth, f2); “it’s just your time” (Brian, f2); 
“That’s my peace and quiet – everybody go away”  (Geraldine f2); “It’s the only time 
when you get any peace and quiet in your own thoughts” (Michelle, f4); “It’s my space, 
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you know?” (Declan, f6); “I’d see it as a kind of sanctuary” (Tony, f7) and “I’m in my 
own personal little bubble” (Colm, f8).  As Michelle (f4) also notes:  “It’s an hour and a 
half no matter what I do so I may as well turn it into something that I’m actually 
enjoying”.  The peace and quiet sought in the car also clearly facilitated the better 
performance of work for commuters.  Michelle (f4) delineated this point directly: 
 
Definitely you leave work sometimes and you’re still thinking through all of the 
problems, and actually I’ve found if you try to push yourself to find a solution 
and it doesn’t come, often when you’re wondering home thinking of something 
else, you think “ah well that was it – that’s what I should have done at 12 
o’clock today (laughs) to solve that”. 
 
It is clear commuters’ comments represent normative behaviours, enabling and 
reinforcing neoliberal exigencies of work in late capitalism, while also reinforcing 
individualised freedom discourses around car consumption (Packer, 2008).  However, 
these practices can again conflict with other specific discourses and programmers’ 
visions for automobility.  The construction of the car by commuters as a personal, 
peaceful space shapes opinions on car-sharing for example, practices around which 
commuters generally held negative views that run counter to policies governments can 
be keen to promote in order to sustain mobility.  Barry and Pauline (f1) opine that 
sharing the car with others resulted in the loss of this personal space that is so attractive 
to commuters: 
 
Barry: Well you know you’ve got, let’s say, a stranger in the car and you want 
to… listen to something on the radio.  Or you don’t want to talk…And you’ve 
Joe Bloggs sitting in the seat beside you. 
 
Pauline: It depends who it is I suppose, if you’re good friends with them, then 
it’s grand, but if you don’t really know them that well, if it’s just a colleague it 
might be a bit uncomfortable. 
 
Barry: Yeah but carpooling…It’s fine the odd time, but on a Monday to Friday 
(basis), ah forget it.  
 
Brian (f2) agrees that the presence of others could be disconcerting: “If there’s 
somebody in that space – you’re going: “Wha?  What the hell is that person doing in my 
car?!”  For Beth (f2) car-sharing was constructed in terms of the invasion of the space 
they had so keenly carved out as their own.  Clare (f9) also notes: “I don’t know. I like 
when you’re on your own you can listen to whatever CD you want to listen to.  Or 
you’re not worried that – are they really –  Do they hate this CD?”  Indeed, some 
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commuters are quick to offer explanations as to why car-sharing doesn’t work.  
Michelle (f4) argues there was no-one in her work that lived near her to share with, 
while Pauline (f1), David (f4) and Declan (f6) note the potential that car-sharing has for 
making you late.  Clare (f9), who gives a lift to another student, also notes the potential 
for delays involved in car-sharing and said that she becomes distracted when others 
were in the car.   
 
Yet the National Transport Authority’s (NTA) Draft Transport Strategy for Dublin 
(2012, p. 152), which covers policies designed to limit growth in car traffic over the 
next 15 years includes “lift sharing initiatives to reduce single occupancy car use”.  The 
NTA website on car-sharing aims at creating “smarter travel workplaces” and has 
signed up a number of organisations and institutions in Ireland including Maynooth 
University and Symantec – “one of the world’s largest software companies” 
(carsharing.ie, 2014).  The first benefit of car-sharing listed is that it “saves you 
money” including reduced fuel costs, road tolls and parking, as well as reducing “wear 
and tear on you your vehicle…less maintenance, a longer car life and fewer repairs” 
(carsharing.ie, 2104).  So as well as articulating neoliberal rationality in the promotion 
of car-sharing (because, for example, this can be understood “according to a particular 
calculation of cost for benefit” [Read, 2009, p. 28]), carsharing.ie neatly undermines 
the representation of freedom that is the (neo)liberal mediated frame of the car.  It does 
this by promoting car-sharing as part of the “production of an apparatus that sustains 
increased mobility” (Packer, 2008, p. 8).  Combined with the counter-conducts of 
commuters in resisting concepts such as car-sharing, what is again shown the 
“complexities and inconsistencies” and the contingency that can inhere to governance 
(Flint, 2002, p. 621).  But such counter-conducts do not worry the programmers’ vision 
for neoliberal society – in terms of the over-arching neoliberal subjectivity in which an 
“individualistic conception of human selfhood” overrides other considerations (Gilbert, 
2013, p. 11).   
 
Even further complexity is evident here, however.  Laurier, et al. (2008, p. 21) considers 
car-sharing as work in itself and argues for the need to understand what it is that makes 
it such a “perilous obligation” if it is to be encouraged.  Indeed, the widespread 
assumption that car-sharing is fraught with social danger forms the premise upon which 
the humour of the TV series Peter Kay’s Car Share (2015), for example, is predicated 
upon and built.  But for my study’s commuters, part of car-sharing’s peril derives from 
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its potential to also undermine a different kind of work: the way in which the car 
facilitates this psychological “processing” of the working day.  This form of 
responsibilization encompasses thinking or planning tasks, the relaxation practices that 
have been seen, or even singing along to the radio.  “Processing” such as this (or indeed 
any other work done in the car) is disrupted or threatened when the need to car-share 
presents itself, though it is not necessarily mutually exclusive of car-sharing per se.  To 
foreground the work that is done on ourselves in the car is to emphasise this as an 
important facilitation of the sustained successful performance of jobs or careers (and 
private lives) in neoliberalism.  Though unpaid, the space for the performance of this 
work is fought for and defended from threat by these commuters (Urry, 2005).  What is 
shown is how “the time we pass in the car is of value in other significant ways beyond, 
or parallel to, the necessary reductions of traditional economic models” (Laurier, et al., 
2008, p. 26), while facilitating the operation of such models in practice.  Yet the 
connectivity of this “processing” accomplished in the car to workspace is a generally 
unremarked upon facet of the reproduction of life-as-it-is.  This also illustrates the way 
in which social relations are made up of normative behaviours which are in turn 
constituted by both aligned practices and counter-conducts.   
 
Moreover, for working commuters, their practices in the car constitute a struggle 
between actual working time – what is allowed as the maximum duration allocated to a 
company’s amassing of surplus labour and value – and leisure time.  This is a struggle 
with consequences, not least for people’s private lives, but potentially for health and 
wellbeing.  The struggle is nothing new, however, although the car produces particular 
manifestations of it as has been shown.  Karl Marx, albeit writing about the second 
industrial revolution, argued that “the capitalist has bought labour power at its day-rate” 
(Marx, 2011, p. 120) and that “the working day contains the full 24 hours” (2011, p. 
290).  Marx (2011, p. 292) found that capitalist production, in seeking to extend the 
working day as far as possible, produces: 
 
not only the deterioration of human labour-power by robbing it of its normal, 
moral and physical conditions of development and function.  It produces also the 
premature exhaustion and death of this labour-power itself.  It extends the 
labourer’s time of production during a given periods by shortening his actual 
life-time.  
 
Many writers have emphasised the utility of Marx’ analysis to contemporary currents 
and tensions in late capitalism.  Fordist notions of work in Europe and North America, 
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for example, have been replaced by the idea of the “socialized worker”, bringing into 
being “a new epoch in which the factory is increasingly disseminated out in to society 
as a whole” (Gill and Pratt, 2008, p. 5; emphasis in original).  This manifests in 
concepts such as the “social factory” and “the factory without walls” (Negri, 2005), in 
which the entirety of society becomes accessible to capital, concomitant with the 
transformation from the Keynesian to the neoliberal state (Gill and Pratt, 2008, pp. 5– 
6).  Indeed, Read (2009, p. 33) and Negri (2005) point to the a “real subsumption” of 
society in neoliberalism, in which “all subjective potential, the capacity to 
communicate, to feel, to create, to think” is incorporated “into productive powers for 
capital”.   
 
In terms of implications for quality of life, writers such as Ross (2003, p. 19) describe 
how in “no-collar” knowledge industries for example, work has become “recalibrated” 
and incorporates “activities, feelings, and ideas that are normally pursued during 
employee’s free time”: 
 
everything that employees do, think, or say in their waking moments is potential 
grist for the industrial mill...For employees who consolidate office and home, 
who work and play in the same clothes, and whose social life draws heavily on 
their immediate colleagues, there no longer any boundaries between work and 
leisure.   
 
Ross (2003, pp. 50-51) refers to Whyte’s (1960) The Organization Man in which 
American middle-class workers of the Fordist post-war decades were “encouraged to 
find the true meaning of themselves in leisure time and consumption, and where the 
authoritarian workday was a dreary sacrifice that earned them the right to pleasure on 
evenings and weekends”.  This constitutes the antithesis of the contemporary no-collar 
mentality of flexible working environments, flat management structures, and an 
extended working day (epitomised by the Microsoft slogan “we offer flexible time – 
you can work any 18 hours you want” [Ross, 2003, p. 52]).  Indeed, Moran (2005, p. 
39) says that the “decline of formal hierarchies (at work) comes at the cost of increased 
uncertainty about where work begins and ends”.   
 
Commuting is heavily implicated in this blurring of the edges of the workday for my 
participants.  While only one focus group cohort specifically worked in IT industries 
and another cohort worked in financial services, other commuters worked in media, 
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teaching, human resources, and pharmaceuticals, while more were mature students, 
many with part-time jobs.  There is not the scope here to compare the ways in which 
more hierarchical or flat management structures prevail in each of the different sectors 
these commuters worked in, nor to comprehensively analyse the extent to which the 
Irish experience might differ to the American and European ones.  But it is remarkable 
across the work (and study) environments the degree to which “the daily activity of 
reaching that space becomes part of work itself” and how “the commute has become 
workspace” (Moran, 2005, pp. 48-49).   
 
Fraser’s (2001) concept of “job spill”, in which new mobile technologies “turn 
commuting into a form of multi-tasking” (Moran, 2005, p. 49) helps conceptualise the 
forms of labour that emerge in the car.  The idea is developed by Gregg (2011) in the 
concept of “presence bleed” in which technology makes work constantly available and 
possible: 
 
Communication platforms and devices allow work to invade spaces and times 
that were once less susceptible to its presence…firm boundaries between 
personal and professional identities no longer apply.  Presence bleed explains 
the familiar experience whereby the location and time of work become 
secondary considerations faced with a “to do” list that seems forever out of 
control.  It…explains the sense of responsibility workers feel in making 
themselves ready and willing to work beyond paid hours. (Gregg, 2011, pp. 14-
15) 
 
These communication technologies work together with the affordances of commuting to 
constantly reproduce the blurring of boundaries between work and home environments 
and personal and professional identities.  The blurring of boundaries is reproduced by 
way of actual work done in the car, the processing work highlighted here, or the later 
facilitation of work that the flexibility of the car enables, through dropping children to 
school, for example.   
 
Thus, it can again be seen that the behaviours and practices of these commuters, while 
sometimes aligned and sometimes counter to particular discourses of governmentality, 
can nevertheless work to reinforce a general neoliberal social structure.  But rather than 
seeing this as tyranny, commuters view it as a norm and fight to defend the space and 
time spent commuting by car for the purposes of performing aspects of these different 
forms of work (Urry, 2005).  In a sense, what has been shown in this section are the 
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complex ways in which governance is never total, nor power relations never settled 
once and for all in these car-commuting environments.  It has been shown how some 
strategies of governmentality about automobility can be undermined and overtaken by 
other strategies that work to reinforce the exigencies of, or programmers’ visions for, a 
neoliberal society and economy, but in complex and perhaps unforeseeable ways.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored car-commuting and mediation around the introduction of 
safety cameras as sites of counter and aligned conducts that constitute assemblages of 
cars and drivers, the dispositif of road safety, and automobility’s power relationships as 
they are lived.  The exploration of the safety camera network as a disciplinary form of 
power highlighted how the cameras help inculcate the subjectivity required for the self-
regulation of conduct in neoliberalism.  The cameras do not simply create these 
“necessary” behaviours by themselves, however.  As has been shown, mainstream 
media support is marshalled to legitimize the cameras and limit counter-conduct around 
their introduction.  The analysis has shown how the media underscores the legitimacy of 
the camera network through the ritual construction of a common-sense consensus.  The 
elements of the consensus include the denial of private and corporate agency, a denial 
that is belied by newspaper reports that constitute a description of the actual 
complexities of these intermeshing agencies and relationships.  The consensus is also 
built through the channelling of ideologically safe counter-conduct through the AA and 
Conor Faughnan and through the categorization of unauthorised debate alongside the 
activities of criminals and dissidents.  The Irish Times is authorised to speak for 
“everyone” in this consensus, the delineation of which forms an analysis of the ways in 
which neoliberalism surfaces in mainstream print media.  It has been shown that the 
consensus is not so much about road safety per se, but rather the creation and 
maintenance of a new entrepreneurial marketplace that further internalises standards of 
behaviour associated with neoliberal tenets (Barnett, 2010).   
 
Yet neither the disciplinary power of the cameras nor the mainstream consensus can 
simply enact an unproblematic neoliberal reality.  The actuality is much more complex 
and messy and shows how programmers’ visions for automobility and neoliberal 
sociality are formed in “multivocal and decentred” ways (Weir, O’Malley, and 
Shearing, 1997, p. 505).  First, official actors clash over the “correct” way to implement 
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cutbacks that may have an adverse effect on road safety.  But the resulting counter-
conducts of Gay Byrne never threaten the neoliberal imperative because he does not 
question that cutbacks are required, merely disagreeing with where they are being 
imposed.  Next, analysis of online contributions reveals much richer debate around the 
implications of the cameras’ introduction, debate that is dismissed by the mainstream 
consensus created by The Irish Times.  Mainstream media inhibits discussion of 
nuanced opinions and counter-conducts, while pointing to the actual complexity of 
opinion around the issue of the cameras.  Online though, resistance can manifest in the 
expression of opposition to the cameras from boards.ie members, whose discontent 
suggests alternative courses of action which, although perhaps micro in scale and 
destructive at times, represent alternatives to current governing practices.    
 
However, all of the above analysis derives from media forms, albeit from both 
mainstream print sources as well as user-generated content.  The chapter went on to 
analyse commuters’ reflections on their activities in their cars, considered as a form of 
work, both in mediated and non-directly media related contexts.  The messy practices 
described by my focus group participants constitute normative behaviours that both 
align with the programmers’ visions and act as counter-conducts.  Counter-conducts 
occur while commuters struggle to accommodate what is required of them when the 
complex pressures of work and private life are combined within the context of what 
neoliberalism makes necessary and desirable through commuting.  The “work” of these 
commuters included eating in the car, the use of the car as a space to plan the work day 
or leisure time, as well as the need to defend the car as a “processing” and actual work 
space.  All of these behaviours can be considered counter-conduct in the light of 
particular aspects of the programmers’ visions for automobility – the dispositif of road 
safety for example – but help manage the pressing requirements of work, so underscore 
programmers’ vision for neoliberal sociality.  Car-sharing becomes perilous because 
while it might help sustain automobility in a new form, it undermines the imperative to 
use the time and space spent commuting to relax and unwind, to process the working 
day, which itself reinforces the programmers’ vision for neoliberal society.  And the 
time and space to do that psychological processing is fought for by commuters, in the 
face of its encroachment by strategies such as car-sharing, which are also articulated in 
an economic and entrepreneurial fashion.   
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Car-sharing undermines a salient feature of automobility – the maintenance of a 
particular type of individuation (Rajan, 2006) – in which the individual can cut loose on 
the open road (Ingliss, 2005).  Ironically though, the facility to break free becomes 
associated with the maintenance of the ability to continue the tyranny of working.  The 
commute thus becomes an arena in which different, sometimes competing neoliberal 
strategies are actively managed by commuters in complex ways as they struggle to 
negotiate the forms of social action and the boundaries of work and leisure time that 
neoliberal sociality and automobility makes compulsory.  Overall, the chapter describes 
how the agency of users, the media, and the car together shape the form and content of 
social action occurring within it or afforded by it (Dant, 2005).  The picture painted is 
one of a complex interrelationship between official actors and citizens, serious and 
casual statements, mainstream and user-generated media forms, and self-management 
and discipline; all of which together trace the lived reality of automobility and how 
these networks are constituted by counter-conduct.    
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Conclusion: Media-centrism and the complex networks of automobility 
 
This thesis set up the argument that although the Road Safety Strategy outlines the need 
for legislation, enforcement, funding, political commitment, and engineering measures 
in order to make it a success, it relies on an assumption of media-centricity – that the 
mainstream media are central to sociality – to help to transpose policy initiatives into 
practice (Couldry, 2004; 2012).  My contention was that this assumption needed to be 
problematized.  This is not only because policy aspirations are filtered through a 
potentially ambivalent mainstream media and popular culture, but also because they are 
mediated by the users of automobility (Sheller and Urry, 2000; Urry, 2005) who can 
alter proposed actions in practice.  My argument is set into a context in which the 
mediated articulation of policy strategies that seek to ameliorate the car’s problems, as 
well as the everyday meanings of how lives are shaped around it, remain under-
researched, especially in the Irish experience.  This lack remains despite how strongly 
the car signifies modernity and desirability and how its antagonisms are increasingly 
acknowledged (Rajan, 2006; Conley and McLaren, 2009). 
 
I argued it is possible to cut across the institutions and practices that attempt to co-
ordinate a response to the social issue of road safety by considering it as a dispositif – 
an ensemble of disparate discursive and non-discursive elements that have been brought 
together in an attempt to resolve this social problem (Foucault, 1976; Thiele, 1986, p. 
255; Rabinow and Rose, 2003).  Considering road safety as a dispositif has enabled the 
exploration of both strategy documentation and its mediation in a fashion that highlights 
the range of actors involved in the constitution of this apparatus.  However, it was 
argued that the dispositif of road safety also needs to be investigated for how it is lived 
in order to explore the outcomes that actually occur, rather than simply those that are 
planned in advance (Muntigl, 2002).  This is not only because it cannot be assumed that 
the users of automobility will decode policy initiatives in the ways intended (Hall, 
1980).  It is also because of the complexity of social and material networks that 
constitute assemblages of car-drivers and the networks of automobility as they are lived 
in the context of neoliberal governmentality (Foucault, 1978b; Rose, 1999; Dant, 2005; 
Merriman, 2005).  Therefore, my study did not set out to simply check if people 
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understood road safety policy per se.  Instead, it explored the ways in which policy 
understandings are immanent (or not) in how commuters – as users of the socio-
technical system of automobility – articulate how their practices are organised around 
the car.  Each chapter’s particular concerns and focus confirm “the complex networks of 
sociality and materiality” (Merriman, 2005, p. 158) that constitute the dispositif of road 
safety and the networks of automobility as they are lived, problematizing media-
centrism and delineating how the social order of automobility is produced.   
 
Using the mediated policy context of the Donegal accident as a starting point for this 
questioning of assumed relationships between mediation and practices, a very different 
conception of the freedom of the car has been found in Chapter 2.  Freedom, as a liberal 
binary of freedom versus constraint in which the maximisation of individual liberty is a 
key value or ultimate goal that exists in opposition to government, is radically 
reconceptualised.  Instead, while people are extended the freedom to drive, it is 
immediately and systematically linked to (self) government by the requirement for 
responsible action across social practices.  The maintenance of the responsibilized self 
constituted by these discursive constructions entails the distancing of state authority 
from the subject and the re-articulation of expertise in terms of a competitive 
marketplace for road safety.  In this context, ethics and morality become equated with 
economic analysis, underlining the obligation to this very particular kind of neoliberal 
freedom (Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde, 2006).  Commuters articulate received notions 
of the desirability of the freedom the car provides – its potential to enable a breaking 
free from day-to-day responsibilities.  But their descriptions of their own practices show 
just how theoretical such ideas are when constituted within the responsibilities of work, 
study, and family.  Commuters’ freedoms are the product of ongoing dialogues that 
negotiate the requirements of different forms of self-government, as well as the threat of 
discipline that also signals the limit of responsibilization strategies.   
 
The communicative frame of road safety discourses explored throughout this 
dissertation, that construct responsibilization and the economically moral actor as a 
natural centre of “our” values or way of life, is predicated upon an assumption that the 
media’s “natural” stake in this process is to express this nature (Couldry, 2003; Couldry, 
2008a, p. 96).  Certainly, this centrality seems reinforced in the replication by 
commuters of the fiction of the responsibilized subject.  Yet it is undermined by 
commuter self-government that, in practice, plays with and subverts the meaning of 
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mediated messages around specific strategies of responsibilization.  Gaps between 
envisioned policy outcomes, its mediation, and practice do not represent signs of policy 
failures however, as much as the very conditions of existence of the strategies and 
actors of neoliberalism and its technologies of government (Lemke, 2002, p. 9).  This 
really problematizes the mediated centre as a necessary feature of social organisation 
because while the mainstream media is certainly an important actor, it exists as part of 
the networks of other actors that figure in social organisation.  
 
Chapter 3 shows the complexity and contradiction that characterises the deployment of 
feelings.  This is illustrated in how the mediated policy context of the Donegal accident 
utilises instrumental rationalities, while simultaneously intensifying rationalities of 
feeling.  Commuters’ logics can mirror instrumental rationalities deployed in media 
representation about the Donegal accident, but their practices are actually entangled in a 
web of multiple rationalities.  Commuters’ active deployment of affective language 
contrasts with how ordinary citizens of Inishowen are represented as passive ciphers of 
policy strategies.  But commuter experiences that point to the profundity of how the car 
is implicated in social formation go further than a mere contrast between mediated 
representation and practice.  While the media generates stickiness and intensities that 
constitute the affective components of the dispositif of road safety, what is pointed out 
again is the complexity and range of social actors involved in the constitution of 
automobility in practice, and the role of the car in constituting a web of affective 
relationships.  The car-driver assemblage is implicated as a powerful actor that shapes 
the rationalisation of decisions, choices, and feelings that commuters express and make 
through the forms of social actions it facilitates.  Reflexive commuter rationalities 
circulate with the rationalities of policy contexts, and together they constitute the forms 
of sociality that emerge as the dispositif of road safety and the lived experience of 
automobility.  This insight undermines the “individualistic rational choice model” that 
is ubiquitous to the formation of solutions to the problems the car creates (Sheller, 2005, 
p. 222), speaks of the contradictions and tensions that exist between competing 
strategies of governance, and problematizes a media-centric view of the constitution of 
sociality.   
 
These tensions have also been explored in Chapter 4, which reveals more of the 
complexities and inconsistencies that inhere to governance as it is messily implemented.  
For example, the way in which the work imperative trumps the road safety imperative in 
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commuter reflections on their driving practices mirrors how the consensus about safety 
cameras articulated in mainstream mediation is predicated upon neoliberal 
considerations, rather than road safety per se.  This in turn mirrors the way in which the 
risk management strategies of commuters explored in Chapter 2 articulate the outcomes 
of road traffic accidents in terms of the consequences for insurance premiums, rather 
than the well-being of their victims.  What is suggested is the over-riding importance of 
the reproduction of a neoliberal status-quo over the welfare of the subjects it constitutes.   
 
The centrality of the media to the construction of social forms is also problematized in 
Chapter 4 in relation to the difference between concerns of mainstream media versus 
user-generated contributions to internet forums.  Online counter-conducts can disrupt 
the mediated consensus between powerful political and media actors about the 
introduction of speed cameras because the diversity of user-generated content provides 
new outlets for opinion and counter-conduct.  However, if this seems to suggest a 
decline in traditional print and broadcast media forms, that does not mean the same 
thing as a decline in media-centrism.  For Couldry (2012, p. 23) new forms of audience 
interactivity are not necessarily democratizing but instead facilitate (new) media 
institutions’ need to hold our attention by creating new ways “to speak for, and link 
audiences to, the mediated centre” and “provide media producers with key market 
information while intensifying audience identification with particular products”.  
Further research into the implications of user-generated content and social media (for 
example) to the acceptance of policy initiatives could expand upon the ways in which 
the dispositif of road safety is constituted by digital media forms in this fashion.   
 
As already argued, the concept of the dispositif enables reality to be cut a different way 
(Rabinow and Rose, 2003, p. xv), although punctuating moments – such as the Donegal 
accident – are required in order to usefully mould a potentially infinite range of actors 
and entities into a manageable research problem.  The dispositif brings a sense of 
coherence to what in other contexts could be considered disconnected realms of media 
and practices, allows actors to be traced across media forms, and interrogates the 
shaping influence of an expanded range of actors on social practices.  This can be 
applied in a variety of other contexts.  As already pointed out, road safety is only one 
antagonism of the car and others include the environmental harm, congestion, and the 
oil dependence that it causes (Bohm, et al., 2006).  Exploring the dispositif of 
environmental protection, for example, could provide new insights into the relationships 
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between environmental policy and the way such policies are implemented by industry 
or lived in practice in a variety of contexts.  For example, it would be interesting to 
research the recent VW emissions scandal in terms of the dispositif of discursive and 
non-discursive elements that led to such a monumental breakdown of corporate 
governance.  On a smaller and more local scale, I believe car-sharing strategies would 
benefit from further exploration of meanings attaching to the car that condition how the 
dispositif of environmental protection is mediated by a complex range of actors in 
Ireland and thus how successful these initiatives can be.  
  
An avenue of investigation that fell outside the scope of my research was interrogating 
how group and individual accounts of commuting play out in embodied practice.  This 
would involve the exploration of relationships between how people account for what 
they do and what they actually do (Laurier, et al., 2008): Participant observation of 
where commuting “gets done” in practice could elaborate meanings articulated in focus 
groups and identify new meanings in a very important setting of research – the car 
itself.  This could provide even more granular data on the complexity of actors and 
interactions that constitute the dispositif of road safety and the system of automobility.  
Of course, the concept of the dispositif does not need to be confined to applications 
about automobility.  The dispositif allows for the investigation of a full range of social 
problems in ways that can shed light upon the nature of the interrelationships between a 
wider conceptualisation of their constitutive elements and actors.   
 
As already noted, Couldry (2004, p. 8) states that the belief in mediated centres is a 
feature of Media Studies as a discipline, where “undue prominence” is given to the 
media in conceptualising these constituent actors and the elements of social forms.  In 
my thesis, exploring rituals in mainstream media that expressed this myth as well as 
practices that do not seem directly connected to media consumption per se has helped to 
avoid this charge.  This means that media representation has been placed in a wider 
context of an expanded range of mediating actors and this has drawn-out a more 
complex articulation of the dimensions of the media’s social role than the interrogation 
of practices related to the media alone could ever do.  Media-centrism is problematized 
across the thesis in how some media-promulgated discourses more readily chime with 
commuter experiences than others.  In Chapter 4, for example, commuters could discard 
certain aspects of road safety discourses when these came up against the imperative to 
competently negotiate day-to-day working lives.  This seems to point, in these particular 
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circumstances, to the backgrounding of the media as an important actor in the material 
constitution of automobility and of road safety.  But on the other hand, the way in which 
commuters adopt individual, entrepreneurial, or competitive behaviours that was 
identified across all the chapters of primary research aligns with how these neoliberal 
ideologies manifest in mainstream media representations.  Nevertheless, my analysis 
shows the complex ways commuters live their lives is not explained with exclusive 
reference to mediated discourses that espouse neoliberal tenets.  The point, again, is that 
the media is but one of many constituent components of the assemblage of car-drivers 
and complex networks of automobility in practice.  Any simplistic assessment of its 
symbolic power must be considered in light of that realisation, which underscores the 
way in which while “everything goes on as if” mediated centres are necessary, this is 
not logically required (Couldry, 2012, p. 22). 
 
Ironically, the idea that the media are central to social organisation creates a sense for 
policy initiatives such as the Road Safety Strategy that media roles require little further 
consideration.  But finding that mainstream media are but one aspect of the materiality 
and sociality of the car-driver assemblage and the dispositif of road safety shows that 
there are gaps in knowledge of how media shape public perceptions of policy in 
practice.  What my research indicates is that in order to bridge these gaps between the 
assumed role of the media and the constitution of social practices, it is necessary to 
contextualise the reception of mediated policy initiatives as part of a much larger 
framework of actors and entities that constitute social realities.  This becomes an 
analysis of how the car shapes what freedom is in lived experience, meets emotional 
needs, and operates as a vehicle in which forms of resistance can be performed.  But 
that could not be pre-supposed prior to research.  It is only by exploring this larger 
framework that a fuller understanding of the range and operations of actors which, in 
addition to the media, constitute automobility’s networks in practice draws nearer.  
While some actors are more powerful than others at different times and in different 
spaces, a range of actors shape and condition practices and in doing so both practices 
and actors are conditioned and change.  What is required is a better understanding of 
what people “do” with mediated policy initiatives, and this can only be properly 
assessed when “what else is going on” – what other actors and entities are constituting 
or mediating the practices that are the focus of policy – are expanded upon and 
understood.  In a road safety context, I believe this understanding would inevitably 
result in a fundamental shift away from the idea of personal responsibility as a key 
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motif, because this is predicated on the notion that cars and drivers are known quantities 
and entities, “black-boxes” that do not require further examination about how they are 
actually constituted.   
 
In fact, a shift away from personal responsibility is already in evidence, as was shown in 
McAndrews’ (2013) account of the way in which the Vision Zero strategy attempts to 
make road safety experts responsible for road safety.  Such a more systemic 
conceptualisation of road safety is centred on the transportation sector, not on 
consideration of the social and cultural factors that give the car-driver assemblage 
meaning on a day-to-day basis, however (McAndrews, 2013; Redshaw, 2008).  
Distributing causal responsibility for road accidents to experts appears relatively 
unproblematic in terms of the neoliberal strategic sensibilities explored in this thesis.  
But a general acknowledgment of the social and cultural factors that give rise to road 
traffic accidents may be more problematic for neoliberal governance predicated on the 
redistribution of social responsibilities through the media ultimately to individual 
citizens.  This is because such an acknowledgment has the potential to orient scrutiny 
towards the roles of neoliberal governmentality in the creation or reinforcement of 
social or systemic conditions that result in road traffic accidents in the first place.   
 
Indeed, what makes most sense of the themes of freedom, emotion, and counter-
conducts explored in this thesis are the exigencies of neoliberalism.  That commuters 
fight to retain the space to process the working day alone in their cars, for example, 
speaks of how advanced liberalism starts “as a norm to be implanted into citizens” but 
becomes “repossessed as a demand which citizens can make of authority” (Rose, 1993, 
p. 15).  The neoliberal sensibility underlies mainstream textual representations, aspects 
of online debate, and commuter practices.  The neoliberal life is what’s predominantly 
described and what best makes sense of the “work” of all these networks of practices 
taken together.  In combination, what is described is how automobility is comprised of 
“sites of complex processes of domination, resistance and also appropriation” that 
constitute power relations which are never fully settled (Foucault, 1976; Matereke, 
2013, p. 38).  And it is because, rather than in spite, of the way in which counter-
conducts, emotions, and freedoms are articulated that the status-quo prevails.  The 
reproduction of automobility occurs through practices associated with the car that work 
to continually inscribe the car-system and arguably make incrementally more difficult 
203 
 
the transformation of both contingent and predictable practices (Dean, 1999, p. 36) into 
something else.   
 
The question and urgency of the need for transformation (as noted by Dean, 1999) is not 
actually resolved here.  Urry (2005, p. 26) argues automobility “reorganises how people 
negotiate the opportunities for, and constraints upon, work, family life, childhood, 
leisure and pleasure”.  But in my review of literature, Wolf’s (1996) critique highlighted 
that the genesis of the reorganisation that automobility entails does not actually exist in 
living memory.  It is therefore only visible to the historian or academic for example and 
is not necessarily apparent to commuters themselves.  So people have actually not 
reorganised their lives around the car at all, they’ve organised their lives around it.  The 
car and its systems and infrastructure are already there.  All it takes is the necessary 
personal resources and investment for a commuter to utilise them.  Automobility thus 
presents as such an ubiquitous force that it is backgrounded and not imposing in a way 
you might expect an “extraordinarily powerful complex” and critical shaping actor to be 
(Urry, 2005, p. 26).  How the car insinuates, rather than imposes, itself into everyday 
lives underlines the power of its presence and shows the way automobility operates 
through the facilitation of “the general direction of travel in which social processes 
tend” (Gilbert, 2013, p. 19).  This facilitation is especially evident through commuters’ 
practices that articulate as “technologies of the self” (Lemke, 2002, p. 12), rather than 
solely as the threats of discipline such as speeding penalties.  Threats of discipline 
represent the reinforcement of a particular (neoliberal) vision of automobility, rather 
than encumbrance of the system of automobility per se.  
 
Harvey (2001, p. 201) argues that “we cannot see much further than the horizon broadly 
dictated by where we already are” and that in such argumentation, the hegemonic 
imposition of ways of viewing the world limits the ability to consider alternatives and 
“is always a central task for dominant institutions of power” (Harvey, 2001, p. 197).  
The way in which the required/desired action of the fact of commuting has been 
inculcated in commuters’ subjectivity as generally unproblematic (Stewart, 2001, pp. 
18-19) perhaps best illustrates how limited the construction of alternatives is.  But this 
thesis has emphasised how social relations are never fixed once and for all, as well as 
where they can appear to be so.  After all, the purpose in exploring resistance, for 
example, as argued by Dean (1999, p. 36) is: 
 
204 
 
to open the space in which to think about how it is possible to do things in a 
different fashion, to highlight the points at which resistance and contestation 
bring an urgency to their transformation, and even to demonstrate the degree to 
which that transformation may prove difficult. 
 
In other words, to make it possible to glimpse beyond the horizon that Harvey (2001, p. 
201) argued could not be meaningfully achieved.   
But attempting to open a space in which to think about how it is possible to do things in 
a different fashion may simply demonstrate the ways in which actions that reinforce the 
neoliberal status quo can be done “better”.  For example, for Laurier’s (2005, p. 263) 
car-workers, work done while driving was a norm, but the risks around it were:  
 
not rendered accountable to their institution:…there was surprising lack of 
deliberate planning by companies who did not yet treat the growing daily 
mobility of their personnel with the same precision as the long-standing logistics 
of their products.  
 
While Laurier might have seen this as a deficiency, technological advances in the area 
of autonomous cars could transform the accountability of that space.  Workers would no 
longer be also responsible for their own safe transport because they wouldn’t need to 
actually drive such a car, so there would be no reason for them not to “get on with” their 
work.  Some have conceptualised how the interior design of the car could be adopted in 
the context of autonomous cars and make the concept of a mobile living-space more of 
a literal reality (figure 11).  
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Figure 11:  Mercedes-Benz’s F015 concept: “‘Anyone who focuses solely on the 
technology has not yet grasped how autonomous driving will change our society,’ 
emphasises Dr Dieter Zetsche, Chairman of the Board of Management of Daimler AG 
and Head of Mercedes-Benz Cars. ‘The car is growing beyond its role as a mere means 
of transport and will ultimately become a mobile living space’” (Mercedes-Benz, 2015). 
 
 
There is no indication that the resulting spaces will be seen as a form of tyranny that 
further blurs the boundaries of the work day.  Given how much commuters’ subjectivity 
is inculcated with the exigencies of neoliberalism, such developments seem much more 
likely to be accepted as a shiny new horizon as the as-yet unknowable and unforeseen 
practices and contradictions these new spaces will generate are negotiated.  They will 
certainly facilitate new ways in which emotional relationships associated with the car 
can be performed, for example, as well as new forms of work enabled by the deletion of 
the requirement to drive that seem likely to be articulated as new freedoms.  It is hard to 
see research into these new scenarios and their negotiations finding that they disturb the 
exigencies of neoliberalism, not least because they derive from its industry.  Perhaps we 
are so invested in the system, so rushed and primed for accumulation as Harvey (2001, 
p. 201) might say, that it really is impossible to see beyond its horizon.  
 
These conclusions raise interesting implications for future Irish scholarship that 
underline how my research is entangled in broader international and interdisciplinary 
contexts.  That we are moving from the era or personal responsibility to shared 
responsibility for road safety goes hand-in-hand with the diminution of road safety as a 
social issue – at least in the richer countries of the world.  It is in association with the 
rise of new marketable technologies that can help prevent or mitigate road traffic 
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accidents that the usefulness of individual responsibility as cornerstone of road safety 
diminishes, and experts can conceivably take on causal responsibility for it 
(McAndrews, 2013).  Indeed, a crash-free future is inextricably linked to ever-
increasing autonomy in cars.  As computer systems increasingly step-in to mitigate the 
effects of, or avoid entirely, an imminent crash, the heavy crash structures of today’s 
cars will become increasingly unnecessary.  The car of the future may behave like a fish, 
never crashing into other objects in its surroundings.  Cars can become ever lighter, and 
as a result, more fuel efficient, and much less polluting.  As road traffic accidents 
become engineered out of existence, the need for mediated policy around road safety, 
and the drive towards responsibilization, becomes less pressing in this context.  This is 
not to suggest the concept of responsibilization will go away: the attention of 
governmentalization structures of discipline and self-responsibilization will turn 
elsewhere.  It is up to us as researchers across disciplines to explore the nature of 
governmentality that emerges in a range of new and heterogeneous contexts.    
 
Indeed, while there are gaps in our knowledge of public perception of policy initiatives 
and roll of the media in shaping these perceptions, there are also gaps in knowledge in 
how government and the media themselves understand the role of the media and how it 
works.  For my project, addressing these gaps has meant a focus on how policy is 
implemented in lived experience, problematizing the idea that what the car means to 
people is already known and fully understood.  In other words, I have sought to connect 
people to the analysis.  The study of subjective experience interrogates the conditions of 
existence of automobility and policy about the car.  This is really important because 
examining these conditions represents how we connect people and their experiences to 
policy and its analysis.  Where I have found the lived reality of policy initiatives imbued 
with unintended outcomes for example, one logical conclusion must be that such 
outcomes are likely to exist across many different contexts.  So the idea of connecting 
people to the analysis does not need to confine itself to my mediated policy context.  I 
would say to future researchers that if we do not explore the direct experience or 
phenomenology of policy, we will never gain a fuller understanding of the range of 
actors involved in how that context is lived; never understand the particularity of 
unintended consequences to the context under investigation, nor will we be able to feed 
such knowledge back into the formation of better policies – as well as better mediated 
programmes designed for their implementation.  Future media scholarship should 
investigate more of this subjective experience.  This, in turn, will open up further 
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research problems to be explored based on the findings of such research and make for 
an innovative form of the study of media that has more relevant and practicable 
applications to better policy formation. It will also lead to better understandings of the 
media and the constitution of social forms – understandings that can never be accused 
of media-centrism.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Basic demographic indicators of focus group participants 
 
Focus group 1:  Five participants:  Pilot group of extended family members.  
Name:  Gender: Age: Occupation: 
Pauline   F  39 Public Sector Operations Manager 
Barry    M  50 Senior Banking Executive 
Fiona   F  51 Professional Development Trainer 
Don    M  54 Secondary School Teacher 
Brid    F  52 Primary School Teacher 
 
Focus group 2:  Four participants:  Friends of the researcher. 
Name:  Gender: Age: Occupation: 
Brian  M  47 IT Personnel Manager 
Chris  M  40 Journalist 
Geraldine F  30 Recruitment Consultant 
Beth  F  39 Pharmaceuticals Training Manager 
 
Focus group 3:  Three participants:  Mature students of Maynooth University.   
Name:  Gender: Age: Occupation: 
Gary  M  53 Student 
Caitriona F  55 Student 
Emer  F  48 Student 
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Focus group 4: Three participants:  Employees of a large local multi-national computer 
company. 
Name:  Gender: Age: Occupation: 
Michelle F  47 Human Resources Consultant 
Graham M  39 Project Manager 
David  M  39 Human Resources – Compensation and Benefits 
 
Focus group 5:  Four participants:  Students of Maynooth University. 
Name:  Gender: Age: Occupation: 
Gerard  M  42 Student 
Dermot M  27 Student 
Evelyn  F  39 Student 
Jane  F  18 Student 
  
Focus group 6:  Six participants:  Employees of a Dublin city-centre multi-national 
banking organisation. 
Name:  Gender: Age: Occupation: 
Lisa  F  60 Bank Administration 
Una  F  52 Banking Manager 
Margaret F  54 Bank Official 
Kevin  M  32 Banking Manager 
Declan  M  44 Banker 
Brendan M  54 Manager 
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Focus group 7: Two participants:  Students of Ballyfermot College of Further Education 
(BCFE). 
Name:  Gender: Age: Occupation: 
Caroline F  37 Student / Part-time Teacher – Adult Education 
Tony  M  24 Student 
 
Focus group 8: Four participants:  Students of BCFE. 
Name:  Gender: Age: Occupation: 
Therese F  39 Student 
Anne  F  21 Student 
Susan  F  33 Student 
Colm  M  23 Student / Part-time Sales Person – Retail 
 
Focus group 9:  Two participants:  Students of BCFE. 
Claire  F  24 Student 
Sara  F  23 Student / Part-time Radio Producer 
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Appendix B: Sample participant information sheet, consent forms and 
background questionnaire for focus group participation 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research, which is based in the Centre for 
Media Studies at NUI Maynooth.  The study will include a variety of people from 
different circumstances who commute to work by driving.  Your contribution is very 
important to the project and your commitment is highly valued.  This information sheet 
explains the nature of the study and what we will be asking you to do.  It also explains 
how the data you provide us with will be used. 
 
About the research 
 
The purpose of the study is to investigate the social meanings attributed to the car and 
car commuting by the participants in the study.  These meanings are your own 
understandings and knowledge that you associate with your commute by car.  The study 
will investigate the gaps between these meanings and the way in which the car is 
understood in government policy.  It will help in the development of a broader 
understanding of the role of the car in peoples’ lives in Ireland and the formulation of 
better government policy in this area.   
 
Your data, which will be anonymised in order to protect your privacy, will form part of 
the primary research for a PhD thesis based on the research.  This data may also be used 
in a subsequent publication (e.g. a book or academic paper) based on the research 
subject to the confidentiality provisions agreed below. 
 
The purpose of the focus group is to explore your thoughts and feelings about 
commuting.  The session will last approximately 90 minutes and involve up to ten 
people.  You will only be asked to participate in one group session.  You are asked to 
fill out the brief background information questionnaire before the session starts (see 
separate sheet).  The session will be recorded. 
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About your participation 
 
Your participation in any section of the research is entirely voluntary and you may 
withdraw your data at any time up until the work is published without giving a 
reason and without obligation.  You do not have to answer any questions you do not 
wish to, at any stage of the research. You can withdraw from the research during a 
session by simply indicating your desire to withdraw to the researcher.  In addition, 
during a research session you can request that recording is stopped and you can request 
to have sections of tapes erased.  You can withdraw your participation after a research 
session by contacting the researcher (Patrick Boyle) or one of his supervisors.  Contact 
details are provided below.  If during your participation in this study you feel the 
information and guidelines that you were given have been neglected or discarded in any 
way or if you are unhappy about the process please contact the Secretary of the National 
University of Ireland Maynooth Ethics Committee at researchethics@nuim.ie; tel. 353 
(0) 1 7086019, or the researcher’s supervisors: 
 
Dr. Kylie Jarrett ; Dr. Gavan Titley.   
The Centre for Media Studies 
NUI Maynooth: (01) 708 3624.   
Please be assured that your concerns will be dealt with in a sensitive manner.  
 
Principal Investigator:  
Patrick Boyle  
Centre for Media Studies 
NUIM Maynooth Arts Building 
National University of Ireland 
Maynooth,  
Co. Kildare  
(01) 708 3624 
Email:  PATRICK.BOYLE.2010@nuim.ie   
 
Having read this information sheet please read and sign the consent form. 
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Consent form: Focus Group 
 
Project working title:  Routine Journeys, Unique Meanings:  Mediated policy contexts 
and experience of automobility in everyday Ireland. 
 
Principal Investigator:  
Patrick Boyle  
Centre for Media Studies 
NUIM Maynooth Arts Building 
National University of Ireland 
Maynooth,  
Co. Kildare  
 
Centre for Media Studies Office: (01) 708 3624 
 
Email:  PATRICK.BOYLE.2010@nuim.ie   
 
The supervisors of this research are Dr. Kylie Jarrett and Dr. Gavan Titley.  They can 
also be contacted through the Centre for Media Studies office at (01) 708 3624.   
 
Material gathered during this research will be treated as confidential and securely stored 
in a locked cabinet at NUI Maynooth for a period of 5 years from the date of first 
publication.  You have the right to access your transcripts at any time (this comprises 
media files and electronic text transcripts of your focus group sessions, as applicable). 
 
Please answer each statement below concerning the collection of the research data 
 
I have read and understood the information sheet. YES  NO 
 
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions  
about the research. YES  NO 
 
I have had my questions answered satisfactorily.  YES  NO 
I understand I can withdraw from the research at  
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any time without having to give an explanation. YES  NO 
 
I agree to the recording of my participation  
and for the contents to be used for research purposes. YES  NO 
 
Below are sets of statements about how you wish your participation to be used.  Please 
answer each statement. 
 
I agree to my data being used for  
subsequent publications related to the research. YES NO 
 
I agree to my data being made available for discussion  
with other bona fide researchers.  YES NO 
 
I would like my name acknowledged in the report  
(without linking it to content or quotation). YES NO 
 
 
Name: (Printed) ________________________________________________________ 
 
Signature________________________________________________Date_________ 
 
Your contribution is very valuable.  Please feel free to contact the researcher or the 
supervisors if you have any questions. 
 
Please note that focus group participation does not constitute any kind of counselling or 
medical treatment. If during your participation in this study you feel the information and 
guidelines that you were given have been neglected or discarded in any way or if you are 
unhappy about the process, please contact the Secretary of the National University of Ireland 
Maynooth Ethics Committee at researchethics@nuim.ie or 353 (0)1 7086019.  Please be 
assured that your concerns will be dealt with in a sensitive manner.   
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Participants are asked to fill out the following background questionnaire before the 
focus group commences.   
 
Name  
 
Address 
 
Contact Phone Number 
 
Gender 
 
Age 
 
Occupation 
 
Car driver (Make / Model / Year) 
 
How often do you commute by car each week? 
 
What is the typical duration of your commute?  (time and distance) 
 
When I commute I travel from ______________________ to   __________________ 
 
Who do you typically travel with on this journey? (Please state whether you travel alone 
or typically with family, friends, colleagues as appropriate and the typical number of 
occupants in the car.) 
  
216 
 
Appendix C: Sample topic guide/interview schedule for focus groups 
 
Participants to be shown video, for example of a road rage incident or road safety 
advertisement. 
 
Questioning/ prompting and discussion will then respond to this video: 
 
In relation to the video clip: 
• Have you ever experienced this kind of driving? 
• What did you do when it happened? 
• How do you react in situations like this? 
 
In relation to general commuting practice:  
  
What do you think makes a person a good driver? 
 
What makes you a good driver? 
 
What’s the most frustrating or pleasurable thing about driving? 
 
Is your car important to you?  Why? What does the car mean to you? 
 
Why do you use your car to commute? How would you cope without it? 
 
Do you ever use public transport? 
 
How do you feel about road safety campaigns? 
 
Tell me about your daily commute…   
 
What do you see inside or outside of the car? 
 
What do you think about? 
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Who else do you travel with? 
 
If you travel with others, what might you talk about? 
 
What else do you do while you drive (e.g. eating, talking on phone, radio)?  
 
What do you listen to? 
 
Imagine you had no car.  Can you tell me what your commute would involve?  
 
Do you enjoy or look forward to your commute?  
 
What would you like to drive instead of your current car? 
 
What might upset you if it occurred on your journey (e.g. delays, congestion, bad 
driving)? 
 
How do you react in such circumstances?  
 
Do you always drive straight to/ home from work or do you do other things? 
 
When you think about how cars are represented in media, what sorts of words or images 
come to mind? 
 
Can you elaborate on these? 
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